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'Negative Dynamics' Seen in Middle East Situation

LD2906105190 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—The situation in the Middle East is causing growing concern in the Soviet Union, a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry told TASS.

In view of the lack of positive changes in the Middle East peace process, the situation in the region is acquiring distinctly negative dynamics, he said.

"Peace efforts are being blocked and the influence of militant and fundamentalist forces is growing. The arms race and the proliferation of missile, chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction are continuing, which could have disastrous consequences in the event of a new military flare-up in the area.

"In the light of this it is necessary to use all possibilities to remove the causes of the periodic aggravation of the situation and to launch a peace process oriented towards a comprehensive Arab- Israeli settlement, with the convocation of an international conference for the purpose," the spokesman said.

The Soviet Union's multi-faceted approach to the establishment of the peace process in the Middle East is as follows:

"We proceed from the importance of activating various channels and mechanisms, including the peace-making potential of the United Nations, which would help find compromise solutions in the region.

"We believe that it would be useful to begin unofficial consultations on a Middle East settlement among the five permanent members of the U.S. Security Council without delay and agree that the UN secretary-general should appoint his special representative for the Middle East.

"The explosive situation in the Middle East, which still remains unaffected by positive changes taking place in other regions of the world, calls for all the sides concerned as well as the United States and West Europe to show the necessary political will and energetically to join collective efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict," the Soviet Foreign Minstry spokesman added.

"For our part," he said, "we are prepared to constructively cooperate with everyone in the interests of a comprehensive Arab- Israeli settlement and a fair solution to the Palestinian problem."

Tasks of Upcoming NATO Summit Reviewed

LD2906175690 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told a White House news briefing on Thursday that a NATO strategy review would top the agenda of the alliance's summit in London next week. He said the issue would be dealt with with regard for both rapid changes in Europe and the bloc's persisting objectives.

The fundamentally new situation in the continent, which is forcing NATO to update its military and political guidelines, is a result of the Soviet Union's unilateral measures to scale down military confrontation in Europe, the Warsaw Pact's insistence that blocs are an outdated way to achieving security, and the decision to create new political structures to maintain equilibrium and stability in the continent.

What does the U.S. Administration think should be the correlation between NATO's practical measures to ensure security in Europe on the basis of the new principles and its old ways and means to project its persisting objectives?

Speaking in an interview with a group of West European and Japanese reporters, the text of which was released on Thursday, President George Bush declared Washington's readiness to join the nonaggression commitment to Warsaw Treaty countries. He said the issue could be discussed at the NATO summit in London.

Should NATO decide to assume the obligation, this would certainly be an encouraging step in the right direction.

It followed from Baker's briefing, however, that of its former ways and means of achieving the bloc's old goals, the White House intends to keep the first use of nuclear weapons concept intact.

According to the secretary of state, NATO's "flexible response" policy, which provides for dealing a first nuclear strike and the escalating the use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict, may be discussed at the summit, although he didn't see real chances for any changes in it.

So NATO's "flexible response" policy will apparently stay as it is.

The supreme allied commander in Europe, American General John Galvin, recently predicted that the bloc's "forward defence" line in Europe would move further east after German reunification.

This means that he plans to take advantage of changes in Europe for NATO to reap unilateral military benefits. Galvin also went on record for united Germany to allow new air-launched nuclear weapons to be deployed on its territory to "compensate" for the elimination of U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles under the INF Treaty.

These remarks prompt the conclusion that despite the dramatically changed situation, the Americans still

intend to bank on strength in Europe and that U.S. political initiatives for greater security in the continent still play a secondary role.

East German Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere rcently urged NATO to abandon its strategy of deterrence, noting aptly that "general statements about NATO's good intentions are not enough for the Soviet Union."

One would like to hope that the forthcoming NATO summit will work out a really adequate answer to Soviet and Warsaw Pact measures to bring down military confrontation in Europe.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Future of Europe

LD0107213990 Moscow TASS in English 2121 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS—The Bulgarian POGLED weekly published in its latest issue Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's replies to questions from its correspondent. Follows the full text of the interview.

Question: How would you describe the situation emerging in Europe in the process of German unification?

Answer: The process of German unification has undoubtedly added new colours to the already bright palette of changes on the European continent.

As a result we have a geopolitical picture of rare dynamism. Fortunately, the German people's striving for unification materialised just as confrontational psychology is being overcome in world politics.

The Helsinki process did a good turn by demonstrating again its multifaceted potential. The advance towards the unification of the two German states would look completely different if disarmament were not so organically blended with the fabric of international life.

I mean primarily the preliminary work accomplished at the Vienna talks on conventional arms and firm commitment of European states to facilitating the rapid completion of the first stage of talks and their intention to go over without delay to tackling still more ambitious tasks of reducing the military burden.

Generally speaking, the "environment" for the building of German unity turned out to be resilient enough to absorb this system shock.

Moreover, today's situation in Europe is such that German unification, if related problems are correctly resolved, is capable of becoming a powerful catalyst of positive tendencies.

It is not accidental that the problems of institutionalizing the CSCE process and radically transforming military-political alliances and relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been reformulated on a practical plane.

A united Germany, with its ramified links with the west and the east of Europe, can become a pillar of a common European home. All European nations, not least Germans themselves, stand to gain from this.

Another, hope-inspiring peculiarity of the present situation on the continent is, in my view, Europe's intellectual readiness for the transition. Politicians of different countries have voiced many interesting ideas concerning the organisation of a new Europe. Taking into account these proposals, we formulated our vision of future European structures, of which I would like to tell you.

The nucleus of such structures could be formed by the Council of Greater Europe—a forum of the top leaders of CSCE member-countries. The council could meet, in the capitals of member countries alternatively, not less than once every two years, to consider principal problems of European politics and work out, on the basis of a consensus, principled decisions and specific solutions.

A committee of foreign ministers, convened, as a rule, twice a year, could become the body responsible for the implementation of these decisions. Systematic work of this body would serve to prepare significant decisions of summit meetings.

Other ministers—of economics, justice, culture and so on—could also meet within this framework.

"Troikas" of the former, present and future chairmen, could be formed at these two levels. They would have a mandate to conduct urgent consultations, whenever necessary, to organise colletive actions in emergencies.

There is a need to form a small permanent secretariat of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which would ensure exchange of information, prepare major functions, etc. It would have the minimum number of experts and staff.

A consultative mechanism consisting of ambasadors from 35 countries, or 36 countries, if, as we hope, Albania joins the CSCE process, could also work in the capital where the CSCE permanent secretariat is based.

Structures to ensure stability in the military-political sphere could be an important part of new European structures. As it has already been suggested, there could be two such structures.

One of them could serve as a centre for the exchange of information and notification of troop movements and exercises, registration and coordination of inspections and other checks.

The other would analyse complex situations, prevent conflicts or help settle them under the principle of mediation or good offices.

We believe the competence of these structures should widen with time, bringing closer the creation of a security council for Europe.

The setting up of institutes which would effectively advance us towards the creation of legal, ecological and humanitarian zones in Europe deserves to be considered separately.

At present there are ideas to set up some structures that would monitor the establishment of democratic norms in political systems. Free elections, a multi-party system, political pluralism and human rights in a broad sense are meant. We believe that this is needed and we shall go along with reasonable proposals to this effect.

I believe that the effective practice of holding review conferences of the CSCE, such as the Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna conferences, should be preserved.

As you may have noticed, I made a reservation when speaking about a positive role of Germany's unification in the creation of new Europe. This role is possible if the questions related to German unification are resolved correctly.

"External aspects of German unity," which are dealt with by the "two plus four" mechanism, are meant. A line should be drawn under the Second World War in such a way that no one should feel his rights infringed or that he is now less secure then earlier.

I believe that, however, complex this task, the "Six" can cope with it.

I am pleased with the results of the first two meetings of the "Six," in Bonn and in Berlin, and with the nature of contacts I had on this subject with the foreign ministers, partners in the "Six."

I believe my colleagues will not object if I say that we shall exert every effort to be able to report on the successfully accomplished work to the peoples of Europe, the United States and Canada at the CSCE summit at the end of this year.

Question: What is the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation?

Answer: The purpose of and prospects for the Warsaw Treaty are set out in the treaty. It is recorded in its preamble and Article 11 that, on the one hand, the member-countries strive to create a collective security system in Europe and, on the other, are prepared to disband their alliance if the system is formed in Europe and registered by a treaty. The question is, essentially, whether the Warsaw Treaty countries are able to achieve these goals and in what timeframe.

The conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow showed that leaders of allied countries are aware of the Warsaw Treaty's inseparable involvement in the processes now taking place in Europe, above all in the context of building fundamentally new structures of security and cooperation for the whole of Europe.

In a complex period of transition to such structures, the Warsaw Treaty is, undoubtedly, one of the gurarantors of positive developments in Europe.

At the same time, it should be said that all the participants in the alliance, including, naturally, the Soviet Union, are aware that the Warsaw Treaty should be radically reformed in accordance with transformations that have swept the allied countries and the whole of Europe, and that they themselves should aim at the politisation of their structures and methods of cooperation.

Truly democratic relations should be established in the alliance. A road should be open to pluralism of opinions so that it should function in a mode natural for an organisation of sovereign equal partners, the more so as we are all united by the striving to overcome the split in Europe, to ensure its reliable security, guaranteeing it against relapses to the cold war, and to establish broad cooperation on all aspects of the European process.

At the Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee it was decided to form a commission of government representatives and to instruct it to draft by the end of October 1990 recommendations on the reform of the Warsaw Treaty.

So far I would not like to be more specific about the potentialities which the Soviet side will submit to the commission, for the simple reason that they are still being drafted.

But our approach to the Warsaw Treaty is based on a conviction that the alliance has far from exhausted its proposals. Precisely now, in new conditions, it is capable of playing a constructive role to provide political guarantees for a smooth, crisis-free transition to a new system of European security and cooperation.

Does the Warsaw Treaty accord with the national interests of its member-countries? Or—if we dot all the i's how do we assess statements by some Warsaw Treaty members about their possible withdrawal from the alliance? It goes without saying that this is a sovereign right of every Warsaw Treaty member. However, I believe, withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty would considerably limit the ability of the state which takes this step, and diminish its political influence.

It would deprive them of an opportunity to state their point of view, and be heard, on such key issues as arms talks, new relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and ways to overcome the rift in Europe. It is all the more imprudent to abandon assets connected with Warsaw Treaty membership, since it attaches no additional strings to a member-state's foreign policy.

Decisions taken by the Political Consultative Committee at its Moscow meeting to reform the Warsaw Treaty into a primarily political organisation have shaped a completely new situation in Europe, which is very different from the one that existed just one month ago, to say

nothing of earlier periods. There is a real chance for both alliances to shift to constructive, parallel and joint actions to build a new European peace order.

What concrete steps should be taken? The Warsaw Treaty presented its point of view in Moscow, reasserting its readiness to cooperate with the North Atlantic alliance, its members, neutral and non-aligned states in order to promote European stability, disarmament and trust, all advancing the principle of defence sufficiency.

Much is now being said about NATO's intent to respond in kind at the London summit. However, some say that NATO will not be able to give up the old strategy of quick response and nuclear deterrence, and that changes in the alliance will not be as deep and quick as is expected from the Warsaw Treaty. I want to say bluntly—there can be no partial trust, as there can be no partial security. It's either hostility, suspicion and confrontation, or cooperation, openness and partnership. If there is a need for a transition period, then it should be based on mutual trust and predictability, and not on residual confrontation.

During recent meetings in Berlin with foreign ministers from the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany, I have realised that NATO is well aware that it is facing a principled and crucial choice. I hope it will be the right choice.

United States & Canada

Shevardnadze Addresses U.S. Historians 28 Jun

PM0107130590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Discussion With Historians"]

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze received 28 June a group of prominent Soviet and U.S. historians and political scientists participating in the Soviet-U.S. seminar on the roots of the "cold war" and the surmounting of its legacy in world politics.

Welcoming the academics, E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that the work to provide an objective, scientific analysis of the lessons of the past is particularly important at the current crucial stage when politicians have to make principled decisions which are laying the foundations for the future and touch on the vital interests of all peoples. This applies not least to the leaders of the USSR and the United States, who are switching relations between our countries away from confrontation and toward collaboration and partnership. The end of the cold war, the minister stressed, is a supreme gain of our generation. Answering a question from his interlocutors about the main tasks for Soviet-U.S. relations following the Washington summit, E.A. Shevardnadze pointed out that the need to put an end to the arms race determines the continuing and perhaps growing priority of disarmament problems. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the United States must be bolder in developing bilateral relations in all spheres.

The participants in the Soviet-U.S. seminar, talking about the results of their discussions, expressed satisfaction with the fact that the scientific world, like politics, is switching from confrontation to deeper mutual understanding and cooperation.

Bush Interviewed on Perestroyka, Western Aid

LD3006171190 Moscow TASS in English 1642 GMT 30 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Borisenko and Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington June 30 TASS—U.S. President George Bush was interviewed by a group of West European and Japanese correspondents on the eve of next week's NATO summit and the forthcoming Houston meeting of the leaders of seven industrially developed Western countries.

Bush touched upon a wide range of matters concerning East-West relationships, the situation in Europe and German reunification as well as administration positions on perestroyka and on Western economic aid to the USSR.

He was asked the question: "Mr. President, the idea has been proposed by the non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Do you envision that as a concrete possibility?"

The President, having said "I don't know that you need a treaty per se", pointed out that there were ways to ensure that the Warsaw Treaty and a restructured NATO would not pose any threat to each other.

In this connection he did not rule out the possibility of "some declaration" or some other document in which each side would make non-attack pledges.

"The Warsaw Treaty is in a state of change, and that's good. We should encourage that," he said. At the same time he emphasised that he wanted to stop short of saying that "we need a form of treaty between these two bodies as they exist today".

The President then voiced hope that all the sides concerned—both in the East and West—would agree with the concept of "a unified Germany fully integrated into NATO".

At the same time he voiced the idea that as time goes by political, not military, functions will prevail in NATO. He said the best way for the United States to participate in building a stable Europe and the best guarantee against unpredictability and instability was to adhere to the concept of a modified but still strong NATO.

Bush then voiced hope that an important agreement on conventional force reductions in Europe would be signed at a summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the end of this year.

He said the CSCE plays a useful role in the dialogue and removal of some problems that inevitably arise "as we watch all this democratic process."

Bush said he believes that the primary aim for both the U.S. and other NATO leaders was to help convince Gorbachev that he should not feel concern over full NATO membership for a reunited Germany.

In his view, such a way of putting things leaves ample opportunity to discuss force levels and the question where they should be deployed.

The U.S. President was asked how extensive a review of doctrine of the ideas of "forward defence" and "flexible response" would be discussed at NATO summit in London and how this squared with the President's position about a gradual advance to a political role for NATO.

In response, Bush said that he did not expect "any bombshells" as a result of the discussion. "As troops are removed from Europe or as you have arms control agreements that affect force levels, obviously, you want to change your military doctrine. So we'll go forward on those", he said.

"Still, though having recognised that we are living in a world with unpredictability and to some degree instability, and thus we think that there needs to remain a defensive alliance," Bush added.

The President was asked questions in view of calls by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand to try to modernise financial aid to the Soviet Union and whether the United States would join these efforts.

He said he did not think the question of funds and economic support for the Soviet Union should be considered within the context of whether to support Gorbachev or not. This question should be decided by the Soviet Union itself.

"Chancellor Kohl has expressed an interest in this (aid to the Soviet Union). Others have expressed an interest. We've already taken some steps and Europe has taken some steps, too, through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development," Bush said.

"However, we've got some problems here in terms of money for the Soviet Union," he said. "In the first place, there are some legal problems. And secondly, there are political problems out there that cannot permit generous funding to go forward until they are solved."

Among one of these political problems Bush mentioned Soviet aid to Cuba. "If you want to save five billion, there is a good way to start," he said.

"Indeed, I ought to give credit to President Gorbachev, because we can discuss it very openly with him with no rancor," Bush said. "I am anxious to talk at the economic summit about this question because I think it is on the minds of others.

"We do want to try to assist this Soviet reform and we are very interested in the steps that Mr. Gorbachev has taken, and to encourage—we'd love to see those encouraged by all of us."

U.S. Trade Agreement, Market Economy Viewed

LD0107122590 Moscow TASS in English 1116 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ernest Obminskiy comments in today's IZVESTIYA on the Soviet-U.S. trade agreement signed during President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

Obminskiy described the agreement as a "fundamentally new type of a bilateral trade agreement" and said that, during the drafting of the agreement, "the negotiations were being built on the prospect of the Soviet economy's transition to market relations".

He said the trade agreement "is creating a basic infrastructure for economic cooperation on market conditions and with the use of mutual and unconditional rights stemming from the most favoured nation status.

"For us, it is also the first step towards the future full-fledged participation in GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)."

"To all appearances, the U.S. Administration was aware of the scope and depth of the changes, with which the Soviet Union approached the summit," the deputy minister continued.

"We made no secret of the fact that the destiny of the trade agreement was closely linked with other agreements that were ready for signing—on grain, sea navigation and air communication.

"Only the combination of all these agreements could mark a starting-point in the departure from the utter politisation of economic cooperation without any detriment to the national interests of either country," Obminskiy said.

Planned Cuts in U.S. Defense Called 'Meagre'

LD0107121790 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 30 Jun 90

["Moscow Viewpoint" by Valentin Zorin—read by announcer]

[Text] The U.S. defense secretary, he writes, has this week submitted his own plan for Armed Forces reduction providing for a 10-percent cut in defense spending, spread over the next five years. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's plan is disappointing given a meagre amount of proposed cuts, just two percent a year, and its starting point for reckoning. The question is not of actual reductions in defense spending but an attempt to try and bring down the all time high figures of $1.6 trillion, which the previous administration planned to spend over the next five years. The enormous figure was suggested at a time when the world was different to what it is now. But the Defense Department's insistence to continue reckoning in trillions gives rise to doubts.

It would seem everyone realizes that the dangerous and ever-increasing East-West confrontation of the past has given way to normalization and even partnership in superpower relations in an effort to resolve mankind's most crying issues. President Bush has spoken along similar lines during the recent superpower summit in Washington, by wording the task facing the two countries as a desire to shift from restraining each other to building a new world, with the cold war and related conflicts left in the past.

The President's pronouncement seems highly significant. What he has implied is not a mere abandoning of confrontation, which he calls deterrence. More importantly, he spelled out support for partnership if a new

world he called for is to be built. The President's statement is clearly a show of new political thinking and a desire to drop the old stereotypes, given that in the past defense spendings and armories were almost the main material expression of superpower relations. But if the old stereotypes are passed, there is no coherent logic to explain why the defense secretary's new plan provides for $1.5 trillion five-year defense budget with an aim of developing new types of deadly weapons.

In the meantime, efforts must be made to dispel whatever suspicion or misunderstanding remains. Mutual understanding is (?easily) the main trend in international affairs today, which no doubt lies in seeking new approaches as well as rapprochement and cooperation between all countries and nations.

In a recent interview in Washington, a prominent U.S. politician Dr. Henry Kissinger, spoke of the detente of the 1970's (?overstripping) its time. In his view, now was the time to carry through a shift from cold war years to wide-ranging East-West cooperation, which seems a highly accurate observation. Any major political move is now gauged by whether or not it is in line with building a new era in international relations. In this sense Mr. Cheney's plans seems to be falling a bit out of step.

Laptev Confers With State Department's Schifter

PM3006190190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] The practical potential of Soviet-U.S. parliamentary cooperation was discussed during talks in Moscow 29 June between I.D. Laptev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union, and R. Schifter, U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs.

The interlocutors exchanged opinions on a wide range of problems relating to the international situation and our country's domestic development. They also discussed the division of powers between the soviets and the party, and the progress of the process of transforming Soviet society. Profound analysis of the current disposition of political forces nonetheless attests to a consolidation of reformers, I.D. Laptev stressed. The situation remains under control and we will not permit any deformation of the course of transformation, the chairman of the chamber noted.

R. Schifter shared his ideas about the U.S. experience of local self-government and the role of the press in shaping public opinion. Certain aspects of disarmament were discussed.

Dwelling on the economic aspects of perestroyka, I.D. Laptev noted that in the transitional period to a market economy our country is expecting a difficult time. And it is not ruled out that at this stage we will need not just sympathy but support from our foreign policy partners.

China

CPC Greets 28th CPSU Congress Opening

LD0207100690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0812 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Report by correspondent Vyacheslav Tomlin]

[Text] Beijing, 2 Jul (TASS)—The communists of China sent heartfelt congratulations today to communists and the entire Soviet people in connection with the convocation of the 28th CPSU Congress.

The text of the CPC Central Committee message to the congress, which has just been distributed by the XINHUA agency, expresses satisfaction at deepening understanding, friendship, and many-sided bilateral cooperation since the normalization of Chinese-Soviet interstate and interparty relations, which were begun in the 1989 summit meeting. This process, the document notes, does not only correspond to the fundamental interests of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union but also favors the preservation of peace and stability throughout the world in the name of humanity's progress.

The CPC Central Committee expressed confidence in the further strengthening and development of relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and parties on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

The Chinese communists, the message goes on to say, are attentively following the complicated construction and reform which the CPSU has begun. We wish with all our hearts that by means of joint efforts you will be able to overcome all difficulties and obstacles, containing your advance along the path of socialism, the document stresses.

CPC's Founding Anniversary Commemorated

OW0207020490 Mosocw International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] China commemorates the 69th founding anniversary of the CPC today. A meeting of activists from central state and party organs was held in Beijing. Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Premier Li Peng addressed the meeting.

Jiang Zemin said: We firmly believe that socialism is bound to triumph. Certain phenomena in the development of socialist countries should not be considered as accidental. They are dictated by the law of history. The CPC leader called on party members not to flinch from difficulty.

Li Peng said in his speech that it is necessary to smoothly overcome the difficulties encountered in the socialist

modernization drive so as to create a precondition for CPC unification. [sentence as heard]

Record-High Increase in Trade With China Noted

LD0107171790 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] A spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of External Economic Ties has said that trade turnover between the Soviet Union and China has approached two-and-a-half billion rubles, a record high in the history of bilateral relations. Various forms of bilateral cooperation have been expanding. For instance, the Soviet Union has been providing equipment for modernization and building new industrial facilities, more than 30 of them in the key branches of the Chinese economy. Joint ventures have been opening and industrial cooperation is gaining strength.

PRC Experts Discuss Border Issues, Relations

PM0207095590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Commentary by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Savenkov: "Border Breathing New Air; Soviet-Chinese Meeting of Experts"]

[Text] Beijing—A meeting of a Soviet-Chinese group of diplomatic and military experts, who discussed questions concerning Armed Forces reductions and measures to strengthen trust in the military sphere in the Soviet-Chinese border region, has just come to a close in Beijing.

They say in China: "Without descending into the abyss, you cannot learn the thickness of the earth." The bad times have disappeared without a trace. Both countries have finally realized the total absurdity of the state of alienation which in the sixties replaced the friendship and cooperation of the fifties. At that time both sides wanted to have a monopoly on the truth. Gradually the ideological polemics led to tension on the border and intensive border patrols, and this was followed by armed clashes and bloodshed.

Reason slowly worked its way through the ideological shroud and, finally, the political wisdom of the Soviet and Chinese leaders made it possible to begin a fundamentally new stage in our relations: the stage of cooperation and good-neighborliness. The joint Soviet-Chinese communique issued after the historic summit meeting in Beijing is the political foundation of bilateral relations. In particular, it proclaimed the sides' mutual agreement to take measures to reduce Armed Forces in the Soviet-Chinese border region to a minimum level appropriate to normal, good-neighborly relations. It is also hard to overestimate the significance of the intergovernmental Agreement on the Guiding Principles of Mutual Armed Forces Reductions and Confidence Building in the Military Sphere in the Soviet-Chinese Border Region, signed during the April visit to Moscow by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council. After all, we are talking about the longest border in the world: 7,500 km.

How does G.V. Kireyev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Socialist Countries of Asia Administration and head of the Soviet group of experts, view the latest round of talks in Beijing?

"This is not our first meeting," G.V. Kireyev said. "The experts met several times while the agreement was being drafted. We have now reached the stage of putting it into effect. In Beijing we reached agreement on organizational and procedural matters concerning the talks that will begin this fall in Moscow. Their essence is to give real substance to the principles reached by the foreign ministers who signed the agreement.

"It is hard to say how the talks will turn out, but we look to the future with optimism. Our present relations are distinguished by the desire for cooperation and mutual understanding and the readiness for compromise even in areas where very difficult problems are being discussed.

"During the period of estrangement, members of the military watched one another across the border through binoculars. Now they are sitting down at the negotiating table and visiting each other's military installations. On this occasion we visited the surface fleet naval academy in Dalian.

"Contacts in the military sphere," G.V. Kireyev said in conclusion, "which is possibly the most sensitive area of all, confirm the idea of growing mutual trust. Our meetings, like the border talks (let me remind you that the line of the Soviet-Chinese border has been agreed in sections totaling 90 percent of its length), are creating a new atmosphere along the border and in our relations as a whole. What we are doing is part of the general process of developing Soviet-Chinese cooperation in all spheres, which was given a boost by last year's summit meeting."

The border is breathing a new air. Trade is growing rapidly, economic cooperation is developing, and new air and river routes are being opened. People are exchanging spiritual and material values. And a reduction in Armed Forces on the border will make it possible to release vast resources for civilian purposes.

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Party Expels Former Politburo Members

LD3006095790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0838 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Summary] Ulaanbaatar, 30 Jun (TASS)—TASS Correspondent Kim Boldokhonov:

A plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] which ended today condemned the Stalinist-style Tsedenbal regime and said his entourage shared the blame.

Former Politburo members Gombojav, Luvsan, Maydar, Molomjamts, Ragchaa, Dejid, and Lamjav were expelled. The question of the membership of Batmonh, Sodnom, Luvsangombo, Adyaa, Altangerel, and Damdin is to be considered later.

The self-financing of the party and the pay of its officials were discussed.

In connection with his transfer to other work, the plenum released Nyamyn Mishigdorj from his duties as a member of the Presidium and secretary of the MPRP Central Committee."

New Government Paper Launched in Mongolia

LD0107150690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 1 Jul 90

[By TASS Correspondent Dugar Sanzhiyev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 1 Jul (TASS)—The first edition of the governmental newspaper ARDYN ERKH [as received] ("PEOPLE'S LAW") was published today. The decision to resume this publication, with the aim of separating the functions of party and state bodies, was made last April at an extraordinary congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

The newspaper will be published three times a week. Greetings to the readers from P. Ochirbat, chairman of the presidium of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], are carried in its first edition. He notes that perestroyka in Mongolia has acquired an irreversible character and has entered a new stage. The editorial staff of the Soviet IZVESTIYA newspaper has congratulated its colleagues, expressing confidence in the fact that the new newspaper will make a great contribution to the process of the democratization of society and the renewal of Mongolian-Soviet cooperation.

A festival for the ARDYN ERKH newspaper took place today in the Mongolian capital's "Nairamdal" ("Friendship") Park of Culture and Rest. Sportsmen, artistic collectives, journalists, and writers took part in it. P. Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the MPR Great People's Hural, and Sh. Gungaadorj, chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers, were present at the festival.

Moscow's Policy Toward Korea Discussed

SK0207010790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 27 Jun 90

["Gist" of commentary by NOVOYE VREMYA commentator (Leonid Bulezhin)]

[Text] It is very obvious that Soviet mass media have shown themselves stumped and bewildered. They have very insufficiently commented on talks between Mikhail Gorbachev of our country and ROK President No Tae-u. The talks between the presidents of the two countries in a San Francisco hotel seem to have meant that Moscow recognized the existence of two Koreas and adopted one of the most important decisions in the entire history of the postwar Soviet policy toward the Korean Peninsula. It can be supposed that ap[illegible]val and objection have long been [words indistinct] in [illegible]oscow.

It is thought that despite Pyongyang's complaints, Beijing's clear stance, and the firm and immovable nature of the principle of foreign policy, the ground for the Soviet leadership's objection became less (?firm) after Kim Yong-sam's visit to Moscow in March.

Economic interests troubling the country seem to have played a decisive role. The interests of economic cooperation with Seoul are obvious. However, it cannot be said that a turn in the Soviet policy was calculative. The improvement of the people's welfare should be viewed as the government's [words indistinct].

Naturally, the dialogue in San Francisco will result in establishing diplomatic relations with the ROK. This signifies that the proposal for founding a pan-Asian alliance, which was clarified in President Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, will be realized.

According to the criteria of the Western (?human rights-protection] organizations, South Korea invariably has been in [words indistinct]. The problem is, however, that South Korea is not far away from North Korea in this respect. The (?human rights-protection) organizations criticize North Korea for still violating human rights en masse.

Let us presuppose that we trust and [words indistinct] the data of Amnesty International. In its 1989 report, Amnesty International expressed its regret about the fact that there is no openness whatever in the DPRK and that North Korean society is closed, and reported that many labor camps exist there. According to Amnesty International data, approximately 100,000 prisoners are held in camps, and most of them are political prisoners.

In what sense do we have similarities to the DPRK? Are we common in the plan for social reform, in the struggle for the value of mankind, in parliamentarian democracy, in openness, in the multiparty system, and in freedom of speech? We are an ally with the DPRK only in military strategy.

The functionaries of the general staffs in the East and West never fail to add North Korea's [words indistinct] to the number of the combined units of the Soviet troops in the Far East.

What will Moscow have to do? Should it lose an important strategic ally? What can the Soviet Union get from recognizing the ROK?

We can have a strong economic partner who, unlike Japan, trades and cooperates with us and invests. However, we should not harbor any particular illusion about

economic cooperation. What the ROK can give us at present is not sufficient for the economy of our country. The economies of the two countries are not linked to each other, for we exist in different worlds.

In my opinion, our country is gaining something else—a possibility for the feeling of conviction in the Far East. This is not an area of [words indistinct], but a club of businessmen where partners deal with each other in a kind manner. It is a club of Pacific-rim countries which desire to work [words indistinct].

Should we pull up the anchor?

Media on ROK Relations, Economic Development

SK3006132990 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] Dear listeners, we will now carry a brief account of what has been significantly dealt with on South Korea by Soviet publications.

The weekly (?MOSCOW NEWS) has carried an article by (Yuriy Bondar) under the title "(?Review) of South Korea" regarding the San Francisco meeting between the Soviet president and the South Korean president.

The author says as follows:

Soviet reporters dealing with international affairs were not supposed to write about South Korea until a short time ago. However, South Korea has always existed and developed, and more and more it has come to enjoy a conspicuous position in global economic and political arenas. Confrontation and ideological considerations were the reasons behind the Soviet Union's refusal to recognize South Korea. A line of total confrontation had been drawn along the 38th parallel between the two social and political systems on the Korean peninsula. Washington and Seoul joined Moscow and Pyongyang in holding such a view concerning the political structure in the Far East. As a result, the Korean peninsula has remained a fuse in the military and political situation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Today, that situation is changing. The attitude of dividing the world into black and white is now becoming one of regarding the world as comprising various shades of grey. Also, the need to eliminate the cause of tension is growing. A situation in which diplomatic relations can be established between Moscow and Seoul has not yet been created. However, a step already has been taken toward the establishment of normalized relations.

(Yuriy Bandor) goes on to say: It is not hard to understand that this step has not aroused a positive response from the northern side of the Korean peninsula. But then, should Pyongyang's negative reaction hinder progress? I do not think so. First, the development of a state-level dialogue with South Korea coincides with the Soviet Union's political and economic interests. Second, normalizing Moscow-Seoul relations would conform with North Korea's interests as well. The reason for this is that the normalization of relations would alleviate the intensity of confrontation and would establish a foundation of disarmament in the Far East.

The magazine (?ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY) has carried an article on the South Korean capital by (Andrey Ratnikov), a Soviet researcher on South Korea.

In the article, (Andrey Ratnikov) says the following: Seoul is a city of contrasts. This description, which may be a stereotype, nevertheless adequately describes the South Korean capital. The results of the country's rapid development over the past few decades can be witnessed everywhere. Those results, however, are still delicately intermingled with the legacies of the not-too-distant past. Only a handfull of royal palaces still remain in Seoul among the structures of the past, most of which are sheds with thatched roofs and earthen walls. All other legacies were destroyed during the course of the military and social afflictions that swept the Korean peninsula in the 20th century. Now, most of the buildings are (?multi-story), and stores are everywhere. This creates the impression that every citizen of Seoul is selling something.

The author gives the readers a detailed introduction to the history of the South Korean capital, its reality, and its problems.

The weekly EKHO PLANETY has carried an article on problems that have arisen among the former factions of South Korea's Democratic Liberal Party [DLP].

The article talks about the ruling party's history and the protests that have come from some South Korean social circles. Some South Korean social circles argue that the former opposition parties' merger into the DLP is threatening the country's democratic process. It also has been noted that the DLP has come to enjoy a fail-safe majority of 220 seats in the National Assembly and is seeking to become a pan-national party. The DLP platform envisages a transition from the current presidential system of government to a parliamentary system. Under the parliamentary system, prerogative belongs to the premier, who, in turn, is responsible to the National Assembly. (Ends)

U.S. Troop Withdrawal From South Korea Urged

SK0107034990 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Participants in the first academic seminar in the history of relations between the DPRK and the United States have appealed to Washington to withdraw all the U.S. troops from the southern half of the Korean peninsula. In this connection, station commentator (Aleksey Oreg) comments:

Approximately 43,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea at present. In the next few years, the number of

U.S. troops will be reduced. Some time ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney stated in Seoul that the number of U.S. troops in South Korea will be reduced by 7,000.

Military commentators of U.S. mass media have said that this reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea will not actually affect their combat capabilities. This is because the object of reduction is assistant personnel of U.S. troops. As emphasized by newspapers, however, this assistant personnel can be easily replaced by South Korean army personnel if necessary.

[Words indistinct] is the fact that the planned reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea does not envisage even partial withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea. According to released data, more than 1,000 nuclear weapons are stockpiled in South Korea at present.

For what purpose are U.S. troops stationed in South Korea? As in Washington, there is still much talk in Seoul about the military threat from the North.

How can this threat be sincerely discussed when Pyongyang has steadily made efforts to ease military tension on the Korean peninsula?

As you know, the DPRK Government has already proposed that the military forces in the North and the South be reduced to 100,000, respectively. Some time ago, Pyongyang reaffirmed that this proposal is still effective. What should be remembered is that the DPRK has unilaterally cut its troops by 100,000, but Seoul has failed to pay attention to this fact.

The known proposal of the DPRK for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is an overture confirming its sincere desire for easing military tension. There has been and is no nuclear weapon in the territory of the DPRK.

Citing these facts, I have not tried to list all proposals of Pyongyang to ease military tension. There are many proposals. I just want to show how preposterous it is to talk about a threat from the North in order to justify the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.

However, the present situation does not seem to be the same as before. The first measure to cut U.S. troops in South Korea, though it is symbolic, is being taken. It is thought that the appeal of the DPRK and U.S. scholars is likely to play a certain role in [words indistinct] this course.

North, South Korea Nonagression Treaty Viewed

SK0207083290 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Report by TASS reporter (Aleksandr Moliev) from Pyongyang from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The importance of the DPRK's recent proposals has been suitably elucidated at a Pyongyang news conference by An Pyong-su, spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland.

As everyone knows, the DPRK has recently put forward a proposal for easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and creating a peaceful climate for national reunification, as well as a disarmament proposal for guaranteeing peace in Korea.

In the news conference, An Pyong-su said that the proposals put forward by the DPRK have great repercussions at home and abroad. The disarmament proposal is very flexible because its contents consist of notifying each other of military maneuvers, of using the Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, and of installing a hotline between both side's high-level military functionaries. In addition, the proposal takes into consideration the South Korean side's proposals for building mutual confidence.

The proposal also calls for creating a favorable international atmosphere in a bid to realize the long-cherished desire of the Korean people. According to the views of the DPRK, easing tensions and creating a peaceful climate should, above all, be realized.

Without easing tensions and creating a peaceful climate, distrust cannot be dissipated. Also, the question of relations between the North and South cannot be successfully settled.

Even though North and South Korea have engaged in dialogues and contacts for 18 years, South Korea has avoided holding talks related to military questions. This is because South Korea has not been firm in seeking the resolution of military questions, said An Tong-su.

At present, the South Korean authorities can no longer ignore demands for the easing of tensions because they must succumb to the pressure of the trend toward disarmament.

The DPRK's proposal for cutting armed forces is closely related to the conclusion of a bilateral nonaggression treaty. However, the North and the South have different objectives for the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty.

The South side has accepted that if a nonaggression treaty is concluded, it must not only lead to a further consolidation of the existing system, but it must also contain promises from both sides not to use armed forces against the other.

In addition to this, the North has added that a nonaggression treaty must reduce the danger of war to the maximum, that all foreign forces be completely withdrawn from Korea, and that armed forces be reduced. An Pyong-su also said that three or four years would be enough to realize these goals.

South Korea, however, has claimed that substantial U.S. forces must remain in the South until the end of the

1990's. An Pyong-su went on to point out that U.S. forces have stood in the way of Korean reunification.

Several times the DPRK has proposed holding tripartite talks or talks between the DPRK and the United States. The United States, however, has not responded to these proposals.

Anyway, as long as outside forces remain, peace on the Korean peninsula cannot be guaranteed.

In conclusion, An Pyong-su stressed that the reunification of Korea should be realized through the Korean people's own efforts.

Opinion Poll on Relations With Japan Assessed

OW0107101090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] Listeners, results of the public opinion polls held in both the Soviet Union and Japan were announced last week. In this connection, Radio Moscow commentator Dmitriyev writes as follows:

The survey was jointly conducted by YOMIURI SHIMBUN and the All-Union Public Opinion Research Center, and respondents were asked many questions. For example, only a few people both in the Soviet Union and Japan indicated that they were optimistic toward relations between our two nations. Only 1.4 percent of the Soviet respondents and 0.6 percent of Japanese respondents answered that they regarded bilateral relations as very good. This result is almost the same as that of the survey held in 1988.

This low percentage indicates that the extensive public opinions of both sides have fairly objective views of the current situation concerning bilateral relations. In fact, when viewed from the standpoint of the good-neighborly relationship, it would be rather difficult to say that our two nations maintain very good relations. It is regrettable but it is true that current relations are not very good.

At the same time, what is noteworthy is that the number of Japanese who regarded Japan's relations with the Soviet Union as good has increased considerably. While the number of such respondents in Japan was 12.2 percent two years ago, the number this time reached 23.1 percent. In this connection, the number has almost doubled. On the contrary, the number of respondents who regard Japan's relations with the Soviet Union as unfavorable has dropped from 22.8 percent last time to 15 percent this time.

Commenting on this data, Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama stated that it reflected the changes in bilateral relations resulting from changes in the international situation. In fact, as the international situation shifts towards temperate, it is bound to have an impact on the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Many significant events took place during the past one and half years. For example, it has been announced that President Gorbachev will visit Japan in 1991—the first visit to Japan by the Soviet leader in history. A working-level group was organized to make preparations for concluding a peace treaty. Important visits were also exchanged. For example, a Soviet parliamentarian group led by Yakovlev visited Japan last November, and Mr. Shintaro Abe visited the Soviet Union last January.

All these goodwill and constructive moves have intensified our realization of the fact that Soviet-Japanese relations are turning for the better. The outcome of public opinion polls conducted in Japan seems precisely to have reflected this trend. Meanwhile, the Soviet people are capable of making comparisons because they have observed remarkable developments in Soviet relations with all other Western nations, and they do not regard the improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as sufficient.

Many observers hold that Soviet relations with Japan have fallen behind the process in the world as a whole. This is the reason only 17 percent of the respondents to the survey conducted in the Soviet Union regarded Soviet relations with Japan as good. The figure is six percent lower than that of the survey conducted in Japan. Moreover, it is four percent lower than the results of a survey conducted in the Soviet Union two years ago.

Nevertheless, only 4.7 percent of Soviet respondents regarded bilateral relations as bad. Many Soviets have become [words indistinct] probably because the territorial issue, which had not been discussed in detail before, has now come to be reported openly in Soviet papers. Incidentally, this issue was discussed very frequently in the Soviet Union during the past two years so that more people could be made to understand that difficult problems existed in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

In public opinion polls, 17.7 percent of Soviet respondents indicated that the territorial issue constituted a major obstacle to the improvement of bilateral relations, while 39.8 percent indicated that the issue constituted an obstacle to a certain degree.

Based on the figures obtained in the YOMIURI SHIMBUN polls, the Japanese Foreign Ministry is trying to underscore the Japanese Government's position as correct. However, such a conclusion may be taken as somewhat one-sided. As is clear from the same survey, the reasons are that only 10 percent of Soviet respondents approve of returning the South Kurile islands or part of these islands to Japan as the first step in improving Soviet relations with Japan. On the other hand, 27.8 percent of Japanese respondents indicated that the territorial issue could be solved even after bilateral relations had been improved. This is a head-on conflict with the position taken by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry has also turned its attention to the fact that the results of the poll indicate that as usual, a strong deep-rooted feeling of threat coming from the Soviet Union still exists as before. Of the Japanese respondents, 27.2 percent answered that the Soviet Union constituted a major threat to Japan, and 50 percent indicated that they felt the threat to some extent. Meanwhile, 30 percent of Soviet respondents indicated that they felt a certain threat from Japanese military capabilities, and 22.2 percent indicated that only a small threat exists.

Such apprehensions are not just groundless. As before, some distrust still exists between the peoples of the two nations. Japan feels ill at ease because of the presence of the Soviet Union, a military power, as its neighbor. Meanwhile, the Soviet people wonder why, among all the advanced industrial nations, only Japan rapidly is stepping up its military buildup. In this sense, mistrust is reciprocal in nature, and it will take mutual efforts to overcome this. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has already taken unilateral steps in reducing its own military presence and in reducing by a large scale its military vitality in the Asia-Pacific region.

At present, I think we have the best opportunity to deepen mutual confidence between the Soviet Union and Japan. The survey conducted in the Soviet Union indicates that Soviets cherish feelings of amity toward the Japanese as before, with 15 percent indicating strong sympathy towards Japanese and 58.5 percent indicating a certain amount of sympathy. On the other hand, the percentage of Japanese people sharing the same feeling toward the Soviet Union remains low as before. However, the number of such people increased by four percent during the past two years, and it has reached 27.3 percent.

This tendency possibly has intensified because reports on the Soviet Union increased and because many people have started to watch the Soviet Union more objectively during the past few years. Nevertheless, the tendency indicated by the results of the public opinion polls conducted in the two nations has led, as a whole, to a wishful observation. It can be expected that President Gorbachev's upcoming visit to Japan will add new momentum to this tendency. The stronger the genuine good-neighborliness between the Soviet Union and Japan as a result of President Gorbachev's visit, the greater the signficance the visit will come to have.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze Hold Talks With Philippines Official

HK2906063390 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Philippine Deputy Foreign Secretary Manuel T. Yan formally held talks in Moscow. One of the issues discussed involves the bilateral ties of both countries. They also exchanged views regarding international affairs and problems. Results of the Soviet-American summit were cited, such that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has a big impact on the world. Strengthening security and cooperation in the East Asia Pacific Region was also tackled. The Soviet Union and the Philippines have agreed to consolidate the positive efforts in the region.

Shevardnadze and Yan both favor the increased cooperation between the two countries, concretely in trade, science, economics, culture, and other areas. It was also learned that President Aquino's pending visit to the Soviet Union tops the agenda in the move to improve bilateral ties between the two countries.

Philippines Committee Wants Access to Bases

HK2906063990 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Commentary by Viktor Vladimirov]

[Text] The bases executive-legislative committee set up by the Aquino government has urged that the [word indistinct] at the Subic and Clark bases starts. It is also reviewing the alternative uses of the military bases.

According to Chairman Jose Abueva, U.S. nationals refuse the entry of Philippine experts onto the bases, which by law belong to the Phillipines. Abueva said the ban to probe the facilities should be lifted. Otherwise, the experts will not have the chance to investigate them for alternative uses. One of the proposed uses is to convert Clark into an international airport since the Ninoy Aquino International Airport is becoming crowded.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon's negative reaction is normal because of its desire to retain the bases since they are strategic for the U.S. forces in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Regarding the upcoming talks between Washington and Manila on the future of the bases, the pressure on the Philippine representatives is expected to increase. A compensation package of 170 million dollars through arms supply, medicine, and food was part of the debt reduction deal. Washington also made a pledge to help Manila get new loans from foreign financiers. The money is needed to improve the economic situation in the country.

According to Vladimirov, Washington is convinced of its success in the upcoming talks. The U.S. Defense Department has no plan to reduce the number of personnel, including 18,000 soldiers, on the bases. U.S. envoy to the Philippines, Ambassador Nicholas Platt, said the Pentagon plans to modernize the facilities on Clark and Subic. The question of how much longer the U.S. bases will stay in the Philippines can only be answered in the comng round of talks.

Commentary on Results of Burmese Election

BK2906140190 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Commentary by Aleksandr Vladimirov: "Moscow's Views on Elections in Burma"]

[Text] We have been receiving more accurate election returns of the Burmese parliamentary elections from Rangoon. The results clearly indicate the lack of support at the elections for the National Unity Party [NUP]—the former Burma Socialist Program Party—which the people believe represents the systems which pushed Burma toward social and economic crisis.

The NUP managed to win only two seats each in Irrawaddy Division and Kayah State and won one seat each in Pegu Division, Chin State, Kachin State, and Shan State. The National League for Democracy [NLD] is now assured of more than 80 percent of the seats in the new parliament. In Moscow, commenting on the outcome of the elections in Burma, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Soviet Union respects the choice of the Burmese voters and expressed hope that democratic reforms in Burma would bring about more stability and economic progress in the country and a more active Burmese foreign policy in the interests of peace and cooperation in Asia.

Moscow Radio observer, Aleksandr Vladimirov, comments that this development is not only important for the people of Burma, but also for other countries, including the Soviet Union, where ineffective state administration systems, which are declining morally in prestige, are being deserted. This development has not been easy as those from various political and social strata who had benefited from the old systems are trying to undermine such developments openly or indirectly. Therefore, it will be necessary for those who want to see the domination of people's power to know how like-minded people in other countries are struggling to solve similar problems. With such knowledge they will be stronger in morale and will be able to use the experience of others in their struggle for democratic aspirations.

U Kyi Maung, member of the Central Executive Committee of the NLD, in an interview with the Soviet correspondent in Rangoon said: You do not know how grateful we are to your President Gorbachev. Without perestroika, we would not have been able to struggle for democracy in such a manner. When democracy flourishes in Burma, the international prestige of Burma will grow and Burma will certainly be able to take a more active role in various political and economic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. There are many indications that the countries of Southeast Asia, the ASEAN countries in particular, wish to cooperate with Burma. They want to cooperate with Burma in trade and economic fields as well as in other areas.

It can be recalled at this juncture that Burma was once one of the most active Asian countries. It will be sufficient to point out Burma was one of the major countries which founded the nonaligned movement which played a very important role at one time. We can recall the high prestige of Burma when U Thant, a Burmese national, served as the secretary general of the United Nations.

In recent years there has been increasing support for new political thinking in Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region is in the forefront of expansive political discussions. Moscow Radio observer, Aleksandr Vladimirov, concludes by saying that it is hoped Burma would be able to participate and present its views in these discussions.

Near East & South Asia

More on Foreign Ministry Briefing on Near East

PM2906183790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "On the Near East Situation; Statement by USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman"]

[Text] The situation taking shape in the Near East is evoking growing concern in us. In connection with the absence of positive improvements in a Near East settlement, the situation in the region is assuming a clear and negative dynamism. Peace efforts are being retarded and the influence of extremist and fundamentalist forces is growing. The arms race and the proliferation of missile, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction is continuing and this carries the threat of catastrophic consequences in the event of a new explosion in this region.

In these conditions it is essential to use every opportunity to remove the causes of the periodic exacerbation of the situation and to start a peace process oriented toward an all-embracing Arab-Israeli settlement, and toward convening an international conference for this purpose. The Soviet Union's multi-option approach to establishing a peace process in the Near East is well known. We proceed from the importance of getting various channels and mechanisms into operation, including the peace-making potential of the United Nations which would help to find compromise solutions in the region. In our opinion, it would be useful to embark without delay on holding unofficial consulations on a Near East settlement within the framework of the five permanent members of the Security Council and to come to agreement regarding the appointment by the UN secretary general of his special representative on the Near East.

The explosive situation in the Near East which still remains on the sidelines of the positive changes taking place in other regions of the world requires that all the sides concerned, and also the United States and Western Europe, display the due political will and engage energetically in the collective efforts to unblock the Near East conflict. For our part, we are prepared to cooperate

constructively with eveyone in the interests of an all-embracing Arab-Israeli settlement and a just solution of the Palestinian problem.

Israeli Trade Union Makes 'Historic Visit'

LD3006085590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1608 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 June (TASS)—Yisrael Qeysar, general secretary of the largest and most influential trade association in Israel—the General Federation of Labor in Israel (Hiastadrut)—stated that the achievement of absolutely specific agreements was a result of the 'historic visit' by the Israeli trade union delegation to the Soviet Union.

Speaking today at a news conference, the delegation head evaluated highly the policy of perestroyka, thanks to which the renewal of real links in a number of areas between the two states has become possible. The trade unions of the USSR and Israel, he noted have entered the stage of setting up cooperation which should take place on a mutually advantageous and democratic basis. Agreements were reached on exchanging delegations and specialists, holding seminars, and arranging economic cooperation at international trade union forums.

Among the most promising areas of mutual application of efforts and means, Yisrael Qeysar named tourism, which does not demand major material investment and can bring significant hard currency returns so necessary to both countries.

Despite the delegation head unambiguously making it understood that his trade association attaches priority importance to social and economic problems, a number of questions from Soviet journalists touched on the Israeli trade union's attitude toward the Palestinian problem and ways toward settlement in the Near East. I consider that in these issues it is necessary to go along the path of compromise, Yisrael Qeysar said. In our organization, he continued, we are trying to take into account the considerations of both Jews and Arabs. Eighty-five percent of Israeli Arabs are members of the Histadrut, which can serve as an example of how it is possible to live in peace and agreement, without damaging each other's interests.

Tomorrow the delegation leaves for home.

Agreement Signed in Kiev

LD0107204990 Kiev International Service in English 2300 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Excerpts] A delegation of Israel's labor federation [General Federation of Labor in Israel], with Mr. Yisrael Qeysar at the head, visited Kiev. The guests were interested in the activities of the Ukrainian trade unions under the conditions of perestroyka aimed at solving the social problems and establishing closer ties between the trade unions of both countries.

An agreement on cooperation was signed by the Ukrainian and the Israeli trade unions which ensures information exchange, that of tourism and culture, and also joint health programs. Here is a comment on the agreement by the chairman of the Ukrainian Trade Unions Anatoliy Kovalevksiy:"

[Kovalevskiy, in vernacular fading into English translation] [passage omitted] We have had a preliminary agreement and it seems that in the near future we can have a contract on the creation in Kiev of a medical rehabilitation center for the mothers with children affected by the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident. For this purpose we have allocated a spacious building at one of the Ukrainian trade union sanatoria where our Israeli counterparts will install the needed equipment, said Anatoliy Kovalevskiy.

Changes in Sudan Since Coup Examined

EA3006191290 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 28 Jun 90

[From "World Events Today" program]

[Text] Last year on 30 June, a group of officers overthrew the Sudanese Government led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. The National Salvation Revolution Command Council [NSRCC] led by General 'Umar al-Bashir seized power. What has changed in Sudan in the year since then? Our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov says Gen. 'Umar al- Bashir, elaborating on the reasons which drove him and his comrades to take up arms, said the civilian government had failed to end the civil war in the south, the government was corrupt, had brought about the ugly economic crisis in the country, and had given Sudan a poor image among the states of the world.

The general promised at the time—one year ago—to straighten out the crookedness that had crept into life in Sudan, which he blamed the former weak governments. Today, a year after the military coup, al-Bashir is being accused of the very things he used to blame on the government he overthrew.

Decisive steps taken by diplomats serving the military regime in the first months of its coming to power raised many hopes which, however, did not materialize. Many commentators believe that Khartoum foreign policy is at a low ebb. Its only successes have been the agreements on settling the border issue between Sudan and Uganda and on Sudan uniting with Libya. In the case of the first agreement it is not enough for Sudan just to solve its foreign policy difficulties. The second agreement exacerbates the situation in that, for example, relations between Sudan and Chad have deteriorated. In spite of many rounds of talks, Sudan has failed properly to improve its relations with Ethiopia. The regime's unpopular policies have repelled the West, AFRICA BUSINESS has reported.

Even Arab countries friendly to Khartoum fail to understand its rigid stance on the search for a solution to the southern Sudan question and court verdicts, which mostly involve capital punishment. This especially relates to Sudan's relations with Egypt, which was the first country to recognize the military administration led by Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir.

The most important issue affecting Sudan's future—the war in the south—is today farther from ending than it was a year ago. The civilian government that was overthrown, during the last days of its existence, had been able to propose conditions on reaching an agreement with the guerrillas who started their war seven years ago. The military regime buried even the awaited talks by implementing Islamic laws which are opposed and fought against by the people of southern Sudan.

The country's economic problems have not been solved. Only this month Khartoum announced a program for liberalizing the national economy. The program is to move the country away from the earlier policy formulated to fight against so-called businessmen dealing in the black market in which several well-known individuals engaged in the country's commerce were killed. The program does not refer to expected steps, especially that of devaluating the pound, which has proliferated throughout Sudan and constitutes an obstacle to liberalizing the nation's economy.

It is certainly difficult to raise living standards in a country within a year. The program on liberalizing the economy and the other long-term government plans embrace some aspects worthy of optimism, but the Sudanese NSRCC is marking its first anniversary at a time characterized by the expansion of the civil war, an increase in Sudan's foreign debt currently standing at about $13 billion, and the heightening of the distrust most countries of the world have of Sudan's foreign policy.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ethiopia's Civil War, Mobilization Assessed

EA0107175990 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] The Shengo, or Ethiopian parliament has ended its fourth regular session. Radio Moscow reporter Anatoliy Doronin has sent us the following assessment:

The parliament has discussed the current situation in the country and adopted many resolutions based on the report presented by President Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The civil war in the country has done a great deal of damage. This problem cannot be solved unilaterally either by the government or the other organizations. The Shengo resolutions stated that the entire population must participate. Each and every Ethiopian, irrespective of sex, must be armed to support the Revolutionary Army and the People's Militia in the fight against the secessionists and other armed groups. It was also decided that all the country's resources and manpower would be applied to the war effort. In recent times, President Mengistu has repeatedly made similar calls. The Shengo resolution and general mobilization call have now been put out in support of the government's policy. The main question is: Will that policy bring about the desired results? The civil war in Ethiopia is now 30 years old. Neither Emperor Haile Selassie nor the country's present leader, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, have been able to bring the war to an end by means of (?confrontation).

By contrast, forces opposed to the Addis Ababa government have recently been winning great victories on various fronts, thus bringing most of the northern parts of the country under their control. This being the case, it seems they are determined to win decisive victories on the war fronts. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] leaders have firmly said: We will hold talks with the Ethiopian Government only if it accepts the precondition of self-determination. The EPLF wants Eritrea to secede from Ethiopia, but say the people themselves should decide through a referendum.

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF, another big organization, has for its part imposed other strong preconditions as weighty as those of the EPLF. The Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPLF, the biggest group opposed to the Addis Ababa government, is a member of the EPRDF. The EPRDF has laid down a precondition not easy to accept by saying it will observe a cease-fire only if the government led by Mengistu Haile-Mariam gives up power and a provisional transitional government, embracing all the country's political organizations is established.

None of the issues raised by the opposition groups have been raised by the Shengo. The central government says it will never accept these conditions. The Addis Ababa government seems to be saying that the only way it can free itself of its problems is by winning the war. But is this possible? Can the Ethiopian Government Army defeat the guerrilla fighters who are now very strong? Can it preserve Ethiopia's territorial integrity by boasting about its military strength? Above all, can a way leading to peace talks coexist with the decree of general mobilization? The resolutions adopted by the Ethiopian Shengo have brought up these and other questions. Only time can provide the answers, the Radio Moscow reporter in Addis Ababa, Anatoliy Doronin, says in concluding his assessment.

Angolan Government, UNITA Talks To Resume

LD0107202890 Moscow TASS in English 1852 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS—By TASS political news analyst Sergey Kulik:

Talks between representatives of the Angolan Government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] on a settlement of the situation in Angola are expected to resume in Lisbon in the coming days.

During the two previous rounds of talks, held with Portugal's mediation, the positions of the sides diverged mainly over ways to implement a prospective ceasefire agreement and a time-table for the disarmament of combat units.

Portuguese analysts believe, however, that the two sides drew closer together by the end of the second round and that their positions "are close as never before". One would like to hope that optimistic forecasts concerning ceasefire accords will come true during the forthcoming, third, round of the talks.

What should be done to secure that? It seems to me that the two sides should recognize that in the current international situation none of them can remove the other from the political arena militarily.

Such attempts would lead only to a further escalation of tension, new bloodshed, and deterioration of the country's economic position.

Therefore, there should be no slamming of the door, as was repeatedly practised by one of the negotiating parties, or a renunciation of earlier reached accords, and frustration of hte dialogue. One should patiently and persistently negotiate until a mutually acceptable solution promising peace for Angola is reached.

A new, more flexible settlement plan, worked out by the government of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Workers Party, may serve as a good basis to reach agreement with UNITA on political principles for reconcilation.

The recent statement by Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos contains a reply to demand by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to introduce a multi-party system in Angola, the demand which has long served as one of the main stumbling blocks to the conduct of the talks.

"The leadership of the country," the Angolan president said in an interview with the JOURNAL DE ANGOLA, "intends to hold free general elections, during which the people could decide in favour of a single- or multi-party system". The Angolan president for the first time expressed his readiness to meet Savimbi.

Under these conditions, hydropower station explosions that disrupt electric power and water supply to Angola, attacks on food-carrying transport vehicles, putting about 900,000 people on the verge of starvation, and other terrorist acts, which UNITA supporters did not cease even during the negotiations, are entering into obvious conflict with Savimbi's statements about his desire for a political solution in Angola.

The U.S. Administration's request sent to Congress to allocate additionally 10 to 15 million dollars for secret military aid to UNITA does not square with the professed aim either.

Now that representatives of the Angolan Government and UNITA began to establish direct contacts, although preliminary ones, the Soviet side is calling on the parties involved in the conflict to make every effort in order to independently decide upon principles for future accords, to secure a lasting cesefire and to give a constructive character to the political settlement process.

East Europe

Shevardnadze Interviewed by Bulgarian Weekly

LD0207083190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Text] Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, has given an interview to the Bulgarian weekly POGLED, in which he comments that the situation in Europe today is such that the unification of Germany is capable of becoming a mighty catalyst of positive tendencies. It is no accident, Shevardnadze stresses, that the issue transforming the military-political alliances and radically altering relations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO has emerged at the present time on a practical level.

Bulgarian Leader Receives Deputy Foreign Minister

LD3006065590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1638 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Chupakhin]

[Text] Sofia, 29 Jun (TASS)—President of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Petr Mladenov today received here USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy.

They exchanged opinions on a wide range of subjects on the international situation and in particular on the situation in Europe and the Balkans. They examined prospects for the development of cooperation in these regions of the world. Both sides confirmed their shared desire for the further widening of Bulgarian-Soviet relations in the interests of the peoples of both countries.

CSFR Envoy on Relations, Changes in Europe

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0820 GMT on 30 June broadcasts a 30-minute program entitled "Spectrum," devoted to the situation in the CSFR after the recent parliamentary elections. Viktor Lyubovtsev reports from Czechoslovakia, reviewing the election results and the inauguration of a new government. He interviews Jan Carnogursky and the leader of the Slovak Communist Party on their views of the situation. This portion of the program lasts 10 minutes.

This is followed by a 20-minute studio interview between Lyubovtsev and Rudolf Slansky, Czechoslovak ambassador to the USSR. Slansky answers questions about his career following his expulsion from the Communist Party after the Prague Spring, his part in the events of last November, and his views of the current situation within Czechoslovakia.

On foreign policy, Slansky is asked about Czechoslovakia's proclaimed policy of returning to Europe, and its place in a common European home. Slansky says: "The fact that we were virtually not in Europe for 40 years, that our country's political, military, and econmic orientation was very one-sided, inflicted great damage on our country. I believe that the division of Europe into two opposing blocs inflicted immense damage on the whole of Europe in general, and on all our countries. But if we say that we are returning to Europe that does not mean that we are returning to or want to become part of Western Europe, or to exchange one partial orientation for another. That would not be sensible. Therefore, the basis of our policy is this: Yes to a return to Europe, and good, friendly, equal relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe at the same time. While acquiring new friends, we do not want to lose our old friends, of course."

Lyubovtsev moves the interview on to Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and asks Slansky how he sees them developing. Slansky replies: "You know, I am an optimist here. I feel that political relations between the countries, relations between our states, are developing well. As far as I know, there are no major contentious, insoluble problems between us. The problems which arise as we work are also solved as we work. Regarding problems of great importance, such as the problem of the attitude to the process of German reunification and the problem of establishing a common European home, consultations are going on all the time there, and even if there are differences in our points of view, I feel that, in general, they are heading in the same direction; and even if our initial stances have been very far apart in some areas, ultimately they come very close together at the end of a normal process of negotiations, just like that going on throughout Europe. Simply, I repeat, there are no political problems which might put us in any kind of confrontation.

"Of course, the economy is more difficult. It is difficult because the structure of our economic ties which was developed in the past 40 years does not suit either of us. We purchase from the Soviet Union mainly raw materials—oil, gas, iron ore, non-ferrous metals, cotton, and a lot of others—and export our industrial goods. A very hard process of changing all the foundations of our economic relations is going on now. We have had no trouble in general in agreeing to go over to accounting in freely convertible currency and according to world prices we know that we cannot move over to a market economy and base our trade on the principles of the command and administrative system.

"But, of course, huge problems are appearing in the process of negotiations. We have not yet managed to agree on how to express rubles in terms of dollars or on how we are going to convert the fairly large amounts which the Soviet Union owes Czechoslovakia. There are also joint projects in which a lot of money has been invested.

"The second problem here is this. If we are moving over to world trading conditions, we must conduct our trade between enterprises and not between states. States merely guarantee either basic strategic supplies or the conditions for trade, but conditions must be created enabling enterprises to buy and sell directly among themselves."

Lyubovtsev interjects: "I think we are moving in that direction now, a little more quickly in your case, a little more slowly in ours."

Slansky replies: "But it is going very slowly. We are now conducting very intense negotiations on this whole range of issues. Of course, we should like to hope for the most favorable outcome possible to these negotiations, but nevertheless, there are very difficult problems."

In conclusion, Slansky answers questions about the reactions of his Soviet acquaintances to the changes in Czechoslovakia and his view of the place of socialist values in his country's future.

Ryzhkov Congratulates Czechoslovakia's Premier

PM0107131190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[N. Ryzhkov greetings message: "To Mr. Marian Calfa, Premier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Marian Calfa!

Please accept my sincere congratulations on your appointment as premier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

I am confident that relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, based on the principles of good-neighborliness, equal rights, and mutual respect, will be further developed in the interests of our countries' peoples and of peace and stability in Europe.

I wish you success in your activity for the benefit of the Czechoslovak people.

[Signed] N. Ryzhkov

Lukyanov Congratulates CSFR's Dubcek

PM0107131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Greetings message from A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "To Mr. Alexander Dubcek, Chairman of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Federal Assembly"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Alexander Dubcek!

On behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet and on my own behalf I congratulate you on your election as chairman of the CSFR Federal Assembly.

Noting the mutually useful nature of cooperation between our countries' parliaments, I believe that its further development will serve the interests of strengthening good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and promote the deepening of the all-European process and the strengthening of peace and security on the continent.

I wish you great success in your activity for the benefit of the CSFR's peoples.

[Signed] A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

West Europe

Another Hijack Attempt to Land in Sweden Noted

PM0107184590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent M. Zubko: "Another Hijack to Stockholm Again"]

[Excerpts] Stockholm—REUTERS reported on the morning of 1 July that another Aeroflot aircraft had been hijacked to Sweden. The report did not give any details. We phoned the Aeroflot duty officer. We were told that on 30 June Flight 8678, the 2215 service from Lvov to Leningrad, had indeed been forced under pressure from a passenger—A. Mikhaylenko, born 1971, a student—to change course and land in Stockholm at 0015.

Aeroflot staffers had no additional information. At midday IZVESTIYA's own correspondent in Stockholm contacted the editorial office. [passage omitted]

The fight against airborne terrorism can only be won through joint efforts. This truth should be reiterated today. And we should remember that since the Israeli authorities handed over hijackers to the USSR there have been no more people wanting to fly hijacked aircraft to that country. But they fly to Sweden since the local authorities have not yet taken a decisive stand. In the opinion of the Swedish pilots' trade union, for instance, D. Semenov—who hijacked a plane on the night of 9 June—should have been immediately put on a Soviet plane and sent back to the USSR.

Conference on East European Democratization Ends

LD0107215190 Moscow TASS in English 2025 GMT 1 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[Text] Vienna July 1 TASS—An international conference on the subject "Central Europe on the Way to Democracy" ended here today.

It dealt with prospects for the development of democracy, ways and methods for the building of a rule-of-law state, possibilities for the speediest transition to a market economy, the search for a fair solution to the nationalities question and discerning the main outlines of the architecture of a future Europe.

The conference was attended by more than 100 statesmen, political and public figures of the East and West, by leading experts, scientists and professors from major universities.

Main attention during discussions was devoted to the analysis of the current situation in East European countries, economic aid to them, and further development of East-West dialogue, with the dynamics of the current processes taken into account.

Participants in the conference favoured a continuation of democratic transformations and the creation of the necessary prerequisites for the speediest transition to a market economy.

The question of alleviating the burden of East European countries' foreign debt, which has grown as a result of gross miscalculations by the former political leadership of these countries, is now acquiring particular importance, speakers at the conference pointed out.

A number of experts believe that the elaboration of a kind of new "Marshall Plan," which could be coordinated by a specially established international council, could serve a more effective utilisation of Western credits.

The economic instability sharpens social tension, on the basis of which inter-ethnic conflicts flare up with fresh vigour.

Having emphasised the right of every people to a free development, most speakers declared in favour of the need to show a balanced and constructive approach to solving these problems with due account of the objectively established realities. Haste and lack of tolerance can only aggravate still further the already explosive situation in a number of regions, they believe.

On the whole, the exchange of views at the conference made it possible to coordinate the positions of East and West experts in the estimate of the current processes and reaffirmed the readiness of the reformist circles of East European countries to proceed along the road of democratisation towards building a common European home.

Ambassador to France Dubinin Presents Credentials

LD3006050590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Dubinin, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in France, has presented his credentials to President Mitterand of the French Republic. A conversation took place between them, during which the growing importance of the Soviet-French factor in the development of new relations in Europe and in international affairs on the whole, and of the efforts of the two countries together with those of other interested states in setting up a reliable security system in Europe, was noted.

Deputy Minister Meets Denmark's Ellemann-Jensen

LD3006040890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Copenhagen, 29 Jun (TASS)—V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, who is in Copenhagen, met Danish Foreign Minister U. Ellemann-Jensen on Thursday and gave him a personal message from USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze in connection with the completion of the Copenhagen stage of the CSCE human dimension conference and the staging of the next conference in Moscow in autumn of next year.

During their conversation, U. Ellemann-Jensen expressed gratitude for the flexible, constructive approach demonstrated by the Soviet side, which had helped the pan-European forum to end with the adoption of a meaningful final document. Certain questions on the further intensification of Soviet-Danish political dialogue on European and international affairs were discussed.

Political & Social

PRAVDA Carries Report on CPSU CC Plenum

PM2906180390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Report: "Information Report on CPSU Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] A CPSU Central Committee Plenum was held 29 June 1990.

Questions regarding the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress were submitted to the plenum for examination.

A report was delivered at the plenum by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum was addressed by: N.I. Malkov, first secretary of the Chita Oblast party committee [obkom]; V.I. Potapov, first secretary of the Irkutsk Obkom; V.I. Melnikov, USSR minister of the timber industry; V.I. Sitnikov, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Mongolian People's Republic; M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; Ya.P. Ryabov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and personal pensioner; G.A. Posibeyev, first secretary of the Mari Obkom; V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs; and G.I. Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

The plenum approved the basic provisions of the report entitled "The CPSU Central Committee's Political Report to the 28th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of the Party" and instructed the Central Committee Politburo to finalize it, taking into account the discussion which took place. The plenum instructed M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to deliver the report at the congress.

The plenum approved in the main the draft program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism" and the draft CPSU Statutes and made the decision to submit these documents for the congress' examination.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered a concluding address at the plenum.

At this point the CPSU Central Committee Plenum concluded its work.

Radio Panel Discusses Plenum, RSFSR CP

LD3006162890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1000 GMT on 30 June carries a one-hour "Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line" feature, hosted by commentator Yu. Semenov, with CPSU Congress delegates I.I. Dementeva, doctor of biology and senior scientific worker at the All-Union Surgery Center in Moscow; G.I. Revenko, member of the party Central Committee, USSR people's deputy, and member of the Presidential Council; V.V. Chikin, secretary of the Minsk timepiece works party committee; and O.R Latsis, doctor of economics and first deputy editor in chief of KOMMUNIST.

Semenov begins by inviting Revenko to comment on yesterday's CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Revenko says: "At the Central Committee plenum yesterday, the main points of the Central Committee report were submitted to the participants—the Central Committee members and guests. I think I should point out first of all that the plenum accepted as the agenda the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the party's tasks. This is a very important agenda, including both an assessment of the present moment and the tasks facing the party regarding socio-economic development, party reform, and the country's ethnic structure.

Revenko continues: "It's important to stress that not everything set forth in the report's main points was accepted immediately: There was a debate which, for the most part, concerned specifics. There was a clear desire to return to the old type of report—above all to criticism by name, to being told the pace at which things are to be done, the volumes, etc. In other words, during that brief debate one felt, on the one hand, great support for addressing the issue of the Central Committee's activites, but on the other hand a desire to go back to what things were like before, when directives were sent out.

"I am glad that the congress, or rather the plenum, agreed that we need major political assessments, political forecasts, consolidation of our country, of our society, and that we all realize that it will be much harder to tackle the tasks of perestroyka without a new and fundamentally reformed party," Revenko concludes.

There follows a discussion of the Founding Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party, of which all the studio guests are critical. Dementeva describes it as "rash" and full of "empty slogans." Chikin says that it was too engrossed in internal party problems. Latsis agrees, but believes that most of the delegates are "sensible" people, if given time to consider things properly. Revenko condemns those who expect the party to solve all their problems—everyone must be active in society today.

A listener phones in to ask why Gorbachev, the "liberator of the people," was criticized at the RSFSR party congress. Dementeva explaines that he was criticized in his capacity as chairman of the Russian Bureau, as "he did virtually nothing to ensure that we received the documents or the program of that Russian congress in advance." No doubt this was because he was tied up with his presidential duties, she adds.

Latsis comments: "In most cases, attacks on Gorbachev are attacks on perestroyka. That's how I evaluate the basic thrust of Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev's speech, and the speech by Professor Sergeyev was unquestionably just as blatantly brazen—indeed, it's not at all clear why he was speaking, since he was neither a delegate nor was he invited. As for what the party congress holds, there is an objective contradiction here: on one hand of course there will be a struggle, and it is the task of all who wish to defend the party and perestroyka to defend Gorbachev; but there really have been miscalculations and mistakes in the work done, and as far as the Russian Bureau is concerned the poor organization of that congress was indeed the result of poor work by the Russian Bureau—this is perfectly obvious. The Bureau was created several months before the Russian congress with the main task of preparing the congress, but it was badly prepared. So we can see that Mikhail Sergeyevich bears too many responsibilities and isn't managing to cope with everything. He is aboslutely essential to us as a president and there is no one to replace him. At the same time, I think it would be a very bad thing if he were to leave the party. He must lead the party, yet still, we must give some thought to freeing him above all from some of the day-to-day work."

Agreeing with Latsis, Dementeva says that there is no alternative to Gorbachev as party leader at the moment. The right-wingers may have someone in mind but are playing their cards close to their chest.

Returning to the RSFSR Communist Party Congress, Dementeva laments the lack of advance notification of the documents to be discussed and Latsis explains that in fact the congress was prepared very well, "but no one knows by whom." The reformist Moscow delegation was virtually prevented from speaking during the congress, he says.

Asked whether democratic centralism is to be abolished, Revenko replies that true democratic centralism has never really existed. Key principles such as accountability and report-back are essential and must be properly implemented in the future party, he says.

The program continues with listeners' questions on economic reform, to which Latsis responds by recommending market relations as the best way to ensure social protection and economic efficiency. He laments society's "deficit of morality" while Revenko stresses the role of teachers in surmounting the problem.

Semenov concludes the program by noting that it is up to the CPSU Congress itself to decide whether its proceedings will be televised: "If the congress applies to Gosteleradio, as far as I know there will be relays though, as was announced at the press conference, the Central Committtee will have to pay for them."

'Military Overthrow' During Congress Rumored

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[Text] Moscow, June 29 (TANJUG)—Soviet envoy Colonel (?Valentin) Martirosyan today said he did not rule out the possibility of a military overthrow (?at the CPSU Congress). In a brief interview published this evening by the newly founded agency INTERFAX, Martirosyan said his view was based on "the mood of some top officials, particularly party leaders of the Armed Forces." He went on to say that the [words indistinct] doing everything they could to preserve their privileged positions.

Preparations for a military overthrow were rumoured here late last February when a rally of millions was expected to be staged in Moscow and when the city was practically blocked by military units. It was later officially denied that a military overthrow was being prepared, but, as elaborated, that precautionary measures had been undertaken because of possible incidents.

USSR Supreme Court Chairman on Legal Reforms

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[Article by Ye. Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, under the rubric "Toward a Rule-of-Law State": "What Is the Third Branch To Be?"]

[Text] **A state guided by rule of law can be the only possible and necessary form of democratic, humane socialism, and two fundamental principles must be at its basis—the principle of the supremacy and dominion of the law, and the principle of the division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches.**

Unfortunately a disdain for law has predominated in our society for a long time. This is an indisputable, although bitter, part of our past. Because by not achieving respect for the law we could not insure ourselves against the tyranny and abuse of the bureaucracy or guarantee ourselves against violations of human rights.

I would also like to mention that a nihilistic attitude toward the law has an extremely negative effect on the respect for law and order not only of officials but of common citizens as well. Instead of faith in the law and its force, justice, and firmness, people have learned for decades to trust in the boss because the effective conditions of work and life depended on his will and command. Under these conditions the law could not have any meaning. Many people are surprised that even today, in the course of perestroyka, laws that have been hammered out by the USSR Supreme Soviet, including those which carry a positive incentive for everyone, are applied weakly, hesitantly, and timidly. But should they be surprised by this? Respect for law (in general a rather conservative manifestation) not only by officials and executive leaders but by many citizens as well still continues through inertia to be oriented not toward faith

in the indisputable social value and justice of law but rather toward how one may contrive and circumvent the law inasmuch as the success of actions was ensured in just this fashion in the past.

Therefore without detracting from the significance of a legal education, one must nonetheless keep in mind that people will not have faith in the law until its inexorable functions are guaranteed by the whole force of the executive (administrative) and judicial branches. The supremacy of law must be implemented from bottom to top. All rule-of-law institutions must be oriented toward human rights in order to right the unjust bias in the system of "state- citizen" relations which has always been in favor of the former.

What must be done to raise the judicial branch to the level required of a rule-of-law state?

When examining the most varied conflicts, the court bases its activity and its ruling only on the law, and on it alone. Consequently a ruling of the court can be just only if the law itself is just. If a law is outdated and it does not take into account the changes and demands of society, then a judicial ruling on a case which is being submitted in accordance with such a law cannot be competent. And consequently for the successful functioning of the judicial branch it is very important that the legislation used by the courts be fundamentally reworked and brought into correspondence with the actively changing conditions of the life of society as soon as possible.

Moreover, it has been known since ancient times that impunity with regard to an old crime contributes to the commission of a new one. Of about 2.5 million crimes registered with us for 1989, more than 900,000 remained unsolved. When speaking about this serious defect I would like to note in the name of justice that I have observed changes for the better recently in the criminal investigation service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in investigative work. This is reflected primarily in a higher percentage of solved crimes. However, it is not realistic to expect much in this area until the investigative apparat has an independent structure, gets more personnel, and receives modern criminology equipment. But nonetheless we should suppose that as the USSR Supreme Soviet adopts decrees on this issue the goal will be realized more quickly.

The judicial system also needs improvement. For a long time our court was in a humble position. With the absolute supremacy of the command-administrative system in the country, there was not and could not be a division of state power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Power was united and indivisible. Everything was determined and directed by organs and persons who held all the levers of power.

Under these conditions the courts were assigned a secondary role, and their financial base did not correspond to the functions they were fulfilling. Even today more than one-third of the courts are located in buildings which do not meet the basic requirements for conducting judicial trials. Many of these buildings are completely broken down. The courts have practically no modern means and equipment for accounting, planning, and analysis of operations, and in this respect they have fallen far behind the courts in the majority of European states. An increase in the number and complexity of criminal and civil cases in the courts and a significant broadening of the courts' authority to rule on other questions has not been accompanied by an appropriate increase in the number of workers, which has led to a chronic overload in the courts and hurried work.

All this has led to a decrease in the prestige of court work, a decrease in the quality of the staff, and a higher turnover in court personnel. Over the five years between elections about half of the courts and the rayon and oblast level were vacant for various reasons. The proportion of judges at an age most experienced in a worldly and professional sense (those of 40-60 years of age) declined from 61 to 33 percent from 1970 to 1985.

Court personnel, increasingly drawn from the bottom of the barrel, are being replenished with poorly trained specialists who are often unable to resist the pressure of the prosecutor in a trial and give a practical evaluation of the materials of the preliminary investigation. From this we get instances of the conviction of innocent citizens, some for serious crimes. The judges' loss of independence has shown itself in the almost complete disappearance of verdicts of not guilty from court practice inasmuch as the judges, feeling indecision, instead of acquitting the innocent have remitted cases for further investigation to the procuracy where they, as a rule, were dropped.

Recently the first fairly serious steps were taken to improve the judicial branch and make it a strong and effective power firmly guaranteeing the rights of individual citizens and of society. The Fundamental Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Judicial System, a USSR Law on the status of judges, and a number of accompanying laws and decrees have been adopted, and the material security of court staff has been improved. And these measures are already having an effect today—independence of the judges is increasing, and the personnel is improving. But this process is taking place slowly.

It is still impossible to consider resolved the problem of the independence of judges, their subordination only to the law, and the negation of outside influences on the court when ruling on cases. The issue of additional guarantees of the court's independence and of making the court more democratic organizationally, and consequently of making it more just, should be discussed in the course of preparing the draft of the USSR Constitution.

Under these conditions it seems advisable to elect or appoint judges for life or, let us say, when they have achieved the age of 65-70 years. This would create a more stable and independent position for judges and

increase the role and the authority of the court in society. After careful selection of the candidates, the election of judges to the courts of the Union and autonomous republics should be entrusted to the Supreme Soviets of those republics, and their appointment to the USSR Supreme Court—to the president of the USSR with the agreement of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Recently the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted more than 10 laws which regulate various parts of public life and which have entrusted the courts with new obligations in addition to those they already have. Now under the authority of the courts are disputes which may arise as the result of the application of legislation on land, local self-determination, the local economy, responsibility for infringement on the national equality of citizens, etc. All of this will lead to an increase in the volume of work for the courts. A significant increase in the work of the courts is also expected as a result of a planned replacement of departmental procedure by court procedure for resolving labor disputes according to lists one and two and the regulations on discipline. As a result of the adoption of this law alone, approximately 23 million workers who were previously deprived of the right of access to court will now receive that right. The functions of the courts for examining complaints about the actions of administrative organs will be significantly broadened. After 1 July 1990 the courts will be obligated to examine complaints about the illegal actions of organs of state administration and officials infringing upon the rights of citizens. There will be a significant number of cases as a result of the adoption of the law "On the Maintenance of Pensions of Citizens in the USSR."

It can be no other way under conditions of a democratic process: Citizens must have every opportunity for access to the courts for the defense of their rights. But unfortunately the issues of creating for the courts the necessary conditions for carrying out the growing volume of work have not been resolved. And without that it will be very difficult to implement a real defense of the rights of citizens. Therefore taking into consideration the special nature of the aforementioned cases, for the evaluation of which there is no provision in the existing structure of the courts, it is advisable to discuss the question of creating a special system of justice which would have authority over the evaluation of cases arising from legal matters pertaining to the administration and state. It is possible to create a system of these courts within the framework of the existing courts by forming specialized boards of judges.

From our point of view the time has come to discuss one more problem whose resolution could have a positive effect on justice. I am talking about the advisability of creating a system of Union interregional (federal) justice, that is to say of Union courts, procuracies, and investigative organs, and including them in the united system of organs currently functioning. There is a need to resolve this issue because of the fundamental renewal of the Soviet federation, which presupposes setting limits on the powers of the center, the Union republics, and autonomous formations. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet are already implementing measures in this direction. And not far behind will be the adoption of a Union treaty and then a USSR Constitution and the constitutions of Union and autonomous republics, which for the most part will end this process.

On the other hand, the situation in the country is such that instances of violation of all-Union legislation in the republics, infringement on the rights and freedoms of citizens, commission of crimes because of national enmity, etc. are spreading. As a result, the rights of citizens affirmed by the USSR Constitution are not being firmly guaranteed by the existing law enforcement structure.

It is only necessary to cite one example to illustrate such an abnormal situation. Everyone knows how many violations and even serious crimes are being committed on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and Armenian SSR as a result of national enmity. But as a result of pressure applied by local organs of power as well as all types on informal formations, the law enforcement organs of these republics are unable in essence to investigate and examine cases concerning these crimes objectively, thoroughly, and fairly. Therefore the supreme courts of a number of republics often make the request to transfer cases to the courts of other republics. Their requests must be satisfied, although the abnormality of such a situation, as they say, is apparent. In addition, great difficulties are created inasmuch as witnesses and victims do not wish to appear in the courts of other republics.

The authority of the newly created structure of law enforcement organs could include investigation and examination of state crimes, including those committed because of interethnic conflicts, as well as cases concerning violations of environmental legislation when they affect the interests of several Union republics and extraterritorial cases concerning drug trafficking, the black market, organized crime, etc. Their jurisdiction should also include civil disputes about economic questions between the USSR and Union and autonomous republics as well as citizens' disputes with mixed enterprises, joint-stock societies, and cooperatives functioning on the territory of several republics. This, of course, is only an approximate list.

Of course, the action of two more or less parallel structures presupposes a clear limitation of authorities between them and, at the same time, strictly coordinated activity which precludes conflicts between Union and republic organs.

It is imagined that the resolution of the aforementioned issues as well as other problems connected with them will advance court and legal reform by creating an independent judicial branch and will serve to form and strengthen the foundations of a rule-of-law state.

Different Forms of 'Union Treaty' Discussed

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[Article by Academician V. Kudryavtsev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and B. Topornin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law: "What Kind of New Union Treaty We Should Have"]

[Text] The question of the Union treaty is today at the epicenter of the country's political life. And this is natural. The profound crisis in which our society has found itself is largely "bogged down" on problems of the state arrangement and national relations, and extricating ourselves from the crisis without cardinal reforms of the structure of relations which have taken shape in the USSR is practically impossible. Attempts to postpone solution of the question and suppose that it would be removed of its own accord with the implementation of political and economic reforms have not been justified. And not only because the reforms are as yet far from complete. National-state problems, particularly in a country such as ours, play an extremely important, independent part, and underestimating their consequences is dangerous.

It may be said with every justification that a new Union treaty is essential to us today no less than that which was concluded in December 1922 at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR. At that time the treaty on the formation of the USSR was designed to officially structure the association of Soviet republics in a single Union state. Today it is a question of a cardinal rearrangement of the USSR and the imparting of a new character to it. Reality persuades us increasingly strongly with every passing day that the USSR—as it has taken shape as of the present—does not suit the republics incorporated in it. Practically each of them is presenting the Union with a bill for confiscated revenue and missed benefits, the departmental diktat of the center, and disregard for republic interests.

In order to know what we will take and reject from history, a short digression into the not-too-distant past is necessary. We would emphasize that the creation of the USSR in 1922 was a logical consequence of the realization of the interests of the Union republics associated in it. It would otherwise have been impossible to defend and strengthen Soviet power, restore the war- ravaged economy, and provide for security and defense. The threats created by the hostile encirclement were obvious. But the magnetic attraction of the USSR was explained also by its democratic organization. Particular significance was attached to the fact that, according to the declaration and treaty on the formation of the USSR in 1922, the Union republics remained sovereign states with their own territory, citizenship, state authorities, and legal system.

In fact, from the very outset the USSR "exceeded" the customary yardsticks of classical federalism. It is well known that in no Western federation—the United States, the FRG, Austria, Canada, and others—do its members have sovereign state status. Nor is this the case in Yugoslavia or the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Unfortunately, this potential of ours was not subsequently developed and made use of. What resulted in practice was a playing at self-sufficiency and independence which was increasingly often and increasingly strictly abridged from the center.

From the 1930's up to and including the 1980's the USSR, while preserving the formal indications of a federative arrangement, was essentially a strictly centralized, bureaucratically administered unitary state. The role of the republics, both Union and autonomous, amounted mainly to a transference to the localities of the decisions and policy of the Union. The "bands" which tied the Union in one were increasingly less common interests and mutual trust, and more and more levers of the administrative-command system, primarily the party and state apparatus and the punitive mechanism. The atmosphere of the "cold war" and the existence of a large army and strong military-industrial complex played their part. The centralized planning of production and distribution and departmental specialization predominated in the country's economy.

In our day all these "bands" have fallen away. But it is now that the objective factors of the association of the republics and their real interests which should be starting to speak at full voice. If they do not, the Union is unnecessary, and it could suffer the fate of the British Empire whose disintegration was dictated by the very course of history. Some people are today predicting such a fate for us also. Life, however, is showing increasingly graphically that the Union means not an artificial formation and a zigzag of history but the vital requirements of a multinational society. What are they?

It would be wrong today to repeat what was right in 1922. Cardinal changes have occurred in the country and in the world. New economic prospects are opening up with the country's transition to a market economy. Processes of democratization, the development of political pluralism, and the emergence of increasingly new public associations which are frequently feeling cramped within republic borders, are acting as unifying factors. It has to be considered that society still needs armed forces and forces of security and public order. It is difficult to have just missile forces, a submarine fleet, an air defense system, and others individually. Finally, let us not forget about the historical ties which have taken shape in many cases over centuries, severing which would mean cutting to the quick.

The elaboration and adoption of a new Union treaty should not, evidently, be linked directly with the preparation of a new USSR Constitution as was at times supposed earlier. It is well known that the 1922 treaty was later perceived, albeit with slight alterations, in the

1924 Constitution as a section of it. But subsequently—and the policy of unitarization was reflected here—the role of the treaty proved diminished, and it disappeared from the structure of the constitution. The provisions formulated in the treaty were revised and supplemented in the way customary for the Constitution. The connection with the treaty was not taken into consideration either in terms of the content or the procedure of the passage of amendments. It hardly needs proving that such an attitude toward the Union treaty is unacceptable. The treaty should be separated from the Constitution and should preserve its validity together with it.

In fact, three versions of a Union treaty are possible. First, it could contain the most general initial principles of the arrangement of the Union, and consequently be a document short in length. In this case the treaty's provisions would be developed and specified in the Constitution, and they themselves, if at all, would only be repeated as base articles of the Constitution. Second, the Union treaty would enshrine provisions determining the constitutional character of the Union completely. This treaty could be an integral part of the Constitution as a section of it, the difference being however that the procedure of its revision and amplification would be of a particular nature. For example, there would have to be for this the obligatory consent of all the republics, not a majority of USSR people's deputies. And, third, an approach to the treaty where it is identical to the country's Constitution is not ruled out. For this it would be necessary to incorporate in the treaty all matters which are regulated by the Constitution, primarily the section on citizens' rights and liberties.

Of course, the treaty is not being created in a void. The USSR Supreme Soviet has recently enacted a package of laws which decide many questions with which a Union treaty would inevitably deal. These include the laws on delimiting authority between the USSR and the subjects of the federation, on economic relations between them, on the procedure of secession from the USSR, on the languages of the peoples of the USSR, USSR citizenship, and others. It is sometimes said that it is sufficient to enact one or two laws more, and the problem of the Union treaty will be removed altogether.

While by no means belittling the significance of the legislative work done by the USSR Supreme Soviet, mention has at the same time to be made of the following. It would be extremely difficult to create a Union treaty by way of the consolidation of the wording of different laws. The integrity of intent and intrinsic concordance and consistency of the provisions and sections of the document would be lost. There is another material point also: We need to see how the new laws are accepted, how effectively they operate, and what "works" in them and what has proven nonviable. And, finally and most importantly, perhaps—a Union treaty cannot be elaborated and sent down "from above," it must be the work of the republics themselves.

Even in the laws on delimitation of the authority of the Union and the republics and economic relations between them, which have only just been enacted, traces of the old approach when the center endeavored to decide all basic issues are perceptible despite all their newness. The new treaty should renounce the customary ideas and move more boldly toward nonstandard solutions. In any event, escape the cliche: Only a federation, all the rest—anathema.

Federalism has gained strong positions in the world. This principle of state arrangement is employed not only under conditions of a multinational society but also where the national factor plays far from the main part. There are in the world many federative states which are as a rule important, strong, and influential. In the Americas these are the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina; in Europe these are the USSR, the FRG, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia; in Asia these are India, Malaysia, and Pakistan; in Africa, Nigeria. Federalism contributes to a decentralization of power, the autonomy and independence of the localities, and the development of democratic forms of administration. It is highly regarded—as a rational, efficient model of administration.

Whereas a federation is always a state union understood as one state—and the law which operates within it is domestic law, primarily constitutional law—a confederation is a union of states united by an international treaty. The confederation itself is not an individual state.

World history does not abound in examples of confederation. A confederation was maintained for the longest period of time—from 1291 through 1848—in Switzerland. Considerably shorter was the confederation in North America (1778-1787). Federations now exist in their place. But the conclusion that the confederation "passed away" centuries ago would be inaccurate. From 1981 through 1989 two African countries—Senegal and The Gambia—were in a confederative union which came to be called Senegambia. The confederation proved nonviable but bequeathed several interesting documents.

Examining the content of the future Union treaty, it is undoubtedly necessary to proceed from the conditions of our own development. The choice of form of state arrangement is predetermined not by a plan but life's realities. But world experience should not be disregarded.

To judge by the situation taking shape in the country, the Union treaty should on the one hand have its own foundation and basis which unites all the republics incorporated in it, and on the other be sufficiently flexible, envisaging for all its members possibilities of choice of form most suitable for them. Several versions of the republics' incorporation in the Union—including federative, confederative, and so-called "associated membership"—may be modeled in principle. Freedom of choice also implies differences in the status of the

members of the Union, dissimilar relations between them, and different benefits determined by the parties' agreements.

Of fundamental significance for the new Union treaty is determination of the list of its participants. It is well known that only the Union republics were such in 1922. They should, of course, remain such for the future also. But not only these. According to the latest laws, the autonomous republics whose role in the life of the country has increased sharply are also recognized as subjects of the federation. They should participate in both the elaboration and adoption of the Union treaty—this is beyond question.

Much will depend on how we understand the form of the future union. Will it continue into the future also as a union of "Union" republics or will this be, as suggested, an association of all republics and autonomous formations which will be part of the union on an equal basis? The supporters of the second possibility usually give as the reason for their proposal the fact that all peoples—large and small—are equal and each has an equal right to self-determination. There can be no denying this, of course. But are we not at times endeavoring to equate people and state, and are we not introducing superfluous and unsafe statization to the processes of economic development? The equality of the peoples and the diversity of state forms are not in reality as strictly coupled as might appear at first sight.

Were we to seek a common denominator of the innovations concerning the approach to the Union treaty, it should be the principle of it not being the Union which "bestows" rights on the republics, and consequently being able to abridge and limit these rights at its discretion, but of the republics agreeing on what authority to transfer to the Union. The Union does not have the right to revise or transgress this authority. A most important question of the Union treaty arises here—the priority of all-Union or republic laws.

The reason why this question has recently come to the fore and has in places assumed disquieting overtones even is perfectly understandable. It is the long diktat of the center which has failed to come to terms with the republics' interests. Union legislation has essentially substituted for republic provisions and has interfered in what is the prerogative of the local authorities. Whence today's reaction, to the point of the counterpoise of all-Union and republic laws.

How is this question to be resolved in civilized manner? It is necessary for this to clearly separate the jurisdiction of the Union and the republics. Three spheres of relations are formed here: 1) the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics forming the bulk of dealings; 2) the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR, which should incorporate that and only that which is transferred to the center by the Union republics; 3) joint jurisdiction, where each question has to be decided by mutual agreement, including, possibly, variously in respect of different republics. Given such a composition of relations it is obvious that the question of the priority of a Union or republic law should also be viewed in differentiated manner. Not every Union law takes precedence over republic laws, and the other way about also. If it is a question of the exclusive competence of a republic, the republic enactment takes precedence; in the second case, the Union enactment. And given joint jurisdiction? At the parties' agreement, evidently.

The principle of the sovereignty of a Union republic needs to be enshrined and further developed with regard for the bitter lessons of the past. What needs to be done to ensure that it be realized and not remain on paper? The Union treaty, evidently, should not confine itself to a proclamation of the actual principle but give thought to the necessary provisions, procedures, and structures. The economic foundations of sovereignty merit particular attention. A republic will be unable to solve questions of its development unless it obtains the possibility of possessing, utilizing, and disposing of its own national wealth and regulating economic and social development on its territory.

Many sovereign rights of the Union republics were recorded in the constitutions earlier also but were not utilized. It is obvious that they should not only be repeated but developed. The right to conclude international treaties and agreements on matters of interest to the republic, say. Such a practice pertains to the FRG states and Quebec in Canada. The Union republics could independently decide the question of the forms in which they would exercise the right to representation in foreign states, in some cases where there are special interests, consulates and embassies; in others, the allocation of a quota within USSR embassies are possible.

While emphasizing the role and significance of the republics and their "primacy" in relation to the Union, we cannot forget about another aspect. The USSR—a state created by the republics—should in turn be endowed with the necessary authority. Otherwise it will remain a formless formation incapable of accomplishing its purpose.

What specifically should be reserved to the USSR? Determination of the extent of its authority is at times evoking contradictory opinions. On the one hand it is proposed essentially to confine ourselves to a cosmetic overhaul, preserving the majority of today's powers, and on the other hand, maximally to "denude" the Union. Extremes are always harmful. It would be expedient to reserve to the USSR merely that which it is in the interests of the republics themselves more efficient to decide in the center, employing the potential of the whole Union. Such a situation could take shape also when a republic is not in a position to accomplish certain tasks like, for example, the upkeep of a modern army, the execution of space programs, the management of large-scale economic complexes and others. What may be done only by the Union constitutes the subject of its exclusive jurisdiction.

The list of questions which pertain to the joint competence of the republics and the Union would seem enormous. Joint jurisdiction means that the Union would, as a rule, establish the general principles of the solution of this question or the other mainly by way of the enactment of fundamentals of legislation, while the specification and development of these principles would be the concern of the republics. An analysis of the legal situation in the country shows, however, that we have yet to overcome the centralism complex. Not only the fundamentals but also laws whose place is in the republic legal systems are still being enacted at the Union level.

Such a sphere of joint jurisdiction as the rights, liberties, and duties of the citizens merits special attention. We can hardly agree with those who advocate the complete transfer of these matters from the jurisdiction of the Union to that of the republics. The USSR is today bound by many most important international treaties, pacts, conventions, summary documents, and other instruments in the sphere of human rights which impose serious obligations upon it. But even this is not the main point. The main purpose of the association of the republics is to ensure people's free and equal development, creating all the necessary conditions of their life. The Union, of course, cannot remain aloof from this.

It is necessary to establish the procedure of determination of the priority of a republic or Union enactment when the level of jurisdiction is uncertain or, for some reason or other, contentious. But if there is no dispute, the priority of this law or the other enacted in accordance with the authority of a Union or republic body should not give rise to uncertainty. And there is no infringement of anyone's sovereignty here because the particular authority is transferred to the other party voluntarily upon mutual consent.

I would like to say that artificial contradictions between the Union and the republics are constructed and extremes of judgment are permitted at times. It is said, for example, that the republics' transfer of rights to the Union represents an impairment of their sovereignty, and what is more it is interpreted only from the standpoint of noninterference and independence while the interests of interaction and cooperation, recognition of joint interests, and accordingly the creation of international and supranational structures are ignored altogether. Yet world development is moving along the path of a strengthening of the interconnection of sovereign states and their assent to the transfer of some of their rights to other structures.

We would recall that questions of the correlation of our national legislation and the rules of international law have now also come to be decided in a more civilized manner. The USSR is a sovereign state and there is hardly any doubt about this. But here we read Article 6 of the recently enacted USSR Law on Income Tax of the Populace. It says: "If an international treaty of the USSR establishes rules different from those contained in Soviet legislation on taxation, the rules of the international treaty apply."

What, then? Are we losing our sovereignty? Are we farming out our laws to international organizations? Nothing of the sort. The doubts here are merely the fruit of incomprehension, more precisely elementary legal incompetence. An international treaty is of higher precedence than an all-Union law because it binds by mutual commitments at least several states: given its violation, havoc would be played with these relationships and the world rule of law would collapse. And the contracting states are distinctly aware of this. From the viewpoint of their sovereignty it should not be forgotten that an international treaty itself arises not in defiance but in accordance with the wishes of states, the USSR included, since they signed and ratified it. Expressing in this treaty its sovereign will, naturally a country must consistently realize it, at the time of collisions with domestic (national) legislation included.

The same or a similar situation also arises in the event of the conclusion of a Union treaty or the adoption of another legislative instrument on the relations of the center and the localities and the USSR and the Union republics. If this state authority or the other has been transferred to the center, it should exercise it otherwise the subject of the mutual arrangements is altogether lost.

How to conclude such a Union treaty—immediately or, for example, on the basis of preliminary or parallel economic, political, and cultural agreements between individual Union republics—is another matter. It would seem to us that both these paths are possible.

Regional Editors Hold Roundtable on Press

90US1049A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 June 90 Second Edition p 2

[Roundtable discussion with party newspaper editors at PRAVDA festival conducted by V. Kozhemiko, prepared by N. Demidov; date not specified: "Are We Influencing Minds and Hearts?"]

[Text] *We have already reported that editors of many party newspapers were active participants in the PRAVDA festival.*

We publish here a brief record of a "roundtable" discussion. The following newspaper editors took part in the discussion: G. Glushkov, BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY (city of Baku); Yu. Ivanov, VYSHKA (city of Baku); L. Kryuchkova, PRIOKSKAYA PRAVDA (city of Ryazan); B. Mkrtchyan, KOMMUNIST (city of Yerevan); V. Stadnichenko, RADYANSKA UKRAIN (city of Kiev); M. Ugrekhelidze, KOMMUNIST (city of Tbilisi); and also newspaper deputy editors V. Rabayev, KRASNOYE ZNAMYA (city of Vladivostok); N. Lipans, departmental manager of the newspaper VECHERNIY DUSHANBE; L. Savitskaya, deputy editor of KUZNETSKIY RABOCHIY (city of Novokuznetsk), and Yu. Tishchenko, chief

secretary of SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA. The meeting was conducted by V. Kozhemiko, a member of the editorial board and editor of PRAVDA's press and political and social journalism department.

[Kozhemiko] It was no accident that we invited editors of republic, oblast, kray, city, and rayon newspapers to the PRAVDA festival. We are convinced that this will strengthen our ties and contacts, and, indeed, we also simply wanted you to see the festival with your own eyes and to present your own observations and proposals. Perhaps there will also be something useful for our future broad measures. Shall we begin the festival?

[Savitskaya] I participated in several discussions, and I was surprised by how many people there were. There was talk at the meeting, which the ideological department of the newspaper arranged, about the fate of socialism, and many were profoundly disturbed by the problems that were brought up, and interesting speeches were heard in the hall. But at the discussions organized by your department—"Political and Social Journalism and the Fate of the Country"—there was complete babel. In the future, apparently, this has to be taken into account, larger accommodations have to be selected. But, nonetheless, the main thing is that it is a pleasure to see people's enthusiasm.

[Stadnichenko] I have this proposal. Perhaps, starting with next year, try to hold a nationwide PRAVDA festival? We would take part in it in Moscow and in Kiev. In this connection there is also this opinion: Our newspapers also can have their own celebrations. But in principle the idea of a celebration should be developed in general. And to meet more frequently, inasmuch as all of us journalists are moving now in the direction of politicization of the press and assumption of our own positions. But we are moving at different levels and at different speeds. That is, some have moved forward, some have acquired a lot of experience, and others are not yet accomplishing very much.

And here it is impossible not to mention the CPSU Central Committee resolution concerning PRAVDA. Why is this document valuable to us? By the very fact of its adoption, inasmuch as we recently have been feeling that we are being left at the side of the road of party life. I understand all the complexities of the situation, when even a kind of confusion surfaced. And it is good that under such circumstances the CPSU Central Committee nonetheless indicated that the press, in particular PRAVDA, is an effective means in the fight for human minds and hearts. This is very important.

[Glushkov] In my opinion, everything should not be reduced to only a PRAVDA celebration. The question should be specifically about a festival of the party press, and it would be worthwhile expanding the boundaries from the USSR Exhibit of the Achievements of the National Economy to other regions. And it should be done in Moscow in such a way that representatives not only of central but also of local newspapers and journals have their own pavilions and conduct meetings with readers.

[Kozhemiko] We will definitely take your proposals into account, especially because in fact the subject concerns the consolidation of the party press at the difficult and critical political stage that the country and the CPSU are going through.

[Savitskaya] For the last five years the KUZNETSKIY RABOCHIY has been adding 5,000 copies annually. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the city residents are voting for us with their purses, today our future fate is obscure and unknown. The newspaper has two publishers—the city party committee and the city soviet. But in the state budget in principle we receive not one ruble from one or the other, although we bring about R700,000 of clear income to the state treasury.

This situation has developed now: As we understand it, the city party committee intends, apparently, to publish its own weekly, but the city soviet wants to make us its own organ. And this would probably be normal in principle. But another thing is abnormal. On the one hand today the workers committees are the real strength in the city, but on the other hand, unfortunately, it turned out that they and the city party committee did not consolidate.

[Lipans] Indeed, the newspaper at times ends up between two fires. Somehow our newspaper photographer photographed a meeting, and, without coordination, he immediately placed the photo in an issue of the newspaper. And so we were then bombarded from both sides. First, the informals—why were their photographs printed: Now, they say, everyone will recognize their faces. They even planned to burn the editorial office, and there were many threats.

[Kozhemiko] Probably it is most likely that they did not like something in your treatment, in your assessment?

[Lipans] But there was only the usual short stereotyped caption! It said a meeting was held. And that is all. But the city party committee was also displeased. But then, are we to remain silent?

[Stadnichenko] We followed with alarm the events that took place in your Tajikistan, and we understood what this outburst could lead to. I cannot give exact estimates, but it seemed to me that your newspaper VECHERNIY DUSHANBE would have to report material on this every day. I was surprised that you had difficulty with this. The Ukraine is also boiling up, and it is simply impossible, of course, to throw light on everything that happens. But here we have cooperation with the Central Committee of the republic Communist Party. It was realized in the editorial office that we could not handle this situation without rethinking the staff schedule, and a special subdivision was established. We called it a political reaction department; that is, we fine-tuned it for

quick action. Today, practically the entire third page is devoted to the general rubric of "Political Life" every day.

Today, the word "position" has become a kind of touchstone for the party publisher, the editorial board, and the editor, by which political devotion to the work of the CPSU is verified. But, on the other hand, sometimes we do not think about what should be said not simply about a party position but about a position on the CPSU Central Committee Party Platform. There is after all official organizational and legal registration of other political parties: UKhS (Ukrainian Helsinki Union) and "Rukh."

Another press is also appearing. How do we manage opportunities for our influence and, perhaps, speaking frankly, our survival also in a pluralism not just of opinions but of publications themselves?

In my opinion, we have a strong tradition—not transforming ourselves into some kind of a closed publication, caste-like and orthodox, and not being afraid of criticizing our own organizations, but you will not find criticism of themselves in "Rukh" or other publications. That is, RADYANSKA UKRAINA strives and attempts to be popular and democratic, and it understands that if we do not criticize ourselves the communist press will not survive. We are trying firmly to cleanse our party of scum, but our opponents, so to say, observe complete "cleanliness" and do not allow themselves to be touched. In my opinion, this is also one of the topics for reflection.

[Mkrtchyan] Party workers perform very poorly and very little for their newspapers. It was also correctly noted by the editor of RADYANSKA UKRAINA that informal organizations cannot stand criticism directed against them. They publish the most varied articles—from clearly wild behavior to open anti-Sovietism, even almost appeals to armed insurrection. And? Everyone is silent, and no one is doing anything, either in offices or on editorial staffs. That is, we ourselves are letting our authority slide. PRAVDA should set the tone here, and not only it. We also have IZVESTIYA—an official organ which should also think more about the interests of the federation and the interests of the entire country.

[Kryuchkova] Our oblast party committee and the newspaper did not go underground. I think that we are conducting the correct line. What does it consist of? First of all, not to copy the central press. A copy is always worse than the original, especially in a provincial implementation. It is impossible now, of course, to avoid political questions, but nevertheless in my opinion they are not the main factor for us. The main thing still is the individual's specific affairs. People are troubled most of all by the economic disorder. That is the reason the party oblast committee fully undertook a socioeconomic program. For our newspaper, although perhaps some think it is unfashionable, this has become the number one subject.

Despite everything, Ryazan is among the few oblasts that are increasing the production of agricultural products. Naturally there is no full prosperity anywhere. We have a lot of difficulties. But at least people have some confidence that work is going ahead. I have been involved in rural problems for 15 years. And when I see how the culture of agriculture and cattlebreeding is changing, and what new cadres have come, I think it is precisely this that the paper should write about. Because the authority of the party is raised first and foremost by deeds.

And the second basic direction of the newspaper is moral education. Because no matter what the times are, a lot depends on the spirit of the individual.

[Ivanov] In our concerns about the individual we frequently forget about the journalists themselves. Even today no mention has been made of the Law on the Press. But all of us are in a disastrous state. Even PRAVDA members are experiencing the same difficulties as the local press.

[Kozhemiko] And you thought the PRAVDA members live better?

[Ivanov] The fact is, in my opinion, that we must be an example in this sense. In one of the discussions during the festival it was noted that even PRAVDA could not protect its own correspondents in the difficult situation. What is to be said about the local press? That the question of the social protection of journalists is very critical. But the draft law, which we were reading, does not seem to guarantee this protection.

Our editorial office went through two trials with "heroes" of sharp critical speeches. We lost one case and half-lost another. Very likely because the entire editorial staff had only two or three dictaphones, and we were unable to convince the court of what the journalists wrote in their notes. We lag the informals both in efficiency and material and technical support.

[Rabayev] Well, here we have hit on editorial funds. Where to get money, how to live, and how to get out of poverty. This troubles everyone now. I, for example, feel this way: Hold a festival of our newspaper in the spring and autumn. I am already thinking about where to get the money and how much it will cost. And we have taught ourselves how to earn. With great battles, it is true, but we established our own fund of journalistic initiatives. We opened an account in a cooperative bank. All of this seemed illegal to some. But it was settled. Now we have our own account, and we have been accumulating money for eight months already. Where do we get it? It is paid advertising and our own profit, but not that profit which we transfer to the party treasury. As a result, we buy machines for the editorial staff, and we do a lot of other things to improve the conditions of our work. Thus, I maintain: Every newspaper, whether it wants to or not, will learn how to earn.

[Kozhemiko] Representatives of various republics of the country have gathered here. What kinds of problems do you see in reporting on interethnic problems in the press?

[Mkrtchyan] I would like the central organs of the press to be more attentive to interethnic problems. It is better at times not to publish and not to make any comments than to do what is sometimes done. Unfounded and superficial labels should be avoided. If, for example, I go somewhere in Mozambique and within an hour write about the problems that are tormenting the country, who needs this? And we frequently have people come to this country who are incompetent, not knowing the history and culture of the people, and who do not understand the essence of these conflicts. But they immediately start to judge everything. Moreover, categorically allowing for no redress. I simply ask that you be very careful with material relating to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and if someone does come then he should also listen to the people and live here a while so that there would be no, excuse me, rash nonsense.

[Ugrekhelidze] It seems to me that in elaborating on complex interethnic problems we should at least observe the elementary rules of journalism. Any national culture is a universal human value, and the whole world should be concerned about preserving and propagating each of these cultures. Otherwise, nothing will succeed. This requires very high skill, very high competence, and a search for the most common political forces in all individual movements from the standpoint of the progressive development of society.

[Tishchenko] I will add that it is unbelievably difficult now to work on Russian newspapers in Moldavia Every word is literally screened on the part of both the Moldavian-speaking and the Russian-speaking population. One has to keep oneself within a strict framework all of the time, in order not to offend one side or the other. The Russian-speaking population, and this includes Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Gagauz, accuse us of the newspaper being feeble and led by people's fronts. As soon as we say something in defense of the Russian-speaking population, then Moldavian publications start to "take aim" at us. How does one comport oneself? It is explained for us all the time now: If you want to criticize someone, it is better not to do it. But then and there comes a rebuke from the other side for feebleness.

[Stadnichenko] I will once again return to the beginning of our discussion—the relationship with party organs. The question is extremely important, and now, on the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress, it is in need of especially deep analysis. We are working with the republic's party Central Committee in full trust, we have gotten away from the term "leadership" and arrived at the term "cooperation." Apparently, everyone needs this now. But then, nonetheless, how are we to operate under multiparty conditions? And while understanding this, there is still no know-how. Very likely, the classic type of newspaper that we all liked, on which we were brought up, and which we learned to make, is becoming a thing of the past. And we all have to think seriously about what the communist press should be like in the future. And how more successfully to continue the fight for the minds and hearts of people.

Retired KGB General Stripped of Rank, Honors

LD3006102590 Moscow TASS in English 1018 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—Oleg Kalugin, a retired KGB general who made several public appearances denouncing KGB practices, has been stripped of his military rank, government awards, and other privileges.

A special presidential decree issued at the request of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) stripped Kalugin of government awards for actions discrediting the honour and dignity of a state security officer.

The USSR Council of Ministers stripped him of the rank of retired major general.

The KGB chairman also stripped Kalugin of the honorary security officer badge and other KGB decorations.

The KGB leadership has denounced Kalugin for libel.

Human Rights Seen 'Gaining Ground' in USSR

90UN1591A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by Ella Maksimova: "Who Will Defend Rights?"]

[Text] Only students in the lower grades cannot remember the time when the words "personal freedoms" and "respect for human rights" were used only in an insulting, criminal context. Those who demanded that international agreements signed by our government be respected were exiled from the country and thrown in jail, or in some cases, into psychiatric hospitals.

The term defender of rights was written only in quotation marks. "Are you saying we Soviets do not have rights?! Open up the USSR Constitution!" But who opened it? The paper law was needed for paper. For the lead article on an anniversary, a scholarly dissertation on our great democratic possibilities, a pompous paper at an international symposium. We don't know the sensation, even the bearing, the regard of a person whose victorious confidence in his rightness is in fact protected by the entire force of state power and public monitoring.

But perestroyka is gaining ground. I received an invitation in March to a meeting of an organizing committee preparing the founding meeting of the Committee of Soviet Society for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Cooperation. I was invited not as a correspondent, but as a member of the organizing committee, so the following can be considered the diary of a participant.

The draft charters of the future committee and its declarations were touching in their earnestness and candor:

"It must be said at present with bitterness and regret that the governmental and political structures which have developed in our country's history provide poorly for the weak protection and development of human rights, that the social and legal defenselessness of the individual has been created and sustained by many political and legal institutes, ideological dogmas, the diktat and absolute power of government agencies, the dependence of citizens on arbitrary bureaucrats, and the low level of consumption.... We note with concern that international standards of human rights are still not an integral part of the legislative process in the USSR.... We will promote the establishment of law and order in society, of stronger guarantees for citizens' personal freedom..."

Most of the names on the list of members of the organizing committee are deservedly respected. These people's activity and reputation have allowed them to undertake with a clean conscience the sacred cause for which society has suffered. It is true that not everyone by far was present, but the meeting was also significant in the spirit and content of the speeches. The goal was not to pretend at being defenders, but to defend.

Today, there is no one and no reason to deceive. However, there are still those who want to further their own career, to fly all over the world with the mandate of the voice of popular aspirations. But that was not the committee's main concern, which was how to create an effective, independent, nonpolitical association consisting of people of like minds, honest, decent people who would have a single advantage in the face of all government organs and agencies: the force of personal authority and the trust of their countrymen. The committee intended to invite defenders of rights from the sixties and seventies, people who set an example of the unity of duty and commitment.

It is rumored that over five million unanswered complaints are lying in various central agencies. It is understandable why the committee was concerned above all with the technology of assistance itself: accepting, checking, intervening. The anticipation of hard work and the readiness to defend each person who had been disgraced or had his rights infringed lent encouragement. But how can this be done when millions are involved? By using defense groups at every level, from the top down, to the rayon and village. A national movement for the defense of rights united by the committee was the goal.

The date for the founding meeting had already been set, the regulations defined. But two days later word went around that everything was being cancelled. Over three months of organizational work, worldwide announcements, and suddenly the work stopped in full swing, as if someone had stepped on the brake. Either temporarily or permanently.

The first of the five cochairmen of the committee (all five are people's deputies of the USSR), its coordinator and deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Glasnost, Rights, and Enquiries of Citizens, Natalya Yuryevna Reshetova, was discouraged. Yevdokiya Aleksandrovna Gayer was painfully confused. Boris Ilich Oleynik admitted that he didn't know what was happening. The lawyers in the group preparing the draft documents said, "We're waiting."

Well, everything is readily recognizable. A sure tactic of the command system has always been to leave things mysteriously half-said, cutting off any questions, and a famous mythological argument has been the eyes raised upwards.

Someone didn't like the organizing committee's manner of thinking, someone wants to restyle public action according to his own understanding, to keep it within the bounds of officially allowed democracy? It's not really important who this "who" is. A different question inevitably arises, which the reader will guess even if I don't pose it: What is it that now forces them to carry out someone's wishes? Why did the people's deputies keep quiet?

The old manner of thinking in combination with the new social atmosphere creates absurdities of the transitional period. A so-called committee for human rights!

Cochairman-deputy D. Kerimov ordered a stop. But was such a right granted to a cochairman? No. By the way, rights are not only given, they are also taken away. The reasons: it is too early, too hasty, this hasn't been agreed, that hasn't been taken into consideration, there are no authoritative functions, the mechanism for defense of rights has not been developed. Maybe so. In the final analysis, any doubts and deviations are fully compatible with the framework of a democratic order, where questions are discussed together and honestly. The mechanism for putting a stop to public initiative—that is what is troubling. The members of the organizing committee weren't asked, they were phoned. And the most painful of all is that all of us, once again distressed about the imperfection of our underdeveloped democratic institutions, let someone take care of, or not take care of human rights.

Numerous window-dressing societies, unions, and associations have sprung up in recent decades with a single purpose: to prove that which does not exist; or, if you prefer, to hide that which does exist. The facades covered a gaping abyss. The committees functioned, delegated, represented. An entire science with its own master theoreticians and practitioners at misleading not so much us, who see everything, as the naive Western intelligentsia.

The civic associations now springing up everywhere cannot be compared with such organizations. They are voluntary. They resurrect what the others killed. The politicization of society is also evident in people's desire

to act in all fundamental, basic areas of life, tightly closed to them until recently.

The first condition of previous games of will was cynicism. Cynicism on both sides: by the puppets who accepted the role of citizens, and by the puppeteers behind the curtain. Today it is not puppets, but people who are taking the stage, who believe that everything will be done honestly. Attempts can still be made to control them from the shadows. But as we know, the more light the shorter the shadow.

Presidential Decree Restores Writer's Citizenship

LD3006135990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] We have today received injustices committed in relation to some persons deprived of Soviet citizenship. Being guided by humanitarian considerations and displaying goodwill, the USSR president has examined proposals of the commission on citizenship matters and has adopted a decree on the restoration of USSR citizenship to the writers Aleksandr Zinovyev, Vladimir Maksimov, and Zhores Medvedev.

The work of considering material on the restoration of Soviet citizenship is continuing.

Komsomol Central Committee Plenum Held

PM0207091590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 90 p 3

[Information report "On the Second Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee"]

[Text] The plenum released D. Bragish, secretary of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], from his duties as Komsomol Central Committee Bureau member at his personal request.

In accordance with the Komsomol Statutes and the resolutions of the 21st Komsomol Congress "On the Procedure for Electing Members of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau and Secretaries of the Komsomol Central Committee," the plenum ratified the powers of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau members who were included in it as subjects of the federation: P. Gafton, first secretary of the Moldova Leninist Komsomol Central Committee, and B. Yelagin, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol Central Committee.

The plenum elected I. Pavlov, foreman at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine in Chelyabinsk Oblast, a member of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau.

The plenum adopted a proposal from RSFSR Komsomol Karachayevo-Cherkess Obkom [Oblast Party Committee], Stavropol Kray, on the recalling from the Komsomol Central Committee M. Karakteov who had previously worked as first secretary of this Komsomol Obkom, in connection with his transfer to party work and in accordance with the submitted application.

The plenum ratified the powers of Komsomol Central Committee members and subjects of the federation elected to it by Komsomol organs.

The plenum ratified S. Smirnov, second secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, as chairman of the Komsomol Central Committee Financial and Economic Commission.

The plenum elected Ya. Chudrov, first secretary of the Uralsk Komsomol Obkom in Kazakhstan, as chairman of the Komsomol Central Committee Council for Problems of Young Working People.

Difficulties in Publishing NOVYY MIR Viewed

Editor Claims Paper 'Shut Down'

WA2906191890 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 20, 16 May 90 p 7

[Article by S. Zalygin, NOVYY MIR editor in chief: "How NOVYY MIR Was Shut Down"]

[Text] Dear comrades! Every day we receive hundreds of desperate or threatening letters asking why our subscribers are not receiving our magazine. Has it been shut down, or what?

Yes, we have to provide some explanations. We finally managed to more or less clarify our magazine's situation—the publishing and distribution of its 2.7 million copies this year.

We discovered that about 200,000 copies of the first issue have not been printed yet; 700,000 copies of the second issue remain not printed either; only 1 million copies of the third issue were printed and the rest they promise to print in June. That means that the earliest the subscribers can receive it is August. And there is no definite data on the time when successive issues may come out.

In this way the magazine has been excommunicated from the public and literary life of our country. And that life proceeds at such a fast pace that a delay of a month or a month and a half in the publication of certain material renders it useless. We cannot publish our plans for 1991 either, or sign contracts with authors, and that is shortly before the beginning of the subscription season.

Twenty years ago, at the time of Tvardovskiy, our magazine suffered a similar fate, caused then by the pressure of censorship. Now we publish what we consider necessary, what we have announced, and what the readers expect from us. But possibilities remain possibilities and the result is the same: The magazine has been excommunicated from society.

We are told that there is no paper.

This explanation fails to convince us but it gives rise to a lot of questions.

Our magazine brings tens of millions of rubles in profits to the IZVESTIYA publishers. If the situation is that critical, why can't they use some part of this money to buy paper on the free market? Why can't they use some of the said millions to pay overtime to the printing shop workers?

Who in the publishing house and according to what principles (or lack of such) distributes the paper to various publications and plans for us our production and financial figures?

Why isn't there a single person in the publishing house whose duty it would be to constantly watch the magazine's publishing progress, rather than do it on a occasional basis? We are talking about fulfilling the state orders to the monthly sum of R3.2 million! Even if they organize a separate bureau or sector for the purpose, it will not be a bureaucratic excess or an unnecessary expense.

The readers' indignation is aimed at the editors, but we did not violate the dates set for preparing the issue for print. But the publishers do not consider it necessary to explain the situation to the subscribers. They are hiding behind our backs, even though we have asked for several months now that they print a corresponding explanation in IZVESTIYA. The publishers have accumulated bags of readers' mail with their complaints and requests—did any of them receive a reply? The telephones in the distribution center have been simply disconnected. At the same time the publishing house receives monthly bonuses for meeting the production quotas.

We understand that many publications currently have serious problems with paper, but the situation in our magazine is truly catastrophic: We are being discriminated against most.

N. Yefimov, chairman of the State Committee for the Press, announced in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA that NOVYY MIR "has devoured" the paper of many, many books. But what could our magazine "devour" if it does not come out? Or is this how much the committee chairman knows about things?

Let us ask him then: Who is it that "has devoured" the paper of NOVYY MIR? The committee approved for publication in 1990 a number of new magazines, including some with large distribution. These magazines are not in demand and they incur losses. Does that mean that at the end of the last year the committee could not calculate how much paper there was in the country if three or four months later there was such a critical shortage of it?

Finally, why cannot they cut down to the minimum, if not shut down, the publications that are not in demand? Why don't they apply the same conditions to them that we have existed under for years—in which the number of copies is decided by the subscription figures, and no copies are sold retail?

And we ask the committee the same question we have already asked the publishers: We give to the government even more profit than to the publishers; most of the profits are in rubles and some in hard currency. Why can't some part of the profits be used to buy the paper that the combines produce on top of their quotas? Or buy the paper abroad? That is what the cooperators are doing. A very brisk sale of various newspapers is going on by the state committee entrance in Pushkinskaya Square—whose paper is this?

We have addressed a variety of requests to the State Committee for the Press several times. Did we get help at least once? That did not happen; instead the committee successfully blocked a government decision to increase the editors' salary, which now is no higher than two-thirds the average salary in the Soviet Union.

Finally, why did we never get a reply to any of our requests, whether made orally, in writing, or sent by telegraph to the USSR Supreme Soviet (which is in charge of IZVESTIYA)? Nobody shows any reaction to any of our statements in the press, on radio, or on TV either.

So, in essence our magazine has been shut down. We are fighting it as best we can and we now address the public and mainly our readers: Demand that the NOVYY MIR be reinstated in its civil rights; demand that your order, prepaid a long time ago, be executed; demand it in person and through the legal and public organs. We have to look for a way out together. If NOVYY MIR attracts the attention of some USSR or foreign publisher we could consider a new status for the magazine and new forms of cooperation.

After we reacquire the necessary, even if they are minimal, conditions for our existence we will keep up the level of the publication at all costs. Our portfolio is still full today. The authors that we and our readers value are with us.

And one more thing: After we receive the answers and proposals at this address and after we check certain facts we will call a press conference for the largest number of journalists and tell them about the future life of NOVYY MIR.

[Signed] Editor In Chief S. Zalygin, on behalf of the editorial board

From the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editors: There are a considerable number of letters in our mail written by NOVYY MIR readers who did not receive the magazine. We share their indignation and want to remind you that it was NOVYY MIR that started to return the works of A. Solzhenitsyn to his native country. NOVYY MIR promised to acquaint readers with more of his works this year also. If the IZVESTIYA publishers fail to do their duty

with regard to NOVYY MIR it would be nothing other than a violation of the glasnost principle and a flagrant defiance of the process of democratization in our society.

Delays Blamed on 'State Planning'

90UN2157B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 May 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by V. Malukhin: "(The Most Widely Read Literary Magazine Found Itself) A Prisoner of Glasnost," followed by commentary by B. Kuzmin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press]

[Text] "At present NOVYY MIR can, in essence, be considered shut down." This statement by the magazine's editor in chief S. Zalygin served as the opening for the press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists held at the USSR Union of Writers.

The very wording of the theme for the press conference gave one a feeling of uncertainty and concern: "...in connection with the situation around the magazine." However, the state of things ceased to be a secret for the subscribers a long time ago: The January and the February issues of NOVYY MIR did come out, part of the March issue has been printed, but after that the NOVYY MIR calendar has a blank next to the name of every month. The reason for this—the "Izvestiya" publishers do not have either the production capacities or the paper.

Old subscribers must remember that at the end of the 1960's NOVYY MIR kept appearing with outrageous delays as it was struggling through the obstacles set between the magazine and its readers by the ideological censorship. At first glance the current situation repeats the old one: Almost two thirds of the March copies will only reach us in August. There is just one but rather important fact that constitutes a huge difference between the past and the present. The problems of the magazine's delays were caused by none other than its own popularity. During the unlimited subscription campaign of the last year, NOVYY MIR achieved a record for a literary magazine—2.7 million copies. And in a paradoxical way NOVYY MIR became a hostage of glasnost. According to S. Zalygin's estimate, the magazine's 40 employees help bring into the state budget about R24 million a year of net profit. One could start putting watermarks on the magazine pages, but there is nothing to print it on.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published an address from the NOVYY MIR editorial board to its subscribers which put most of the blame on the IZVESTIYA publishers who failed to provide the paper for the subscription needs. D. Plesser, deputy manager of the publishing house, responded to NOVYY MIR in issue no. 142 of IZVESTIYA. In his opinion the problems of the magazine were created by NOVYY MIR itself as it gained a million subscribers by promising to publish seven volumes of A. Solzhenitsyn's works as a supplement. At the press conference S. Zalygin repudiated this claim in a most categorical manner. Here is what the editors of the magazine wrote last year about their plans to publish the supplement: "We think that as a result of our effort every subscriber will own, if he wants to, these complete works. But let us not show undue haste; we need to have patience, paper, and time. We will inform all interested readers as soon as everything becomes clear"[1]

May the debating sides forgive me, but the argument does not seem all that important to me. First, it is because of the circumstances that make us inform "interested readers" about the dramatic fate of NOVYY MIR itself which many consider the best literary magazine in our country. The second reason is that both IZVESTIYA and NOVYY MIR have been equally victimized by the state planning system driving them into an impasse, as the publishing house just pumps over into the budget the profits earned by the magazine (when S. Zalygin was answering IZVESTIYA's question he agreed with it too). And thirdly, the government used the subscribers' money (R38 million in the case of NOVYY MIR) to finance the state budget, and therefore the government bears a certain responsibility as it guarantees subscribers that they will receive the prepaid magazine. All this naturally on condition that there is someone responsible for providing adequate material resources for the subscriptions; that someone should also see that new publications do not get their materials from someone else's funds.

Everybody remembers last year's battles for unlimited subscription which we saw as a realistic embodiment of glasnost. It took just half a year for us to see that you can defeat an agency but not the system. It could happen before that you subscribed to one newspaper but in the middle of the year you would unexpectedly start receiving another one instead. But now you can stop receiving anything. Our experience with unlimited subscription proved one more thing for the umpteenth time: The basic law of socialism, according to which our increasing needs can be satisfied, works only on the pages of political economy textbooks. In the conditions of the economic wonderland in which we find ourselves, the publisher suffers as distribution grows, a magazine shuts down because too many people want to read it, and the industry with one of the highest profit standards is doomed to a miserable existence. As for the future, the draft Law on the Press in its current form deals with the problems of economic independence for publications and publishers in a rather vague manner.

Petitions flood the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and deputies' inquiries go to various places, but there are no answers yet. Meanwhile, the materials prepared by the editors get outdated, certain works that could have appeared first in NOVYY MIR come out as separate books, indignant letters from the readers come by the bagful, and the already close 80th anniversary of Tvardovskiy's birthday will be celebrated without a special issue of NOVYY MIR in his honor. The department

heads talked at the press conference about the could-have-been issues of the magazine. It hurts to think about what we have lost, about what was taken away from us.

As for materials published in the past and the contents of the editors' portfolio, many employees of NOVYY MIR are convinced that the current situation has been created artificially, that some behind-the-scenes powers are trying to settle their accounts with the magazine. There are a number of reasons that do not allow us to think along the same lines. One of them is the similar situation with some other magazines published by IZVESTIYA—DRUZHBA NARODOV, INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, VOPROSY LITERATURY, SOVETSKIY BALET, etc. IZVESTIYA publishing house manager Yu. Yefremov also mentioned at the press conference that the first printing shops to complete printing NOVYY MIR copies were the ones that are subordinate to the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs. Therefore the root of the problem is not political but economic and technological.

One wants to hope that NOVYY MIR will manage to rectify its position—not only because we get pieces of information from time to time about plans to save it. One wants to hope also because the magazine cannot be and should not be lost for us in principle. But even at present we can suppose that some dubious sponsors will not pass up the opportunity to make the famous magazine serve their purposes.

And what do the editors do now? Go on a long vacation? "No, we are working as usual, we are preparing future issues in advance," says S. Zalygin.

He even hopes still to publish the Solzhenitsyn supplement—supplement to the practically nonexisting magazine.

From the editor: We asked B. Kuzmin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press, for his commentary on the situation:

"This is a problem shared by all of our periodicals, and the crux of the problem is in the lack of printing capacities added to the lack of paper and manpower. This means we do not have the printing machines because the industry development program is not going anywhere, and there is nowhere that we can buy machines as our equipment supplies from the GDR have stopped. They used to provide for 70 percent of our capacity increase. The only plant in the country producing printing machines in Rybinsk is definitely not sufficient, but they have plans to transfer even this plant to a different type of production. That means that our industry will have no new printing equipment whatever. We have used up all our printing reserves and we are facing the 1991 subscription.

"Where is the way out? Hypothetically, we could go back to setting subscription limits, but then the problem of insufficient machine building will acquire political undertones right away. Another possibility is to involve the founders of the periodicals and their publishers in the financing of the printing and paper industries and in equipment purchases. The USSR Union of Writers, for instance, could display a business-like interest in the development of a base for its publications which would include NOVYY MIR too. Thirdly, we could carry out a special purpose acquisition of some production lines as took place in the case of OGONEK, whose sharply increased distribution also exhausted all the existing capacities. And, finally, we have to accelerate sharply the development of our own printing-machine building. As a matter of fact, all we need to remove the problem of the NOVYY MIR is two or three rotary presses and one finishing line. But today there is nowhere to get them. Within the next few days there will be a meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium, and we expect them to discuss all the problems in respect with the publication of periodicals in our country.

Footnotes

1. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No. 36.

Ligachev 'Will Keep on Fighting' for Communism

LD0107175990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1553 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Madrid, July 1 (TANJUG)—Politburo member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Yegor Ligachev, who is considered to be the leader of the hard-line in the Soviet party, has said in an interview to the Spanish newspaper DIARIO 16 that socialism can be saved if it develops faster and is substantially improved.

"Just as I am a communist today so will I be tomorrow, and I will keep on fighting for the further development and advancement of socialism," Ligachev said.

Ligachev underscored that he accepted "perestroyka" and was for a democratic, legal, and pluralist Soviet state.

Ligachev expressed the opinion that the deep processes of democratization of society and the strengthening of the legal state in the Soviet Union would produce initial major economic results.

Air Defense Chief of Staff on Border Problems

PM2906154190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Colonel General of Aviation I. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev; place and date not specified: "Unauthorized Passage, Or What the Air Defense Forces Can and Cannot Do"— first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] It was already reported that a light aircraft violated USSR airspace 9 June south of Batumi from the Turkish side. Some mass media also mentioned this on

the last anniversary of the Rust flight: Once again "they failed, they let another intruder go."

Well, these are natural, logical sentiments. After all, we have so often heard it said and have read before in these same newspapers that our airspace is inviolable. And now.... But is everything really that simple? How well-founded and objective are the complaints directed at the Air Defense Forces in such situations? This is the subject of our correspondent's conversation with Colonel General of Aviation I. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff.

[Falichev] Readers are already aware that our airspace was violated by West German pilot H. Schneider. Are there any further details about the incident that have not been reported?

[Maltsev] K. Targay, director of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Aeronautics Department, said 11 June that competent Turkish bodies will conduct a thorough investigation of this incident. According to him, H. Schneider arrived in Turkey aboard a single-seater civil aircraft with the intention of flying on to Iran and then to the Far East as a tourist. He complied with all the requisite formalities for this and received authorization from the authorities to land at Trabzon.

If a pilot violates his flight plan and leaves the prescribed air corridors in Turkey, criminal proceedings can be instituted against him under that country's laws. Moreover, this is the precinct of the Foreign Ministry, and we have supplied it with all the requisite information. After flying across the border and landing at Batumi Airport, the pilot jumped out of the cockpit and left a basket of flowers and a friendly message on the runway. Seeing people running up to him and a Tu-154 taxiing onto the runway, he swung his light plane round by the tail to face the opposite way and took off.

[Falichev] Did the pilot make this visit on his own initiative or....

[Maltsev] It is hard to imagine what his aims were. He may just be an eccentric who sympathizes with our country, as his message indicates. But it is obviously difficult for a person with insufficient training and knowledge of the specific area and our radars' zone of visibility to make such a flight. The pilot knew the location of our radars in this sector and accurately calculated the time to ensure that he was not detained at the airfield or downed by some chance.

[Falichev] Straight after the incident you said that the Air Defense Forces performed their task. The newspaper reported this. But I am now putting myself in the readers' shoes and the following question suggests itself: How can a foreign aircraft calmly land at our airfield and fly off unimpeded without there being any culprits, so to speak? This is paradoxical. What is the point here?

[Maltsev] The point is that air defense cannot do everything. Nor does it have the right to do everything. Having signed the Chicago Convention we do not, for instance, have the right to shoot down civil aircraft. It is not enough to spot and locate aircraft like this. You have to have the means of intercepting it in the area, including fighter aircraft. We cannot fence off the whole country with antiaircraft missiles. I repeat: We alerted everyone promptly and could have opened fire. Visual ranging posts tracked the intruder. In short, people were responsible and ready to act.

[Falichev] Maybe reinforced groupings could be set up in complex sectors like this which often make the news.

[Maltsev] For what purpose? To shoot everyone down? Let us recall Rust. Do you think we had the right to shoot him down? Orders forbid us shooting down sporting and civil aircraft. It is no coincidence that the Politburo resolution at the time noted that the Air Defense Forces had not terminated the flight, and had not resorted to extreme means. But what means do we have apart from weapons? We cannot terminate such a flight without using weapons.

[Falichev] You mentioned Rust. After that incident there were plans to set up mobile helicopter squadrons capable of terminating flights of this kind....

[Maltsev] Yes, we now have helicopters at the most likely flight paths. But it is, after all, impossible to have them everywhere. We do have 64,000 km of border! It is unfeasible and ruinous for our country to set itself the task of combating every hang glider and sporting aircraft. Especially since we are now cutting back our defense spending and reducing the numerical strength of our troops.

[Falichev] Readers and the Supreme Soviet can be told this then. So can one say that incidents like this have occurred, are occurring, and are in principle still possible in the future?

[Maltsev] We simply have to realize that we have, in a sense, become hostages to the propaganda slogan: "Border under lock and key." A slogan that the mass media, incidentally, helped to create. At the same time, data showing that our own aircraft commit such violations every year, overflying the territory of other neighboring states, were kept secret. But no one shoots them down. And nobody there builds up this this kind of psychological pressure against the army. I could cite dozens of examples relating to just the last two or three years.

Believe me: I am not asking for indulgence, slackness, or sloppiness.

[Falichev] So we all have to change the way we regard such incidents?

[Maltsev] In peacetime, air defenses are not here to fight everything that may fly into our country, but primarily to give warning of a missile attack and to monitor the use of airspace and outer space. Some forces are, of course, kept in readiness to repulse a sudden offensive. We are

certainly tasked with guarding the USSR's airspace. But we must not interpret this in such a way as to prevent even a fly from coming in.

Combat aircraft are a different matter. Our pilots have shot them down and even rammed them.... There have been a considerable number of cases where transporters have been forced to land. Two Iranian aircraft violated the USSR state border 30 June 1986, some 173 km southwest of Baku. Fighters and helicopters on duty alert brought one of them in to land at Kyurdamir Airfield and the other one near Goradiz population center. A Kuwaiti Boeing-727 was forced to land at Yerevan Airport 29 October 1986. Fighters on duty alert forced another intruder back over the state border 25 April 1987....

[Falichev] In the wake of the Rust case, the government and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo adopted a resolution outlining a whole series of measures to equip the Air Defense Forces with modern equipment and to resolve socioeconomic problems and other questions. How far has it been implemented today?

[Maltsev] I will tell you bluntly that three years have now elapsed, yet we have nothing special to boast about here, although a considerable number of sundry decisions appeared at the time. Figuratively speaking, only the parts relating to slogans have been put into effect. For instance, there was talk of completely updating the weapons and supplying radars with higher resolution. Only a small proportion of the very low altitude target reconnaissance and detection equipment has been updated. (These were the altitudes used by Rust and his ilk). The same situation applies to the antiaircraft missile troops and fighter aviation.

When the aforementioned resolution appeared in 1987, the main point it made was that the human factor had malfunctioned. We took appropriate steps to pick and certify cadres for combat command organs and to boost responsibility and vigilance. But the task cannot be performed on enthusiasm alone. You can spend days without sleep, staring at display screens, but there will be no results unless all this is backed up with specific materiel and new equipment. I stress: We have everything we need to resolve combat tasks. But the Air Defense Forces were not set up to combat air hooligans. People must realize that.

The Defense Ministry Collegium recently examined the question of the status of alert duty in the light of the well-known events in 1987. A tremendous amount of research was done to prepare for it. We evaluated the total cost of alert duty and whether, bearing in mind the easing of international tension and the thaw in the military-political climate, there was any need for it to be as strict as it had been since the fifties—that is since the "cold war." It does, after all, cost the state a pretty penny in addition to the great strain imposed on personnel who are incidentally in short supply, and to the tremendous expenditure of equipment and arms. Radar subunits have to be posted every 25-40 km to detect everything crossing the border at low altitude. Yet some radars cost several million rubles [R]. Add to this roughly 70-80 men for each of the new "airfields" who have to be fed, clothed, and kitted out....

[Falichev] In other words, the state cannot economically resolve this task today?

[Maltsev] It is impossible. But most importantly, it does not make sense. After all, defending the border is not an end in itself. It is, of course, a matter of prestige to have a border akin to an impenetrable wall. But do we need this demonstration of military might today when it literally costs the clothes off our own people's backs? Is it not more sensible to defend specific facilities that are of state, conomic, or military value; missile bases; airfields; and cities?

[Falichev] Nonetheless, Igor Mikhaylovich, has it been calculated how much it would cost to provide comprehensive border defense?

[Maltsev] Yes, it has. Roughly R3 billion. But, I repeat, no country in the world has a comprehensive radar field at low and very low altitudes. Not even the United States. Or, incidentally, such an uproar over the problem of aircraft infiltration. Some 56 states, including ours, are signatories to the well-known Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation of 1944 and Amendment "3B."

[Falichev] Two years ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article entitled "How Many Masters of the Sky Are There" in which we tried, for the first time since Rust's flight, to show readers how difficult everything is in our skies and that the reliability of our air border depends on order in the sky and the skillful organization of air traffic within the country. Has anything been decided in this sphere since then?

[Maltsev] Unfortunately, I can give you an unequivocal answer: There are still problems. In particular, problems involved in communicating with airfields and airstrips and alerting air defense subunits and command posts. An aircraft is taking off and we are not told whether it has taken off or not. Aircraft fly without IFF [Identification, Friend or Foe] transponders....

[Falichev] I know what a difficult situation prevails today at command posts and "sites" owing to manpower shortages. Troops sit constantly at their scopes; sometimes there is no one to relieve them for hours or even days on end....

[Maltsev] The situation is indeed a difficult one, although there are norms that determine the maximum period a man can stay at his combat post after which he is simply unable to adequately respond to information he receives. However, we are nearly always forced to violate these norms. Why? We have given shortage of manpower resources as one of the main reasons; this became particularly marked following what I consider to be the

hasty decision to stop drafting students for active military service. Another reason, and not everyone knows this, lies in the fact that the Air Defense Forces have to carry out nonspecific tasks. There is nothing in writing or legislation to say that we tackle many economic questions in addition to alert duty. We have built houses and barracks, and reared hogs and other poultry. Air Defense Forces feed themselves for six months on the meat they produce. This means that a man works in pigpens, tends cows, and procures hay instead of standing alert. And someone else mans his combat post for him. So we are knowingly violating sanitation and hygiene norms and, if you like, moral norms as well. At the same time we realize that we cannot do without this: That is the position the country is in now. It is, of course, also a nuisance that we supply certain "sites" with barrels of water over distances of hundreds of kilometers. In this respect too, the Politburo's decision regarding equipment for these subunits also, regrettably, remains unfulfilled.

Let me stress once again that the Air Defense Forces have been tasked with providing the USSR president with prompt and authentic information about the start of an airborne or space-launched attack so that the requisite decisions can be adopted. So let us determine our position as regards priorities: We either tackle our main tasks or we wage war against airborne hooligans.

In conclusion, let me stress once again that we have everything we need to resolve our combat tasks. But in addition, today we need to take a sober view of the changing world, our country's position in it, and the tasks and potential of air defense.

Central Committe Secretary Discusses Social Mood

PM2906133190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 2, 6

[Unattributed interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov: "You Cannot Build a Home on Your Own"]

[Text] [Interviewer] Oleg Dmitriyevich, recently you have visited those regions of the country where a tense social situation has taken shape and have taken part in the work of a number of party conferences and the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. If you were to sum up these impressions, is it possible to highlight a certain common factor in people's moods on the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Baklanov] I have the firm impression that the majority of people are seeking ways of consolidating the efforts of the party and people in order to prevent a social eruption. The main demand now is to switch from words to deeds. In this situation the value of the constructive activity of each one of us is higher than ever. All honest forces in the country are trying to continue work on the development of perestroyka; the democratization of our society; glasnost; the improvement and ordering of our economy; and the introduction of greater freedom to its structures.

[Interviewer] But in both the soviets and the party there are different views of the ways of resolving these problems. In the CPSU alone at least three platforms have been advanced. Is it possible to find any uniting principle in them?

[Baklanov] I think the uniting factor for the platforms which already exist and for the trends which have not yet been formed should be the main thing—improving the people's life. From the material which has already been elaborated it is essential to synthesize everything valuable for a precise program of actions for the party. Of course, there can be variations when some people break away from the left and right, but it is very important to prevent great tragedies like those which have already happened in some of our republics.

I disagree with those people who say that everything which has been done in the past 72 years has been a tragic mistake. Yes there have been errors, but they cannot be put down to the idea which unites us. After all, we do not abandon general human ideas despite Nero, the Inquisition, or Hiroshima.

I joined the Communist Party and do not intend to become a turncoat, I intend consistently to defend our communist perspective.

From my viewpoint, against the background of the political measures which are being implemented to democratize our society and to create a rule-of-law state, two delaying factors now appear—primarily the state of the economy and also what I would call permissiveness. It is clear that without strengthening the economy political progress may simply choke. And permissiveness is the other side of the medal of democratization, unacceptable to any civilized state.

[Interviewer] But the struggle against what you call permissiveness should obviously be waged within a legal framework....

[Baklanov] Undoubtedly. In this connection I should like to say that legislative organs at all levels are indebted to our society. The relevant laws must be put in order within the framework of the Constitution, in the direction of the clearer definition of responsibility for observing them—I stress—at all levels. It would merely be a good thing for the newly elected soviets, the law enforcement organs, and the government not to restrict themselves to merely declaring the need to fulfill the laws....

[Interviewer] In this connection I want to recall that you were in Kemerovo recently. An agreement was signed there with the miners which satisfied everyone. But now social tension can again be felt in the miners' region....

[Baklanov] I communicated with many people there and submitted a specific opinion—the agreement which has

been reached is being fulfilled only slowly, not within the stipulated deadline, and the local soviet and party organs are providing little information to the population regarding the fulfillment of particular points. For instance, the law on pension provision could already be implemented but nothing is being done locally for this, while the miners simply did not know of the new opportunities.

Of course, the worst questions are the social ones—it is these questions which most perturb people. And first of all I would cite housing. We are resolving this very important problem too slowly and we are failing to use all existing opportunities. In addition, the leaders of various farms and enterprises frequently blame the center—it is the center, they say, which has failed to give or to earmark something for them. Against the background of this passiveness, the vigorous and enterprising leaders with whom I met in the Kuzbass are particularly notable. At the "Kedrovskiy" pit, where the director is Anatoliy Grigoryevich Pristavka, still a young man, and where there is an active party organization and an active trade union organization, the miners are successfully provided with housing even under difficult conditions. There they have achieved a situation where anyone who wants to construct a house is allocated 0.15-0.20 hectares for the plot, and they have launched construction by the economic method while fulfilling and overfulfilling their basic coal extraction targets. There is such a fine psychological climate there that there is not even any talk of strikes. And I know many such examples in other regions I have visited—Sverdlovsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Perm, and Omsk. It is here that the initiative of the party masses, about the need for which we have said so much, has an effect. The unity of the party with the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia is forged in such specific deeds.

Perestroyka in the country has revealed and continues to reveal to us people who are enterprising and qualified. It seems to me that one of the main tasks of the party organizations is to recommend these people to leading work. It is through them that the party's influence on the state of affairs will be specific and fruitful. There is no doubt that feedback is also formed from these people to the party organizations. What I have said applies not only to communists but also to nonparty people, because we should rely on a broad spectrum of human activity.

[Interviewer] But in the waves of spontaneous meetings it is hard to distinguish a man who is really keen on his business and his country from those who can only demonstrate the "originality" of their views.

[Baklanov] Here is a story. The Padishah decided to build a new palace and he brought in the best architects. One of them eloquently described what the new palace could be like. But another said: "I don't know how to describe things so beautifully but I shall build a palace like that." He got the job.

Now we need people who know not only how to talk but also how to act. Recently we have heard plenty of demands and promises. But the time has come to pay for the bills run up at meetings and far from everyone has rolled up his sleeves in a businesslike way but is trying, as before, to replace specific deeds with populist slogans. But experience has taught people a lot. Observing the work of the Moscow party conference and the Russian constituent congress, I noted that the delegates can quickly discern who is who, who criticizes for the sake of criticism or for some other reasons of his own, and who has engaged in specific deeds.

[Interviewer] Approximately two years ago, when you were minister of general machine building, you were elected a CPSU Central Committee secretary and instructed to take charge of the defense industry. Those were tempestuous years for the entire country, but it seems to me for the defense industry in particular. After all, the new political thinking opened up new approaches toward a field formerly closed to public discussion. How did you structure your work under these conditions? What in your view did you succeed in achieving and on what salients should efforts be concentrated?

[Baklanov] The new political thinking, an awareness of the need to resolve interstate problems exclusively by political means, the renunciation of the use of military might as an argument—this is indeed a drastic turn which has demanded exceptional courage and willpower from the party and state leadership.

The question of a substantial amendment to previously adopted plans for production and deliveries of arms and military equipment arose primarily.

A subject of special concern has been the conservation of the scientific and technical potential accumulated by the defense sectors under the conditions of the reduction of resources earmarked for scientific research. So far this has not been fully implemented. We have to a certain extent succeed in channeling the efforts of defense science into the solution of urgent national economic problems.

A lot of attention has had to be paid to defining priorities in the development of individual avenues in the defense complex. As a result of a detailed analysis of the prospects for development, priority has been given to the expansion of output of the electronic industry, the development of computer and radio equipment and communications facilities, and the intensification of the national economic orientation of space research.

If we are speaking of where we should focus efforts on the future, I should like to note primarily the need to improve the technical standard and reliability of military equipment and also the quality and functional potential of civilian output and consumer goods. These problems are complex and the optimum scientific and technical, economic, and organizational forms for their solution must be found.

No less important is the task of elaborating an effective economic mechanism for the functioning of the defense complex under the new conditions of economic management. Considering the specific features of the defense sectors that is no simple question, especially within the framework of the transition to market relations.

[Interviewer] Since you have started talking about it, I should like to ask you immediately: How do you see market relations?

[Baklanov] I prefer to speak of a mixed economy although, of course, terminology is not the essence of the matter. But I understand the problem in the sense that the introduction of market relations should not be an end in itself but a method, an instrument for improving the people's life. That is the main thing.

I do not think that we will travel the path of having no state enterprises at all in the future. They exist even in the most developed capitalist countries. But freedom should really exist in the economy. I understand it like this: A regulated market is a means of increasing the people's welfare, it is freedom for the producer combined with protection for the consumer.

But nor should we oversimplify the question. I would not like the market to be a slogan like the diversion of the Siberian rivers or the development of the virgin lands, when we used to say that we would feed the whole country and sell grain abroad. I think we must look more deeply into these questions. We should not forget that in the world there are about 100 countries working on the market principle but only 10-15 of them are rich, the rest are in debt.

I consider it necessary to stress that the actual transition to regulated market relations could have the right to be implemented only if it serves as a guarantee of social protection for people and of a higher living standard for all strata of the population.

[Interviewer] But the fear is often voiced that it is primarily the dealers who grew rich from the shadow economy who are gaining from them.

[Baklanov] That is an important question. We must decide urgently how to protect ourselves from this, for instance a thought out system for declaring incomes. Yet we are not seriously elaborating such a system—even the proposal voiced on the subject at the USSR Supreme Soviet has "vanished into the sand." A sensible system of taxation should be connected with this. Then the state coffers will be filled and an importunity will emerge to channel funds primarily into the development of health care, education, culture, science, and social protection for servicemen, pensioners, and students.

[Interviewer] The defense sectors are now emerging onto the domestic market increasingly actively. On the one hand, great hopes are pinned on conversion, particularly as regards increasing consumer goods production. Yet on the other hand the progress of conversion has recently been subjected to increasing criticism. What is the matter?

[Baklanov] We must have a clear idea of the fact that the implementation of such large-scale transformations requires not only time but also considerable expenditures of material and technical and financial resources. The production of arms and military equipment, like any other production, has its own specific features. Therefore it will be necessary to modernize and retool hundreds of shops and enterprises, to assimilate new manufacturing methods, to teach "peaceful" professions to tens of thousands of workers in defense plants. Calculations show that for the period through 1995 we will have to spend something in the order of 10-11 billion rubles.

It is essential to resolve the package of questions connected with ensuring social protection for the workers who are laid off. I have in mind the retention of their average wages for the period of their retraining and of their pension benefits, the retention of economic incentive funds at converted enterprises, socioconsumer problems, and much else.

In addition, the buildup of the civilian production of consumer goods will naturally require an increase in supplies of raw and semifinished materials, subassemblies, and components from other sectors of the national economy.

As you can see, the dimensions and problems of conversion go far beyond the framework of the defense complex as a whole. Essentially the implementation of conversion is a nationwide task. Right now a draft state program for the conversion of the defense industry for the period through 1995 has been elaborated and examined in the country's parliament and submitted to the Presidential Council.

As for the criticism which has been mounting recently, in my view there are both objective and subjective reasons for that. Among the latter we can include individual unconsidered decisions whereby the powerful scientific and production potential of defense enterprises is used to increase the production of less than sophisticated goods and articles. It is of course possible to understand enterprises' desire to load the released military capacities as soon as possible just so long as they can retain production volumes, their numerical strength, and the development and economic incentive funds. Of course, the efficiency of such conversion is low and this is not the best way of implementing conversion.

We must also consider the fact that conversion is not a process isolated from the country's overall economic development. Its implementation is objectively affected by all the negative elements inherent in our economy: the disorder in the market and the decline of discipline and controllability.

[Interviewer] How have the defense complex' tasks changed with our country's adoption of a defensive military doctrine?

[Baklanov] The present shift of the main factors ensuring the state's security away from the sphere of the antagonism of military-strategic potentials and into the field of political collaboration and the development of the processes of the consolidation of stability and collective security still do not guarantee that these processes are irreversible—the sources of military conflicts have unfortunately not yet disappeared.

This fact must be considered in foreign policy activity. And for this reason some of the Foreign Ministry's arguments in response to the critical remarks heard in the press recently seem unconvincing. But as a whole its reaction to criticism instills the hope that the disputes really "will benefit the country and its defense."

The effectiveness of defense building today should be ensured primarily by qualitative parameters—both with regard to military equipment and to the armed forces personnel. A reduction in defense expenditure requires a change in the approach toward developing and producing arms and military equipment. We should engage in earnest in reducing the output of models of military equipment developed and produced and in increasing the reliability of this equipment and improving its specifications. The successful solution of these tasks remains the main duty of the defense complex. We must do everything necessary to ensure that Soviet people's peaceful labor is reliably defended.

[Interviewer] In conclusion I should like to ask you what are your thoughts and mood as you prepare for the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Baklanov] I shall say immediately that I am preparing for it with optimism. I justify this by the fact that I have attended recent party conferences in the collectives: Despite the difficulties and disputes and the dissatisfaction of some comrades, the overall aspiration of the communists is to consolidate.

For many years I worked in the missile and space industry and in science as well as studied social questions. And always—in resolving complex tasks—we strove to rely on young, healthy, strong forces, using the experience and knowledge of the older generation. That is why the renewal now taking place in the party and all society opens up promising prospects. The democratic steps which have been taken in party building and in the people's life are irreversible. And at the same time an understanding is emerging of the need for increasing organization and responsibility ruling out elements of chaos, nationalism, and permissiveness.

The work of the party and of soviets of all levels of our multinational federation is the linchpin of all these great changes. Our common home can only be built together.

Head of New Central Committee Department Queried

LD3006085290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Interview with V. Kuptsov, head of CPSU Central Committee department for liaison with sociopolitical organizations, by television correspondent A. Konstantinov; place and date of interview not specified—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Konstantinov] Public organizations, once contemptuously known as informals, are entering ever more vigorously into the political arena and gaining more and more trust among people. In the past, when the Communist Party enjoyed undivided power, this kind of polyphony of various associations, blocs, platforms and—to recall a word that was until recently almost a term of abuse—factions, posed no serious threat to the single-party monopoly. But now that power over people's hearts and minds is being won in a complex and quite literally street-level struggle, and the CPSU Central Committee is seeking a way to dialogue, constructive dialogue with other political forces in the country. This is why for the first time in its entire history the CPSU Central Committee has set up a department for liaison with socio-political organizations.

[Kuptsov] I think that by setting up the department we are creating a kind of channel both for direct contacts between the Central Committee, for instance, and the party as a whole, and the new movements themselves will cooperate as a whole with the Central Committee.

[Konstantinov] To get into the Party Central Committee building we had to pass security guards—will all organizations have free access to you here?

[Kuptsov] Well, there is an established procedure. I think that with the democratization process this framework too will be scrapped. When that will be is hard to me to say, but at any rate the time will probably come. Indeed, this strand of our work will be central to the work of our party. I think we shall meet more than once if the imminent congress adopts and confirms—as I'm sure it will—that work with public and political organizations will simply be one of the central functions of the party committees and organizations as a whole.

[Konstantinov] Whether or not a dialogue will emerge between the new CPSU Central Committee structure and representatives of the informal organizations, only time and the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress will show.

Metropolitan Discusses New Patriarch Selection

90UN2006A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Metropolitan Filaret, patriarchal locum tenens and metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, exarch of all the Ukraine, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Yu. Golubev; place and time of interview

not specified: "And the Church Needs Unity"—first paragraph is RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA introduction;]

[Text] On Sunday morning 10 June, the bells of Bogoyavlenskiy Patriarchal Cathedral will announce to the orthodox world the enthronement and installation of a new patriarch, the 15th, of Moscow and all Russia. In the meantime, active preparation is ongoing in all eparchies for the Universal Assembly which will open 6 June and elect a new head of the Russian Orthodox Church. On the eve of this important event, our RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent met with Metropolitan Filaret, patriarchal locum tenens and metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, exarch of all the Ukraine.

[Golubev] Your eminence, what has happened to cause the coming assembly to be moved up?

[Filaret] In accordance with present church regulations, a new patriarch must be elected not later than half a year following the death of his predecessor. But the Holy Synod decided to do this earlier, and there are weighty reasons for this.

The fact of the matter is that along with the positive changes we see in the life of our country and in the church itself, other tendencies, alarming ones, are now being noticed. Specifically, we cannot help but be alarmed at the striving of some of the clergy and believers of the Ukraine toward autocephalism—the establishment of a church independent of the patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, using illegitimate methods. In this instance we are alarmed at the fact that forces outside the church are pushing believers into such action, forces desiring to take advantage of the authority and influence of the church to attain their own unseemly aims—to achieve the secession of the Ukraine from the USSR.

The Uniate problem remains extremely critical and is fraught with the most dire consequences. Exacerbation of religious strife between orthodox believers and eastern rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine has already led to acts of violence; Christian blood has been shed in places. What could be more frightening? After all, in our troubled times it is the church which must provide an example of tolerance, a peaceable disposition, compassion, charity, and fairness. Such is its age-old mission, the significance of which is difficult to overestimate today.

Schismatic tendencies are manifest elsewhere in Russia as well. All of this demands that the patriarchal throne be immediately occupied by a new head of the church, an individual capable of directing the efforts of all believers toward unity, accord, and the moral rebirth of our society. Thus it would be unwise to hold off to a later time convocation of the Universal Assembly.

[Golubev] And how will the process of nominating the new patriarch proceed? How will he be elected?

[Filaret] Procedural matters will be discussed at the metropolitan conference which traditionally precedes the Universal Assembly. I am convinced that on this occasion, for the first time in recent decades, we will be making our selection from several candidacies, and the voting will be done in secret so as not to constrict the conscience and will of the delegates.

[Golubev] I hope there would not be any need for this, but in any event—could you, let us say, propose your own candidacy?

[Filaret] No. The metropolitan conference will nominate candidates to the assembly. But of course every participant there will be able to freely express his opinion on one or another candidate. In addition, there are certain requirements he must meet according to our regulations. Only a metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church at least 40 years of age, a USSR citizen with the proper education and experience in managing his eparchy, may be elected as patriarch.

[Golubev] It would not be tactful to ask you who is actually seeking the position of Most Holy Patriarch. But we must consider that this is far from being a matter of idle interest, and it is not just believers who are expressing great interest.

[Filaret] Without a doubt the new patriarch will leave his mark on the life and activity of our church. However, it would be naive to expect, for example, the kind of revolutionary changes which took place in our country after Gorbachev was elected to the highest party and state posts. Do not forget that the church has its own traditions and canon law, which every patriarch is obliged to follow.

[Golubev] Well, in our society too there have been certain seemingly immutable traditions and dogma, and attempts to eradicate them were considered sacrilege....

[Filaret] These are two different things. I repeat—we must not forget that the church is not of this world, although it is in the world. Whereas the state is exclusively an earthly entity, and so entirely different laws apply to it. Thus, the primary mission of the patriarch is to preserve the purity of the orthodox faith.

Today it is not only schismatic forces which are operating presently in the orthodox church. There are discussions on many issues. There are those, for example, who believe we must follow orthodox tradition faithfully and unswervingly, and not permit any changes. Others advocate renovation. There is a proposal, for example, to significantly "lighten" the church language, to make it more understandable for today's parishioner. Or the idea of changing the church calendar—shifting from the old to the new style. All this deserves our attention and reflects the inevitable processes which show the viability of the church.

With respect to our mutual relations with the state, naturally we are expecting a great deal from the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.

The most important task, I repeat, is the preservation of unity in the church. And struggling to achieve this does not entail stooping to compromise. Unity cannot be attained at the expense of a departure from truth and traditions, at the cost of sacrificing age-old values in the name of transient considerations. Through its own example the church must oppose those centrifugal forces which are tearing apart our society and our country. In the eyes of millions of believers, the church has been and remains a symbol of fraternal unity, one of the basic forces facilitating the rebirth of morality.

Soviet Peace Committee Supports Gorbachev

LD3006014190 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—The Soviet Peace Committee today released a statement expressing support for President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies.

"There is no task more important today than national reconcilation and consolidation," the statement said, in part.

"The guarantee of its solution lies in support for the president's policies," the statement read, describing Gorbachev as "a man capable of displaying political wisdom and restraint, rallying together democratic forces, disengaging irreconcilable opponents, calming down passions, and upholding the country's prestige on the world arena."

"Power of people (in the USSR) is to cover a long way of establishment. But even the first steps inspire hope that the lack of political culture and other infantile disorders of our democracy will be overcome," the statement pointed out.

The statement appealed to all peace and pro-democracy campaigners in Soviet society to consolidate around the head of state. "We believe in the success of the new political thinking for our country and the world," the statement emphasised.

Hijacked Aeroflot Plane Returns From Sweden

LD0107094890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0815 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Taras Larickhin]

[Text] Stockholm, 1 July. (TASS)—A new act of air piracy has been committed on a Soviet passenger aircraft. Threatening an explosion, a criminal forced the crew of the Tu-154 airliner which was making an internal flight on the Lvov-Leningrad route to change course and land late yesterday evening at Stockholm's Arlanda airport.

Since members of the Soviet crew had no command of English, Swedish flight managers had to bring the aircraft down with the aid of two "Viggen" fighters of the Swedish Air Force. Ten minutes after landing, the air pirate surrendered to the Swedish authorities. He turned out to be a 19 year-old Leningrad student. It was revealed that the grenade with which he was threatening to blow up the airplane was in fact a fake.

The Swedish police have begun their investigations into the incident. As police inspector Lennart Pettersson told journalists, during preliminary interrogation the hijacker justified his actions by saying that he did not wish to serve in the Soviet Army. The air pirate, who was detained this morning, was sent to Stockholm's "Kronoberg" prison. It is expected that a decision on his arrest will be announced today.

At the present time the issue of when the Soviet plane with 152 passengers and 7 crew members will be able to fly back to the Soviet Union is being resolved. The Swedish police have carried out a inspection of the aircraft with specially trained dogs, aimed at discovering any explosive devices. No such devices have been found on board. The passengers are meantime resting in the airport building where they have been offered coffee and sandwiches.

The Swedish telegraph bureau has now reported that the Soviet airliner with 152 passengers and 7 crew members on board returned to the Soviet Union today.

Fourth Soviet Airliner Reported Hijacked

LD0107075990 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Excerpt] A Soviet Tupolev 154 airliner with 159 people aboard was hijacked to Sweden on Saturday. It landed in an airport near Stockholm. The Aeroflot plane was performing a regular flight from Lvov to Moscow. The hijacker, a 19 year-old youth, surrendered to the Swedish police. None of the passengers was hurt. This is the fourth hijacking of a Soviet airliner in less than a month. Two were hijacked to Finland and one to Sweden. The circumstances of their capture are being investigated by the local authorities. [passage omitted]

Laws on Income Taxes, Languages Adopted

LD0107081490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] Two laws adopted by our country's Supreme Soviet come into force today. One of them is the Law on Income Tax. A new financial body—the State Tax Inspectorate—will begin functioning as well. The second law—the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR—comes into force simultaneously with similar laws of the union republics. A language festival is being held in Tselinograd to celebrate this event.

New Foreign Cooperation Association Formed

LD0207105690 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS—The Soviet Union has set up a new association to promote foreign economic, business, cultural, and other contacts between Soviet and foreign organisations and individuals.

The centre of international contacts was set up by the Energiya rocket building amalgamation, the Elektronmash electronics manufacturer, the scientific-research institute of oil machine-building, the Yaroslavl-based Yarinvest foreign trade firm, and other industrial enterprises and creative organisations.

The association has already helped several Soviet defence enterprises sign lucrative contracts with foreign firms on cooperation in plasma-chemical coatings, composite materials, and ceramics.

It has already organised the first Soviet tours by special-interest tourist groups. It now plans to organise an international children's drawing competition: "I and the big world". It will also build a large cultural centre in Moscow.

In order to provide more information about the Soviet Union, the association has set up an independent news agency (NINFA) geared for foreign readers. The first new bulletin will be sent to subscribers today.

Academy of Social Sciences Holds Graduation

PM2706142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report: "Cadre Reinforcements for Perestroyka"]

[Text] A ceremonial meeting was held in the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences 26 June to mark the latest graduation of postgraduate students and graduates. They were congratulated by R.G. Yanovskiy, rector of the academy and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, professors, lecturers, and representatives of the public.

This is the first time that several graduates qualified in the specialized subject of "Theory of Sociopolitical Relations" with the right to teach in VUZ's [higher educational establishments].

A.N. Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary, addressed the meeting.

Today perhaps more than ever before, he said, the party needs cadres with a profound understanding of the ideas, aims, and tasks of perestroyka, people who perceive all the new and, in many respects, unusual elements that are appearing in our lives. Today there is indeed a danger of a split in the party, which may not merely retard but even destroy the entire perestroyka process.

We are proposing to dismantle once and for all the centralized, administrative edict, bureaucratic system of economic management and replace it with a system of relations based on the interest of producers geared to the consumer market and thus to man's needs.

This is the main aim of perestroyka. The democratization of society, glasnost, and the formation of a new political system founded on true power by the people—although they are in themselves an important achievement of perestroyka—cannot be regarded as an end in themselves. The main point is that this creates a political foundation, a moral atmosphere, and democratic mechanisms that enable us to embark on the gigantic task of reforming the economic foundations of society,.

At present the government is finalizing its proposals on the basis of their discussion at the USSR Supreme Soviet. One point is clear—delay in implementing reform will only tighten further still the knot of existing problems. Perhaps this only serves the purpose of those corrupt circles and shadow economy operators who earn huge superprofits from speculative deals amid total shortages.

Hence we favor reforms, but the kind of reforms that will not shift all the difficulties onto workers' and peasants' shoulders, and transformations from which honest workers, above all the impoverished strata of the population, stand to gain.

The adverse nature of economic and social development is also linked to a considerable extent with the exacerbation of interethnic relations. They are penetrating and coloring all spheres of social activity in corresponding shades. One of the main questions here is how to harmonize relations between the center and the subjects of the federation, along with relations between the republics themselves. I think that most Soviet people realize that we need a strong union that occupies a fitting place in the world. This is in the interests of every republic and every people.

The CPSU proceeds from the need to ensure equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of their national affiliation, and advocates the primacy of human rights over a nation's rights. The 28th CPSU Congress draft program statement reflects these and other theses in the country's nationalities policy.

The debate that developed over the precongress documents revealed a fairly broad spectrum of views and viewpoints on the party, its role in a society in the process of renewal, and its future. Having generalized all the proposals, the Politburo and the Central Committee are taking to the CPSU Congress documents that make it possible to consolidate all the healthy forces within the party.

The CPSU represents the party of socialist choice and the communist perspective, which takes a creative view of the theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and

of socialist practice, and also perceives the other achievements of human reason and world culture. It expresses the interests of the working class, peasants, and the progressive intelligentsia and consolidates working people.

The closing stage of the debate at the congress itself will undoubtedly be tense, trenchant, and emotional. This was also shown by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Constituent Congress. One can say most definitely that the 28th congress will be open to most diverse viewpoints within the party. I am convinced that it can adopt the kind of decisions that will enable all honest, democratically minded forces to work fruitfully within the party.

Exit-Entry System 'Imperfections' Criticized

PM2906144190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report: "Absurd Instructions"]

[Text] "I pledge to provide normal living conditions, and I take upon myself the expenses connected with food, medical, everyday, cultural, and other services...." This sentence which, with minor editorial amendations, could quite easily pass off as a populist promise made during an electoral rally, does not in fact have anything to do with electoral battles.

Every worker at a Soviet institution abroad who wants relatives from the USSR to come and visit him, has to sign this solemn pledge without changing a single word in it.

It is well known that the draft law on entry and exit, which had a successful first reading at the Soviet parliament back in November of last year, has still not been definitively adopted. Therefore, bureaucratic instructions whose compilers obviously did not worry about cultivating a feeling of respect toward their compatriots when drawing them up, are still in force.

The imperfections in the existing entry-exit procedure often force Soviet workers abroad to seek a way out of some quite absurd situations.

There is no doubt that the entry-exit law will finally bring order into this sphere. But it will not be possible to adopt it before the fall, because parliament is on vacation. Meanwhile, there is no need at all to wait for the legislators' decisions in order to critically appraise the existing procedures, and to at least repeal those that are blatantly at odds with common sense and humiliate people.

Soviet Muslims Aided in Pilgrimage to Mecca

PM0207121790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Yu. Vladimirov in response to reader's letter under the rubric "Details for You": "On the Eve of the Hajj"]

[Text] G. Saidov of Dagestan asks to be told about the Muslims' pilgrimage to holy places in Saudi Arabia.

In accordance with the Muslim calendar, this year's hajj—the journey to Mecca and Medina by adherents of Islam, accompanied by particularly solemn worship—begins 30 June. But 1.5 million Muslims have already arrived in Saudi Arabia from various countries during these days.

As regards the hajj for Muslims living on the territory of the Soviet Union, this year the number of pilgrims setting out for Saudi Arabia will increase more than fifty-fold compared with last year, K. Moldobayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Council for Religious Affairs, answered us. More than 1,500 Soviet citizens professing Islam will visit Medina and Mecca. Some of them set out for Saudi Arabia last Saturday, and others will fly out on the day this issue of PRAVDA is published. By decision of the USSR president, the state has given the pilgrims diplomatic and financial assistance by allocating currency for residence abroad in exchange for Soviet money and organizing charter flights from Moscow, Tashkent, Baku, Kazan, and Mineralnyye Vody. I believe that these facts convincingly attest that the process of perestroyka under way in our country accords with the fundamental interests and aspirations of believers—with the observance of human rights.

Cossacks Form Own Union, Publish Newspaper

LD0107151190 Moscow TASS in English 1505 GMT 1 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS—A constituent Grand Assembly of the Union of Cossacks ended here today with the adoption of a charter, a program, and the election of leading bodies.

For three days about 250 delegates, representing Don, Kuban, Terek, Urals, Siberia, Transbaykal, and Ussuriisk Cossacks, discussed ways for the revival of their cultural, spiritual, and historical traditions and decided on a number of organisational matters, including the publication of their own newspaper, KAZACHII VEDOMOSTIY [COSSACK GAZETTE], the first issue of which was circulated during the assembly days.

"The establishment of a union of Cossacks is a major landmark along the way of uniting the entire Cossack movement not only on the territory of Russia but abroad as well," Sergey Kazakov, a clerk of the Grand Cossack Assembly, told TASS.

"The union's charter stipulates the need to maintain contacts with all communities and associations of Cossacks abroad with a view to helping them to return home," Kazakov emphasised.

The delegates unanimously elected Aleksander Martynov, who comes from Gnilovskaya Stanitsa (village) of Rostov Region, as the atamen (chief) of the Union of Cossacks.

After the Grand Assembly ended, the participants held a public prayer service in the Nativity Church at the Starosimonovskiy Monastery.

It was decided to hold the next assembly of the Union of Cossacks in Moscow on autumn 1991.

'Declassified' Maps Now Available to Public

PM2906145590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by V. Scherban under rubric: "No Secrets": "Maps Do Not Lie"]

[Text] Travelers have been done a small favor by the USSR Council of Ministers' Main Land Surveying and Cartography Administration: Orders for most detailed maps showing their chosen routes are now being accepted from tourists.

This is what A. Levin, chief of the USSR Council of Ministers' Main Land Surveying and Cartography Administration Central Land Surveying and Cartographic Respository, had to say:

"The production of topographical maps tailored to tourists' individual orders has become possible thanks to the fact that a breach was somehow successfully made in the practice of classifying maps, which irritated virtually everybody. The '1:1,000,000' map was recently declassified.

"In order to acquire such a map, a tourist should send us a letter outlining his route and indicating the scale to the following address: 109125 Moscow, Volgogradskiy Prospect 45, Central Land Surveying and Cartographic Repository."

Economic

Yanayev Remarks on Transition to Market Economy

LD2906121290 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Budris and Yuriy Kozmin]

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—Renewed trade unions must become a constructive opponent to the government and organisations to work out alternative approaches towards solving problems connected with the increase of living standards, said Gennadiy Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU]. He spoke today at a news conference in Moscow devoted to the problems of the Soviet transition to a market economy.

Trade unions have existed for a long time in conditions of "perverted diktat" on the part of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), Yanayev stressed. According to him, the trade unions must be independent of any party and build their relations with them, including the CPSU, on a partnership basis.

Acknowledging the need for the market, the trade unions disagree with the government in determining ways of transition, he said.

"We demand that a referendum be held in the USSR, that Soviet people give their conscious agreement," he stressed. The union leader stressed the need to create "social shock-absorbers" to cushion the possible negative consequences from the transition to the market for various categories of working people and to avoid a social explosion. If no provisions are made, unemployment in the country will rise to 21 million people within the first year of transition to market, he said.

The AUCCTU submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet 14 bills providing for the protection of economic and social interests of the population in connection with the transition to a market economy, Yanayev said. He stressed the need to consider these documents at the next session of the Soviet parliament in autumn.

Speaking about the development of various forms of ownership in the country, the union leader supported privatising some small-size trade and service outlets, and cottage industries with a limited number of workers. But the main assets must remain in the hands of the state, Yanayev said.

Asked by journalists about "alternative" trade unions in the USSR, he described it as a natural process of the workers' movement.

"We are ready to engage in constructive dialogue with such organisations because international experience has shown that only a strong single trade union centre, not torn by confrontation, can ensure the protection of workers' rights," Yanayev stressed.

Aganbegyan Heads Commission on Market Economy

LD2906230990 Moscow TASS in English 1508 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—Leading economist Abel Aganbegyan, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was put in charge of the commission on the assessment of alternatives to switch to a market economy.

The commission was set up by a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers on June 21 in compliance with a decision taken by the Soviet Parliament on the concept of transition to a regular market economy.

The government priorities the drafting and realisation of the most rational alternative for this transition with the least possible social and economic expenses.

Therefore, the commission is charged not only with the examination and preparation of findings on alternatives but also with the drafting of recommendations to include them in a programme of measures to form (beginning in this year) a structure and mechanism of a regulated market economy.

All findings should be forwarded to the USSR Council of Ministers by August 15.

The commission consists of 23 scientists and experts.

Soviet State To Promote Small Business

LD2906231190 Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—The Committee for Economic Reform at the USSR Supreme Soviet has found it necessary to work out a national law on small enterprises and submit it to the autumn session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Andrey Orlov, deputy chairman of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform, has told TASS. The Council of Ministers will soon adopt a preliminary resolution on the development of small enterprises.

It is envisaged to create them in all spheres of the national economy on the basis of various forms of property, including private property. Small enterprises can also be formed through the buying out of state-owned production facilities and separate production sections, if they are not bound with the rest of the enterprise by a single production cycle.

It is also planned to form union, republican and regional financial funds for supporting the minor encomy. They will be made up of voluntary contributions of Soviet and foreign state institutions, enterprises, public organisations and even individuals. Aside from it, some financial priviliges are envisaged for small enterprises, Orlov said.

According to the criteria of the commission, enterprises with a staff under 200 people and the annual output under R10 million are regarded as small ones. Such enterprises account for some 5 per cent of the annual industrial output of the Russian Federation and 3 per cent of workforce employed in industry. The figures show that this sector is underdeveloped and is monopolized too much, Orlov stated.

He believes that the development of the minor economy will permit to develop new technologies in some priority spheres for science and promote a more effective use of the equipment. For example, in the Kalinin district of Moscow cooperatives operate equipment installed in state-owned enterprises on the second and third shifts.

Besides, minor business is an excellent school of management. It can consume the manpower released in the process of the transfer to a market-oriented economy. These are some of the advantages of the minor economy. However, a well organised mechanism of state support is needed to put them into practice, Orlov believes.

Freight Cars Accumulate at Siberian River Port

PM2906125790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by N. Vidonov]

[Text] [Announcer] A few days ago our correspondent in Yakutia reported on the alarming situation on the republic's main transport artery, the Lena River. Today we have received another reportage from the Osetrovo River port railroad junction, where more than 300,000 railroad freight cars have accumulated.

[Correspondent] And trains continue arriving. The station is becoming more and more congested and the passage of trains through the station is becoming difficult.

The Osetrovo port rivermen are barely managing to unload 260-280 freight cars per day, which is on average 50 freight cars less than the norm. The Lena, whose water level is low as a result of the protracted drought, can no longer carry the heavily laden ships.

This kind of situation occurs on the Siberian river relatively frequently. The current situation should have been taken into account by the goods dispatchers, suppliers, and of course the Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], which regulates the rhythm and volume of railroad and river transport. However, departments continue to go about their business in isolation, without taking the general interest into consideration.

There is a great shortage of freight cars in the country. Ore and coal miners are waiting for them to ship out their output. Refrigerator car sections and containers are waiting to be unloaded. After all, they contain perishable goods and food products. All this can be transported to Yakutsk, Lensk, Sangar, and so on, only during the summer, and only by water.

It is important now, as a matter of urgency, to draw up a general program of action. Time is pressing. It is necessary to expedite the unloading of freight cars, define priorities in the dispatch of goods, and involve the small-scale fleet, ships with a shallow draft, in the transport process.

And the Gossnab must, of course, adjust the flow of goods so as to prevent the Lena transport junction from turning into an agglomeration of freight cars.

'Urgent Decisions' on Improving Harvest Work

LD0107154890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers, with the broad participation of agro-industrial committees of the union

republics, has considered questions concerning provision for harvest work and adopted urgent decisions on radical improvements in fuel supply and increasing the supply of spare parts and rolled goods and other material and technical resources necessary to carry out harvest work on time. The USSR Government has obliged the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] and the republican supply bodies to catch up before 15 July with arrears in deliveries. To encourage collective farm peasants and workers who have attained high results in growing and harvesting grain crops this year, it has been planned to allocate for sale to them in the first quarter of next year, via consumer coproduction [poterbitelskaya kooperatsiya], 10,000 motor vehicles, 5,000 motorcycles, 100,000 refrigerators, 100,000 television sets, 30,000 sewing machines, and 100,000 washing machines. The USSR Government has also determined other urgent measures related to harvest work this year.

Higher Prices Urged for Farm Products

LD2906114690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 28 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] If we speak of socialism, we must also speak about the solid chain of mistakes and crimes. And at times I ask myself: Was nothing good really done in those years? We can ponder and argue over this question but, in my view, the worst thing is that we are often not very scrupulous. I would say that we abandon the best traditions of our grandfathers and fathers, who worked all their lives on our land, including under the so-called command- administrative system. They worked because it earns respect. Thank goodness, many of them are still not afraid to stand and defend what has been created and achieved by those generations.

[Correspondent L. Ilchenko—identified by caption] We took these pictures on several farms in Sumy Oblast, regarded as the heartland of our Ukraine, providing all the basic goodness of the confluence that is situated here.

In the countryside, these remote pastures belong to two different farms, each of which is strong. The agricultural output that is produced is well established. For some decades these collective farms [kolkhozes] have been headed by two Ivans—Ivan Nikolayevich Lovoy and Ivan Maksimovich Ostatinko. And these old soldiers are not in the least afraid to arouse the wrath of conservatives or the opponents of perestroyka in defending from attack the collective method of farming that has been established and tested by themselves in their own lives, and paved streets, the collective farm hospitals, the children's establishments, the trade centers, the houses of the still-young labor veterans, and the new buildings for young specialists who have come to work in the countryside. Their only wish is to create better social conditions in the countryside.

[People's Deputy V.A. Shevchenko, chairman of the oblast soviet—identified by caption] You know, we have to understand eventually that resolving our requirements, the requirements for a good life, the requirements of the rural inhabitants, all depends on how much we transform the socioeconomic concept of our village, how much we build these houses, how much we provide health facilities, how much classification work we do. But to solve these problems the collective farms need funds. So, for the collective farms to get these funds, it is necessary to increase purchase prices. The more meat and milk that the collective farm produces and the more of other livestock products that it produces, the more losses it sustains, too. And we receive R500 million in funds from various state sources to offset these losses.

[Ilchenko] And that is just in your oblast?

[Shevchenko] That is just in our oblast. We in the oblast soviet reckon that if that R 500 million are assigned to our population to compensate for the difference between the higher retail process....

[Ilchenko] For meat and milk?

[Shevchenko] ...For meat and milk, and if purchase prices are increased by that amount, the collective farms will have the funds to solve their problems.

Scientific

Activities of 'Mir' Orbital Complex Reported

17 July Space Walk Planned

LD2906103890 Moscow TASS in English 1013 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—The crew of the sixth main expedition of the Mir orbital complex is completing its 20th week in space.

Under the programme for the study of the earth's natural resources and the environment with the use of photo equipment and spectrometers, the cosmonauts are taking pictures of various regions of the planet. The experiments aim to obtain scientific information on the state of flora and water reservoirs in different regions of the country, the bioproductivity of sea water and large-scale ocean currents.

A 160-hour experiment to grow a monocrystal of zinc oxide, a semiconducting material with improved characteristics, in the electric heating device "Crater-B", continues.

Today, the crew will conduct geophysical research and scheduled maintenance of on-board systems and equipment.

Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin will spend part of the day preparing spacesuits and equipment for extravehicular activities. A spacewalk is scheduled for July 17.

Both cosmonauts are in good health.

Rescue Possibilities Cited

LD2906182190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Preparations are being completed in our country for a new manned space flight. In mid-July two crews will set out to the Baykonur cosmodrome. On 1 August one of them should be launched into space and replace Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin on the Mir complex. The latter two have been working in space for half a year.

Our special correspondent, Leonid Lazarevich, asked Aleksey Arkhipovich Leonov, deputy head of the cosmonauts training center, to talk about the concluding stage of this expedition.

[Begin recording] [Leonov] You know that on 16-17 [month not specified] it is planned that cosmonauts Solovyev and Balandin will go out into open space. They are to go round to the descent vehicle, inspect it, carry out measurements of the thickness of the heat-protection covering, return the heat-protection covering to its initial state, check the cartridges and caps [piropatrony i kolpachki], and check that nothing has happened to them, and to transmit all the information to earth. On the basis of this information a decision will be made as to what we should do next.

[Lazarevich] In the Western media there has been much talk about the crew being deprived of the possibility of returning and that it will be necessary to send up a vessel; they have described the situation as tragic.

[Leonov] I do not know where this information has come from. The people who are responsible for this work have not given these reports to anyone. We have heard that indeed our heat protection covering has been torn off and is in a free state. It was torn off probably with the movement of the fairing. I am still amazed that this did not lead to pressure loss. And I was delighted at the courage of the crew who made an umbrella and that umbrella began to protect the station from the direct influence of the solar system. But this situation is somewhat easier. But all the same, we shall look at all of this with attention and if it is necessary to send a new vessel there then we have a well worked out program for this. We have a rescue vessel. We have cosmonauts and rescue commanders who are ready to go up at any moment, tomorrow if necessary, to render assistance. Apart from this rescue vessel a variant of the transport vessel could go up, dock automatically and pick them up. But at the moment we are not particularly worried although we are undertaking all necessary measures and working out various options. We have already worked all of that already.

[Lazarevich] Aleksey Arkhipovich, who are these rescue commanders who can go up to help at any moment?

[Leonov] Lyakhov, Tolya Berezovoy, Sasha Vokov, and Volodya Titov. Four of them, very experienced cosmonauts who have been on flights and whom we have been training for years without a flight engineer. [end recording]

[Announcer] The return to earth of Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin is planned for 9 August.

Rest Day Scheduled

LD3006083290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] According to reports from the flight control center today, our cosmonauts are having a rest. Just two hours are allocated for obligatory physical exercises. In the first half of the day there will be a television meeting of the cosmonauts, Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin, with their relatives and close ones. Communication will be achieved by means of a relay satellite which is above the equatorial part of the Indian Ocean.

News Conference on Semipalatinsk Test Site Held

Consequences of Explosions Examined

LD2906203790 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—A press conference on the Semipalatinsk test site, the truth and inventions connected with it, was held here today. It was attended by USSR people's deputies, representatives of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement working for the closing of the test site, of some ministries and the management of the Semipalatinsk test site.

Deputy Maira Zhangelova and other Kazakh legislators pointed to the growing number of suicides in the area adjacent to the test site, of congenital defects and nervous disorders resulting from nuclear explosions. They stressed that residents of the Semipalatinsk region threatened to dismantle a railway line in order to block the transportation of cargoes to the test site. A three-day protest hunger strike declared today in all Semipalatinsk hospitals is also proof of such feelings. Kazakh deputies demanded that a "competent international commission" be sent to Semipalatinsk for determining the damage inflicted by nuclear explosions to people's health and the region's ecology.

Valery Devyataev, representative of the Soviet Health Ministry, refuted with the help of documents the statements of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk activists. He said that after the stopping in 1963 of ground and air explosions the radiation level at the test site and the areas adjacent to the Semipalatinsk region was within the limits of radiation safety. At the same time, he admitted that the health of some 10,000 people was undermined by consequences of nuclear explosions before 1963. They are under continuous medical observation.

"I am sure that humanity will eventually come to a nuclear-free world. However, there will be a lot of difficulties on this way," said USSR Deputy Atomic Power Engineering Minister Viktor Mikhailov. "It is not this country that started nuclear tests. Our tests sites stood idle for two years and a half out of the past five years, while the U.S. did not stop its nuclear explosions."

While nuclear tests were suspended in this country, Americans mastered the production of neutron howitzer shells and created a new generation of Trident-2 missiles. The Soviet side has to take reply measures in response to the creation of new types of nuclear weapons by America, including for the strategic defence initiative.

It was reported that this year the strength of underground nuclear explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site will be under 30 kilotonnes, and in 1991 and 1992—under 20 kilotonnes. In 1993 they will be stopped altogether.

1993 Testing Halt Announced

LD3006122590 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] All underground explosions at the nuclear site in Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan, will be stopped in 1993.

This has been announced at a news conference in Moscow attended by people's deputies, military officials, the leaders of some ministries, and representatives of the Nevada/Semipalatinsk movement which seeks to shut down the test site.

Deputies from Kazakhstan said that the number of suicides, nervous disorders, and congenital diseases is on the rise in the regions adjoining the test site.

A spokesman for the Health Ministry claimed that the level of radiation at the test site and in the adjoining areas is normal.

Deputies demanded that a competent international commission be sent to Semipalatinsk to determine the damage caused by the nuclear explosions.

Future Funding of Granat Observatory Discussed

LD3006124490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] And now an interview that our special correspondent Leonid Lazarevich recorded at the traditional briefing at Glavkosmos. He was talking to Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Balebanov, deputy director of the Space Research Institute.

[Begin regording] [Lazarevich] Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, the new observatory Granat has been operating in orbit for nearly seven months. What data have been obtained?

[Balebanov] Well, during that time, some 200 communications sessions have been conducted with the Granat space station. Virtually all the equipment is functioning normally, as it was intended to. I don't want to steal a march on the scientists, but I should just like to name the new results that have been obtained.

Since the telescopes mounted on the station and measuring the cosmic radiation in the X-ray and gamma wavebands enable pictures of a source to be obtained with a high level of precision—of the order of one angle minute—we have observed the fine structure of sources that could be seen earlier. For example, instead of what had been assumed to be a single star, flickering or pulsating, we found two pulsars. A completely new source has been discovered not far from the center of our galaxy, and that source has already been named Granat's Source. I think that that is just the beginning.

[Lazarevich] Granat's predecessor, Astron, transmitted information for six long years. At the moment, the work has only just begun, and one imagines that information from the observatory will keep coming in for a very long time. But eight guaranteed months will go by. Who will finance the running of the observatory, and where will the money come from?

[Balebanov] Well, you've asked a fundamental question, even though it doesn't involve very much in money terms in comparison with overall space expenditure. We just can't manage to bring about a situation in which scientific research in space is placed on an equal footing with the military and national-economic uses of space; that is, in which the financing of science is not carried out from the leftovers that industry and Gosplan [State Planning Committee] have from all the other space activities, but which had priority. After all, everything starts with science. Everything is determined by scientific progress. [end recording]

Military

Yazov Quizzed on Troop Withdrawal Problems

PM0107182990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Litovkin; place, date not given: "Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov: Society Should Be Concerned About the Army"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR defense minister, answers questions from our military correspondent on how the problems of the withdrawal, settlement [obustroystvo], and social protection of troops returning home from abroad are being resolved.

[Litovkin] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, how many troops and how much equipment has currently been withdrawn from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, and Mongolia?

[Yazov] If we take into account those units we are unilaterally cutting—and you know that we made this decision two years ago—and units that are to be redeployed, the figures look as follows. Last year more than 27,000 men, 2,700 tanks, and 310 aircraft were withdrawn from GDR territory. The process of Army reduction continues.

This year more than 43,000 men, 900 tanks, more than 680 artillery systems, and 52 warplanes have been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

More than 16,000 servicemen and more than 470 tanks, 360 artillery systems, and 121 aircraft have been withdrawn from Mongolia.

What lies behind these indicators? First, they are proof that we are scrupulously and honestly carrying out our commitments: The troop withdrawal is proceeding strictly to the agreed schedule. Second, we are showing in practice our adherence to the new defensive doctrine and the principle of defense sufficiency. After all, the Armed Forces cuts, the partial redeployment of military units, the alteration of their sphere of specialization, and the creation of defensive groupings were envisioned precisely by this doctrine and by the concept of military reform.

[Litovkin] In what parts of the country are the withdrawn units being stationed? Why in those places in particular rather than any others? What considerations were decisive for the Defense Ministry in reaching this decision—strategic expediency or the need to rapidly solve the problems that emerged?

[Yazov] We proceeded on the basis of the need to solve a range of problems. Of course, operational and strategic considerations had to take priority: We had to deploy troops so as to ensure that in the event of, for instance, aggression against Soviet territory, they would be able to carry out their defensive mission successfully. Moreover, it was necessary to take account of the questions of the troops' everyday activity.

I'm not revealing any great military secret if I say that, in elaborating the options for the new deployments, we deliberately gave the strategic aspects a back seat. We gave priority to people's interests and the economic and sociopolitical situation in the country. We thought not only of how and where to build housing, but of whether certain regions had a developed industrial and social base. We need to find work for the wives of officers and warrant officers, to create opportunities for the children to have a full education, and to find places in kindergartens....

We discussed all the pros and cons at the Defense Ministry, in the government, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and at the Defense Council with the president's participation. The choice fell to the country's central regions, its European region. Divisions of the Central Group of Forces, for instance, will go to the Moscow Military District—Gorkiy, Sormovo, Kursk, and Shuya—the Baltic Military District, and the cities of Kaliningrad Oblast. The famous Irkutsk-Pinsk Order of Lenin and Order of the October Revolution Three Times Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division will go to Belorussia, which it liberated during the year....

Most Southern Group units will also go to Belorussia and the Ukraine, near Lugansk, Cherkassy, and Dnepropetrovsk.... Divisions from Mongolia will be deployed within the borders of the Transbaykal Military District. Except that individual units—this applies above all to aviation—will be sent to the North, Siberia, and Turkestan.

[Litovkin] Why this injustice toward pilots? I know a helicopter regiment. It fought in Afghanistan. Then it spent just over a year in Hungary, and now it's going back to difficult conditions in the Turkestan Military District.

[Yazov] Almost all helicopter units visited Afghanistan. How could we determine who should serve in a hot climate and who should be "spared?" How could we determine the fairness? On the other hand, Turkestan, the Far East, and the Far North are all rotational postings with preferential conditions. Nobody is posted there "forever."

The problem is that we have no "free" airfields, and aircraft are tied to airfields. We have been forced to distribute the pilots and consolidate [uplotnyat] Air Force garrisons. Currently there is no other way out.

[Litovkin] What other difficulties is the Defense Ministry encountering with troop deployment and settling the families of officers and warrant officers? How are these problems being resolved and are they being resolved?

[Yazov] The main problem is housing. Although we will be able to wholly deploy soldiers and sergeants at existing barracks—admittedly, they will have to sleep in two separate stories and stand in two different lines at the mess hall, which is tolerable in principle—the situation with regard to apartments for the families of officers and warrant officers is very very complex.

You know that we currently have 173,600 people on the housing list, with more than 10,000 in Moscow alone. We have to take account of another 25,000 people coming from Hungary and Czechoslovakia without accommodation. The housing situation is the number one issue in all districts where we are withdrawing troops.

Using the Ministry's efforts and funds we annually build 60-70,000 apartments and, it would seem, we can wholly

meet our own needs for a few years. But, however paradoxical it may seem, this task is beyond us on our own.

The fact is that each year 70-75,000 officers, warrant officers, and extended-service volunteers are discharged each year upon retirement. Last year alone more than 110,000 men were discharged to the reserve in connection with the Army and Navy cuts. Some 85 percent of these continue to live on the territory of closed military garrisons. At the same time, 55,000 military college graduates and 40,000 warrant officers and ensigns—the overwhelming majority of whom are family men—are coming to start their service. Another 60,000 a year move around: Some are promoted, some enter an academy, some leave a region by rotation.... Until they receive housing at their new posting they retain their housing at their old posting.

What are we to do? Above all, we must instill the proper order with regard to the registration and distribution of housing—there are reserves in this area. We must obtain the 5 million square meters allocated to us on a proportional basis and owed to the military by local soviets. The main thing is to sharply increase the pace and volume of our own construction.

We have worked out a draft targeted social welfare program for servicemen and their family members, as well as for people discharged from active military service. It was presented for ratification by the USSR Council of Ministers back on 28 April. It contains a special section aimed at solving the housing problem. In the new five-year plan we aim to build 436,000 apartments with a total area of 24 million square meters for cadre servicemen—this is almost 25 percent more than in the current five-year plan. This figure includes 1.5 million square meters—or 25,000 apartments—for units withdrawn from the Central and Southern Groups of Forces.

These apartments will be built by USSR Defense Ministry military construction organizations—which will account for 19 million square meters—contract organizations from the Union republics, and construction ministries.

[Litovkin] All this is the future. What is being done today for the families of officers and warrant officers who are leaving the groups of forces?

[Yazov] Currently these families are housed in hostels, hotels, and housing allocated to them at the new garrisons. Moreover, a number of barracks, headquarter buildings, and training centers have been converted into hostels, and additional prefabricated hostels have been built. For instance, in the Moscow Military District alone there are five barracks with 300 places, while in the Belorussian Military District there are four barracks and two training centers with 320 places....

Is that a lot or not? According to our calculations, they can currently house 50 percent of the homeless families. One family per room. Some 30 percent of officers and warrant officers will return to those places of service where they have reserved accommodation. The other 20 percent will have to rent apartments in the so-called private sector. This possibility exists. A recently adopted resolution set the compensation for renting housing at between R30 and 90 a month depending on which part of the country is involved.

Moreover, 17 apartment blocks housing 1,482 families will have been commissioned in the first quarter of this year. Four of them are in Sormovo, two are in Shuya, and three are in Zaslonovo....

The Gosplan [State Planning Committee] has allocated us an additional R70 million, we have found reserves of another R30 million, and this year we will commission another 60 apartment blocks, 8 barracks, and 156 prefabricated hostels. I am confident that not a single family will be left without a roof over its head.

[Litovkin] Perhaps these difficulties you have mentioned could have been avoided if we had prepared in good time to withdraw our troops, rather than withdrawing on such a tight schedule. Or perhaps it was thought that our troops would be abroad forever?

[Yazov] That is a fair rebuke, but only partly fair. After all, even the status of our troops is defined under all intergovernmental agreements as "temporarily present on the territory" of the other country. I have already said that our defensive doctrine and the military reform forecasts had planned for our troops to be withdrawn from abroad and redeployed within the country.

We had been planning to withdraw our troops in connection with the half-million cut and in accordance with the expected accords in Vienna, but who would have thought that it would all happen so quickly? Revolutionary change cannot be foreseen or planned for. Although it did not catch us unawares.

We were able to persuade the Hungarian and Czechoslovak leaderships that it was physically impossible to withdraw the troops within a year. We are quietly doing this job on schedule. Not without difficulty, but without panic or fuss.

[Litovkin] One last question, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. How are military men cooperating with local republic, soviet, and party organs and the public in settling troops in new areas?

[Yazov] In different ways. In most regions we have complete mutual understanding. Particularly in Belorussia and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The people realize that it is not our own wish or desire to complicate the housing and social situation. I want to thank the people of Gorkiy and the Shuya city soviet for their great help. In Ivanovo Oblast, for instance, we were efficiently allocated a plot of land for construction and helped to set up a heating plant and to draw hot water from the plant's boilers. This October

two five-story apartment blocks of 70 apartments will be commissioned there for the families of officers returning from Czechoslovakia.

In Ivano-Frankovsk representatives of informal movements blocked our construction plans. They claimed that a five-story building would block out the sunlight for other buildings. It would do so even on the outskirts of town. It is shameful to hear such things.

The families of officers and warrant officers leaving the groups of forces with their units—like our entire Army—are not some caste of pariahs, they are our people and an inalienable part of society. We must be concerned about them together.

Legality of Military Harvest Questioned

90UM0694A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 16 Jun 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Justice Lieutenant General A. Katusev, chief military procurator and deputy USSR general procurator, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent N. Panyukov; place, date not given: "The Labor Force of One Soldier"]

[Text] **We have grown accustomed to this: If there are difficulties with harvesting (and they happen every year)—military motor transport battalions hurry to the rescue; trouble comes to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station—soldiers are once again among the first to be assigned to eliminate the consequences of the accident; an earthquake hits in Armenia—and over there people in military uniforms are also in the hottest spots....**

However, have we given thought to the legal aspect of such acts? Are we aware of how pernicious the influence of this is on the combat readiness of our Army? Have we tried to calculate even approximately what the state has to fork over for this supposedly free "labor?"

The employees of the Office of the Chief Military Procurator have done a lot of work recently on reviewing this problem from the point of view of legality. Our correspondent met with Justice Lieutenant General A. Katusev, chief military procurator and deputy USSR general procurator, and asked him to respond to the questions the readers of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA ask in their letters.

[Panyukov] Aleksandr Filippovich, judging by our mail the readers of our newspaper are primarily interested to know this: To what degree does the organization of such actions comply with laws and statutes? For example, reserve Sergeant G. Strigin wrote to us: "The practice of using motor transport battalions has existed for more than 30 years now. Until now, nobody has told me what the legal basis is for the undertakings of this kind, no matter how hard I tried. I doubt very much that such a basis exists at all."

[Katusev] The author of the letter is absolutely correct. Indeed, they started talking about the absence of a legal basis for the annual formation of motor transport battalions quite recently, despite this very long-standing practice. For example, last year a group of military reservists who were involved in harvesting went home without the permission of the command. The procurator's office could not press charges for this, and it was unable to do so exactly due to the absence of a legal basis for the existence of these formations to begin with.

[Panyukov] So, how does it look then: Are military commissariats and unit commanders acting arbitrarily?

[Katusev] Not quite. Certain orders and regulations adopted by the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the Ministry of Defense, and the USSR Ministry of Agriculture in this regard do exist. However, they do not have the force of law. Besides, these documents are clearly obsolete because they do not take into account a transition to new conditions of economic operations in kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], enterprises, and organizations. Contractual relations with agricultural enterprises are necessary now.

[Panyukov] Therefore, you are still in favor of maintaining such formations in the future?

[Katusev] Unfortunately, it is hardly proper to raise the issue of whether the motor pool battalions are to be or not to be at present, when the economy and agriculture are affected by crisis phenomena. The aid they provide to the national economy is quite perceptible. Suffice it to say that last year the motor transport battalions transported more than 26 million tons of farm products from the fields of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia, including 10.5 million tons of grain. Who can come close to them in this endeavor? Alas.... We can attach hope only to these formations because for now there is no worthy alternative to them. Otherwise we can easily be left without grain altogether. However, we need legislative acts on procedures for the use of servicemen and military reservists for work in the national economy. It is necessary to increase the material liability of customers for the idle time of transportation vehicles due to, say, their failure to provide cargo and fuel.

[Panyukov] Do such things also happen?

[Katusev] This is exactly the point. In the course of reviewing this issue we revealed glaring mismanagement and waste in the organization of battalions and violations of the rights and lawful interests of the military reservists and servicemen. Perceiving their absolute impunity, the leaders of some oblasts order considerably more motor vehicles than they need year after year. Due to this, local leaders turned away the motor transport units arriving on their farms last year in some sovkhozes and kolkhozes of Chita, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, Lipetsk, and Voronezh Oblasts, Stavropol and Krasnoyarsk Krays, and the Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic].

For example, Director of the Dzerzhinskiy Sovkhoz in Voronezh Oblast P. Kravchenko put in an order for two platoons (this means 46 trucks), and subsequently gave them up after two days of idle time. Up to 70 percent of trucks were idle in Berezovskiy and Yemelyanovskiy Rayons of Krasnoyarsk Kray. In yet another oblast, the utilization of 14 motor transport battalions was as low as approximately one-half. Actually, five motor transport battalions, that is, approximately 2,500 trucks, were not in operation. The local organs and the command used personnel and equipment to haul construction materials, clean up land lots, and for construction and other work which has nothing to do with harvesting in order to somehow reduce the acuteness of the problem.

[Panyukov] Aleksandr Filippovich, there are letters in the editorial mailbag which recount absolutely incredible cases. As their authors testify, it turns out that they put thousands of kilometers on their vehicles while moving from one rayon to another in search of work without hauling a single grain during the entire harvest season. Is this really true?

[Katusev] Yes, and there are many such cases. For example, two motor transport battalions of the North Caucasus Military District which initially worked in North Caucasus were redeployed to Altay Kray. A month later, they were again dispatched to North Caucasus for "harvesting," where they did not embark on harvesting for a week. After this, they drove their vehicles to the disbandment point. Cross transportation of motor transport battalions by rail over considerable distances has been allowed to occur.

For example, motor transport battalions formed in the Southern Group of Forces, the Carpathian District, the Kiev District, the Odessa and Leningrad Military Districts were dispatched to Kazakhstan. At the same time, motor transport battalions from the Turkestan Military District worked in Lipetsk and Saratov Oblasts. Battalions from the Transbaykal and Far East Military Districts were employed in Orenburg Oblast and the Bashkir ASSR.

The combined cost of such redeployments amounted to R28 million last year. Expenditures for transporting six motor transport battalions from the Western, Southern, and Central Groups of Forces amounted to 2 million hard-currency and transferable rubles.

[Panyukov] But this is mismanagement: The servicemen are distracted from combat training; military reservists are separated from their families, from their primary business, and are ultimately left without work....

[Katusev] It is certainly mismanagement, and glaring at that! According to the data of the Central Finance Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, R45 million which the motor transport battalions earned last year covered only one-half of expenditures for their formation, maintenance, and redeployment, which came to more than R85 million. We should also add to this R50 million paid by civilian enterprises, offices, and organizations to military reservists as their wages for the time of their stay at this so-called active-duty training....

[Panyukov] The "loaf" turns out not be that cheap.

[Katusev] Alas, this is exactly the case.

[Panyukov] Aleksandr Filippovich, what information does the Office of the Chief Military Procurator have regarding living arrangements for such formations? Letters to the editorial office suggest that this is a very acute problem. There is a complaint about this in every letter, and the facts cited are glaring: There are no canteens in a number of military construction detachments which are located in Armenia. The people lived for a long time in summer tents without equipment in sub-zero temperatures. There is no electricity, water, or utensils; food is cooked once a day, and frequently with foodstuffs which are not fit for consumption.... In "Chernobyl formations," there is a shortage of dosimeters, and for this reason the registration of exposure doses is imprecise; their undercounting is allowed to occur. The people use blankets with a high degree of radioactive contamination, and receive food in vacuum flasks with elevated radioactivity....

[Katusev] It is hard for me to object to these authors.

[Panyukov] However, this is arbitrary rule and lawlessness.... Do your local procurators have something to say about it?

[Katusev] In the absence of laws, it is hard to count on legality, and it is still harder to consider supervision by the procurator. Of course, we are convinced that it is not the business of combat units to work on such problems of the national economy. However, at the same time we understand that for now they cannot do without the troops in such situations.

This is why we, the military procurators, are now seeking to ensure that the entire set of issues arising be resolved legislatively, and a legal basis for such formations be developed if there is no opportunity to abandon the existing practice.

A recent expanded meeting of the Collegium of the Office of the Chief Military Procurator was attended by representatives of the ministries and departments which use military formations for their purposes; the meeting was preceded by extensive and painstaking work in the field on revealing violations of law and the rights of the servicemen. We demanded that the ministries and departments put things in order and ensure normal conditions for the life and operation of the troops. Suffice it to say that an instruction was issued to the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops on the immediate removal of servicemen from the danger zone in the area of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. This instruction was carried out within literally several days.

[Panyukov] Still, many of our readers advocate the immediate discontinuation of the use of this very expensive "free" labor. In particular, the idea of forming civilian motor vehicle pools without drafting the same drivers to the Army from the reserves has gained considerable support among the people; for this period of time, the Army may provide the necessary number of motor vehicles.

[Katusev] Of course, relieving the Army of the functions which do not properly belong to it is the ideal scenario, especially at present, in the process of further reductions in the Armed Forces when it is necessary for the military units to concentrate on strictly defensive tasks only.

[Panyukov] Some readers associate a solution to this problem with the introduction of an alternative service. What is your attitude toward this?

[Katusev] It is favorable. It is possible that very shortly construction and highway-construction units will be detached from the Army, as the present-day railroad troops are. Service in a number of noncombatant positions by these troops is likely to turn into an alternative service with its own regimen, duration of service, and legal status of the personnel. The possible formation of motor transport battalions in the future on the principle of alternative service is not ruled out either; these battalions may be subordinated to the leadership of the Armed Forces only in time of war....

However, for now this and many other things are, alas, only dreams. Meanwhile, pressing tasks need to be accomplished right now. This is why, without discounting the long term, we should think about today, and should urgently implement a program for increasing the degree of organization and profitability of the participation of troops in the transportation of the crop, elimination of the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia, the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, and natural disasters, and a program for the legal support of these and similar undertakings. After all, strict compliance with the rights of servicemen and reservists may only be ensured only on condition that an appropriate legal basis is created.

Yazov, Others Sign Retired Officer's Obituary

PM2906130190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 First Edition p 4

[Obituary of Colonel General, Retired, Leonid Mikhaylovich Leonov]

[Excerpts] Colonel General, Retired, Leonid Mikhaylovich Leonov, participant in the Great Patriotic War and winner of the USSR State Prize, died following a serious and prolonged illness. [passage omitted]

L.M. Leonov was born 1 January 1923 in the city of Mesyagutovo, Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], the son of a serviceman. [passage omitted]

From 1976 through 1989 he was deputy commander in chief of Air Defense Forces. [passage omitted]

[Signed] D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, I.M. Tretyak, V.M. Shabanov, A.N. Soshnikov, V.V Litvinov, N.M. Boyko, I.M. Maltsev, S.S. Sapegin, V.L. Koblov, O.A. Losev, A.G. Basistov, B.V. Bunkin, P.D. Grushin, A.I. Savin, V.S. Savin, V.S. Semenikhin, Ye.S. Yurasov, V.A. Khokhlov.

Baltic Republics

Lithuania Calls for Independence Act Moratorium

Debates Continue

LD2906132490 Moscow TASS in English 1317 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Kasis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius June 29 TASS—A second day of debates in the Lithuanian parliament about the government proposal to declare a moratorium on the March 11 declaration of independence made it clear that deputies were unanimous in stressing Lithuania's right to sovereignty and statehood. But as regards a moratorium on the declaration of independence, differing views have been aired.

Professor Kazimieras Antanavicious, for instance, said, "Hardly anyone will understand our reluctance to begin talks with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to announce the moratorium today".

Writer Vidmante Jacukaite stressed that "if there is a chance to begin talks with Moscow, it must be seized immediately. If no chance is available now, it should be sought".

According to Jacukaite, the moratorium announcement should be made conditional on the lifting of the economic blockade and the restrictions on the entry to Lithuania from other countries and on the non-use of force against draft-age young people seeking to evade the Soviet Army call-up.

Academician Vytautas Statulevicius said he was certain Lithuania should seek a two-year transition period for settling relations with the Soviet Union.

Many deputies, however, were not inclined to look for a reasonable settlement. "We have no mandate to abolish or suspend independence. We stand to gain nothing from this, while the Soviet Union stands to gain all," said Deputy Statis Malkevicius.

His colleague Saulius Peceliunas told the parliament that the text of the government proposal was "unacceptable and even dangerous".

Deputy Jonas Liaucius proposed to announce—for the duration of negotiations with the Soviet Union—a moratorium not on the March 11 act "On the restoration of the Independent Lithuanian State" but on the implementation of this act.

Debates continue.

Text of Moratorium Statement

LD2906183890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1615 GMT 29 Jun 90

["Text" of the moratorium on the Lithuanian Act of Independence read by unidentified speaker at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] The Statement by the Supreme Council of Lithuania:

The Supreme Council of Lithuania, being and remaining the spokesman of the sovereign powers of the nation and state, restoring the independent state of Lithuania and striving to implement all these powers in seeking interstate negotiations of the Lithuanian Republic with the Soviet Union, proclaims a 100-day moratorium on the 11 March 1990 Act on the Restoration of the Independent State of Lithuania, which is to commence from the start of such negotiations and [words indistinct] legal actions stemming from it.

At the start of negotiations between the Lithuanian Republic and the Soviet Union, their goals and conditions are to be defined in a special protocol by the further authorized delegations.

The Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic may extend or repeal the moratorium. In the event that negotiations are broken off, the moratorium automatically loses its validity.

If, in the course of certain events or circumstances, the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Council of this convocation is unable to carry out its functions in a normal fashion—excuse me, state government functions—state government functions, the moratorium loses its power, at that moment.

Moratorium Temporary

LD2906171490 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius June 23 TASS—The Lithuanian parliament has declared a temporary moratorium on the independence act for the period of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The statement to this effect, adopted by the republican legislature today, defines that the temporary moratorium will enter into force at the start of the talks and will remain valid for a hundred days.

A total of 69 members of the Lithuanian parliament voted in favour of the moratorium. Thirty-five deputies voted against and two abstained.

Landsbergis Addresses Supreme Council

LD2906160590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0909 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Address by Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies and all those who are listening. [passage omitted] What is the moratorium and what is the importance of the 11 March act? I will remind you of the explanation of the word moratorium in accordance with the international law dictionary. Yesterday, it was quoted here in Russian. Moratorium is an agreement of international law subjects to suspend some actions within certain limits of space or time. The moratorium is usually linked with the emergence of special circumstances and can be established in conducting negotiations on special questions in an international treaty.

It would be so. We have created special circumstances. The moratorium would apply to two subjects of international law in conducting negotiations on an international treaty, essentially on the second peace treaty.

The unilateral nature of the moratorium would be not, quote, in accordance with the regulations. Why us only? Why could they not suspend certain actions? For example, they could proclaim the suspension of their illegal 23 August 1940 law of annexation. But if today they cannot do this, we, bearing in mind the difficulties experienced by our neighbors and our other interests, will not be stubborn. Furthermore, if a unilateral action is expected from us, it is being expected and it is accepted, it is becoming bilateral by itself, it is becoming an agreement.

I know that the notion of the moratorium is not comfortable to the ear of a Lithuanian. Suspension or temporary suspension would sound better. But Mikhail Gorbachev, agreeing that one notion in the text should explain the other, prefers moratorium.

And we can write a more detailed explanation whose actions would be affected by the moratorium. We can make a present to the partner in negotiations of that sound which is not comfortable to our ear. And we would ask our people not to wince at a naked word, and not to attack it as a red rag, but always read everything that is written down.

Now about the act. This is the second act of Lithuania's independence which in its second section recalls the first act, the act of 16 February 1918, the still-valid legal basis of the Lithuanian state. The moratorium, if we proclaim it, will not touch the validity both of the first and second acts. It will only stop legal actions based on the second act, will order suspension of them for a period of time fixed by ourselves. This is a decision of the sovereign—to suspend or not to suspend. This confirms both independence acts and who is the sovereign on this soil and who is the mouthpiece of the will of this sovereign. Whether anybody likes it or not, the sovereign will of the nation or of the state is expressed only by this Supreme Council. This is stated in the last section of the 11 March act. If it would seem to be dangerous to suspend it even for a short period of time, what will then be the foundation of the activity of the Supreme Council and who will express Lithuania's sovereign will during the negotiations, then an additional [word indistinct] should be written in the moratorium document.

The act of the restoration of independence proclaimed by the Supreme Council empowered by the nation is important in that it clearly tells after 50 years about sovereignty and its implementation. In the sphere of states rights everything belongs to us, only many things have been taken away and still not returned. It is important to us not what to regain, but how to regain, by what procedures, conditions, and in what order. This should be the topic of negotiations, and not the so-called divorce, where the partner still could dispute the sovereign rights.

Simple international and any other justice on earth should be based on one formula: That state must leave our state.

Having chosen the path of peaceful political struggle two years ago, we must continue to achieve this final aim by political means, by negotiation. Let nobody try to explain that the regulation of relations among states should be aimed against people, citizens of states.

Now the condition for negotiations is a moratorium. But the condition for the moratorium is also negotiations. Until the negotiations start, the moratorium is only a piece of paper, uncomfortable and threatening. It is not valid in reality—unless propaganda makes out as if Lithuania is retreating. [passage omitted]

To tell the truth, I am not inclined toward a concession demanded by a stronger party. But after my trips to Moscow, I have prepared yet another draft document, and I would support it. Examine it and, perhaps, we will express our joint will assuming joint responsibility. [passage omitted]

There is a point of view that says let us defend within the encirclement, wait until they are ruined, and so on. Let us convert this point of view into a readiness to meet the worst; gathering the harvest with our hands or organizing assistance in obtaining firewood is not the worst state of affairs, although some people may mock us. We must be prepared to meet the worst, for instance, if the supply of gas is completely stopped, if we do not obtain much after having refused to tie the noose of a Union agreement around our necks, and if we become separated from trade with the west by a new iron curtain.

But we would face the worst in the form of the internal anger provoked by evil exterior blockades, of an internal split. Some people wish it very much, but this does not aply to us advancing toward spiritual and state freedom.

Let the anxiety about the moratorium not turn into anger and threats. Let them turn into understanding and solidarity.

If we adopt such a document, a lot of time will pass till the beginning of the negotiations, till the moratorium. Experts and diplomats will negotiate about the coming negotiations, and people will watch what is happening and what must be done. [passage omitted]

True tension and crisis are still far away. So far we are standing firm. These will begin when we approach the negotiating table. Then all animals will be let loose: slanders and disputes, incitements and threats, and various pressures. Let us be ready.

Landsbergis on Baltic Reaction

LD3006113190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Summary] Speaking about the draft statement on the moratorium at the Supreme Council session, Vytautas Landsbergis stated inter alia:

"Now about the interests and attitude of the Baltic states. I am partly familiar with their views. I know that the Latvians are talking in the commissions. It is the idea of their chairman of the Supreme Soviet to reach an agreement through a moratorium. Their Latvians' attitude was (?not favorable). However, there are different social conditions; also, nobody has forced them to make a final decision today.

"I know from Estonia that Chairman Ruutel thinks that this is our affair. They understand that our situation is special, that we are in the forefront, and experience more misfortunes. They are not able to compensate for our misfortunes, although they are trying and helping.

"I have heard an idea that our moratorium would only slightly delay our certain break with the present political situation in the whole Baltic region. We would also like the Latvians and Estonians to take several resolute actions, to be on the same level and [words indistinct] the same blockade, and so on. But the situation is different.

"Therefore our step could be understood as a certain development on the Baltic front. We will be in the forefront, well in the forefront. They know that we are examining various versions of the moratorium. This affects the situation, and the foreign ministers have adopted a decision that political actions should be coordinated. Therefore they must be informed. We may try to phone and read the statement on the telephone. I will be able to inform them this evening, as I will be in Tallinn".

After the statement, Landsbergis was asked by Deputy Paulauskas whether there were any plans by all three Baltic states to go to negotiations together.

Landsbergis replied: "We have already formulated a proposal that the negotiations should be three against one. But now we are set one against one. Perhaps this is a political calculation by the Kremlin, or maybe our splinter [Landsbergis means that Lithuania is like a splinter in Moscow's body] is so unpleasant that they do not wish [word indistinct] the problem of this splinter. Of course, basing ourselves on what unites us with Latvia and Estonia, we can postpone the problem. We could say that we the three of us go to negotiations as one or we do not go at all. But this would hardly be a politically diplomatic position. I imagine yet another version—either the Latvians and Estonians catch up with us and we have very long discussions until the negotiations with the Kremlin start, or we include as a condition of the negotiations the participation of the Latvians and Estonians as observers, so that they know what is happening".

Prunskiene Says Goal Remains

LD3006154590 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1445 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Today the Soviet (?leadership) announced that oil deliveries to Lithuania will be resumed as soon as possible. This news comes one day after the Lithuanian parliament decided to freeze its declaration of independence for 100 days. And this period can be extended, if necessary. This was stated by the premier of Lithuania, Prunskiene, who is visiting Kotka in Finland, from where Anders Eriksson reports.

[Eriksson] The economic blockade of Lithuania is now over. This news was received by the premier of Lithuania, Kazimiera Prunskiene, from the Soviet premier, Nikolay Ryzhkov, after the Lithuanian parliament decided yesterday to freeze its declaration of independence for 100 days. Among other things, Moscow has announced that oil deliveries will now be resumed.

Prunskiene also thinks negotiations can now be started soon with Moscow, within two or three weeks.

[Begin recording] [Eriksson in German with superimposed Swedish translation] Is it then possible to achieve a negotiated solution within 100 days?

[Prunskiene in German with superimposed Swedish translation] Well, this is the question. Gorbachev has said that two or three months will be needed, and I have also [words indistinct] but we shall see. If it is not enough, we are prepared to extend the period. [end recording]

Thus, Moscow's economic blockade against Lithuania has had the intended effect. Lithuania has now (?frozen) her independence declaration for 100 days and is [words indistinct] prepared to extend it further, if necessary. The hard line represented by President Landsbergis has now had to give way to a more compromising attitude, represented, above all, by Prunskiene herself. But, she stresses, our goal is naturally still national independence,

even though the pace will now be somewhat slower than Lithuania had planned from the beginning.

Prunskiene on Possible Soviet Territorial Claims

LD3006174790 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1600 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Premier Prunskiene said later today that during her telephone conversation with Premier Ryzhkov in the Soviet Union concerning the negotiations on the independence of the Baltic republics, Ryzhkov questioned the present borders of Lithuania. If Lithuania wants to secede from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government may make claims to strategically important areas, such as the port of Klaipeda and various air bases. Premier Prunskiene tells "ekot" that any such claims would be rejected by Lithuania.

Vilnius Rally Appeals to CPSU Congress

Anti-Lithuanian Protest Seen

LD3006223290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Opponents of Lithuania's independence held a rally in a park in the center of Vilnius today. The rally adopted an appeal to the congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union due to start in Moscow next week. About 2,000 people gathered in the rally and they eagerly applauded those orators who spoke of the danger that bourgeois state order was reviving in Lithuania and those who claimed that exploitation of the working people of Lithuania was getting stronger.

The participants of the rally expressed their support of the most conservative circles in Russia and severely criticized President Gorbachev for his meeting with Lithuanian leaders. The broad public in Lithuania hardly pays any attention to such acts of protest against Lithuania's independence, while the adherents of an indivisible Soviet Union seem to be trading on this tolerance of Lithuania and they actually engage in open anti-state activities.

The resolution and the letter to the congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted by the rally today are clarly anti-Lithuanian, if not chauvinistic, while the speakers at the gathering launched open and rude attacks not only on political figures in Lithuania but also on the whole Lithuanian nation.

Citizenship Law Protested

LD3006181290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1701 GMT 30 Jun 90

[TASS correspondent reports]

[Text] Vilnius, 30 Jun—Thousands of people attended a meeting held in Vilnius's Kalnai Park today by the socialist movement for restructuring in Lithuania, known as "Vienybe-Yedinstvo-Jednosc." It was called to discuss a decision on the issuance of citizenship documents by the republic of Lithuania, adopted by the republic's Supreme Council, as well as the revoking by the Lithuanian Pariament of decisions made by Vilnius and Salcininkai rayon soviets on the establishment of national territorial formations in those rayons.

Speakers were concerned about the future of those inhabitants of the republic who do not want to lose their Soviet citizenship. They felt that the Lithuanian Supreme Council's decision to issue the republic's own citizenship documents was ill-considered and hasty, infringing the rights of many inhabitants and aimed at increasing confrontation between Russian speakers and the Lithuanian section of the population.

Referring to the question of national territorial formations, speakers noted that the Poles, who make up the majority in Vilnius and Salcininkai Rayons, were entitled to decide on their problems for themselves.

The participants in the meeting passed a resolution condemning these decisions of the Lithuanian parliament. They organized a petition opposing the Supreme Council's decision to commence issuing the Lithuanian Republic's own citizenship documents.

Military Call-Up in Lithuania Falls Short

LD0107184490 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] The daily LIETUVOS RYTAS, published by the Lithuanian parliament, has reported that the spring call-up to the Soviet Armed Forces has ended. Only 1,207 youths out of the 5,800 suitable for military service came to drafting centers. Lithuanians make up nearly 50 percent of those who decided to serve in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Radio Vilnius has got information from the Lithuanian Military Commissariat that another round of call-up will start soon, and you will hear more about those problems related to military service in tomorrow's program "The Way We Live."

Vilnius Radio Carries 29 Jun Supreme Council

Moratorium Debates Continue

LD2906074690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0600 GMT on 29 June begins a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Deputy Abisalas announces that debates on the moratorium on the act of independence will continue today.

At 0603 GMT Deputy Antanavicius approaches the rostrum. He expresses the opinion that confrontation leads nowhere, and the same applies to emotions. The deputies must be and are united in their striving for the creation of an independent Lithuania, but Moscow

cannot be trusted and vigilance is essential in any negotiations with the Soviet Union. He favors the moratorium and says one of the proposed versions should be adopted today.

At 0622 GMT Deputy Jasukaityte says the deputies have been elected not to govern but to serve Lithuania and they should seek ways to start negotiations with Moscow. One does not know what will happen after the CPSU Congress, therefore negotiations should start now and this will help Gorbachev continue his policy and at the same time will help Lithuania. Moratorium should be adopted under the condition that the blockade will be lifted immediately and that no action will be taken against young Lithuanians who do not wish to serve in the Soviet Army.

At 0638 GMT Deputy Abisalas asks the deputies not to engage in emotional speeches, but speak to the point discussing only the moratorium. The deputies agree that each of speech should last not longer than ten minutes.

At 0641 GMT Deputy Stakvilevicius urges the deputies to be careful and vigilant in adopting the moratorium. All possible guarantees must be ensured. Deputy Stankevicius describes as unstable the political situation in the Soviet Union, arguing that Moscow is interested in accelerating the solution of the Lithuanian problem. In this opinion, the deputies should not be in a hurry and wait until situation in Moscow becomes more stable. Principal political actions should be coordinated with Latvia and Estonia. The moratorium would make Lithuania once again dependent on the Soviet Union.

At 0655 GMT Deputy Peceliunas voices the opinion that the government project on the moratorium is unacceptable. All other versions should be carefully examined. The moratorium would be acceptable applying it to actions, but it cannot be applied to the act of proclaiming independence. It would mean the Soviet Constitution would be valid in Lithuania and this is unacceptable.

At 0705 GMT Deputy Liaucius criticized versions on the moratorium. In his opinion the conditions of the moratorium should be very carefully examined.

At 0712 GMT Deputy Sejunas thought that all possible versions on the moratorium should be examined and proposed his own version.

At 0719 GMT Deputy Rasmavicius stated that there is no guarantee the governmen's proposed version on the moratorium would lead to negotiations. The suspension of the act on independence is not possible, nobody has authorized the Supreme Council to do this. The moratorium is acceptable only if it is understood by the other side the same way as it is understood by the Supreme Council.

At 0727 GMT a statement by a group of ten deputies is read protesting against utterances by Deputy Genzelis made yesterday, comparing Lithuania with Cambodia.

At 0729 GMT an interval until 0800 GMT is announced.

Debates Continue

LD2906094490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 29 June continues its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 0801 GMT Deputy Vaisvila begins speaking. It is not clear to him which laws would be valid in Lithuania if the moratorium is proclaimed. The proclamation of the moratorium would mean the proclamation of something unknown to deputies.

At 0810 GMT Deputy Jursenas says he thinks the proclamation of the moratorium would be a maneuver and all versions should be discussed in carrying out this maneuver.

At 0816 GMT a deputy, whose name is indistinct, proposed that various versions of the moratorium should be published in the press so that the Lithuanian people are well informed.

At 0820 GMT Deputy Slicyte objected to the word moratorium and stated she would vote against the proclamation of the moratorium.

At 0830 GMT Deputy Macys expresses himself for negotiations but objected to the proclamation of the moratorium.

At 0835 GMT Deputy Aksomaitis reads an appeal by local government deputies in his constituency urging the council to proclaim the moratorium under very strict conditions, not touching the act of independence.

At 0841 GMT a deputy, whose name is indistinct, reads a statement by the electors in his constituency opposing the government proposals on the moratorium.

At 0847 GMT a deputy, whose name is indistinct, says he opposes all versions on the proclamation of the moratorium.

At 0850 GMT the debates continue, some deputies oppose the proclamation of the moratorium, some support various versions, and some accuse the government for its irresolute actions as regards negotiations with Moscow.

At 0909 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis approaches the rostrum. He explains in detail the meaning of the word moratorium. Lithuania's political aims should be achieved through negotiations, as long as the negotiations have not started, the moratorium is invalid. After his visits to Moscow he has prepared yet another document, which he reads. It is a statement by the Supreme Council proclaiming a 100-day moratorium during the negotiations, which can be prolonged or discontinued by a decision of the Supreme Council.

At 0923 GMT Deputy Ilgunas proposes to vote for the statement read by Landsbergis. He says debates should be discontinued.

At 0924 GMT a vote is taken; it is decided by a majority of votes to continue debates. Another 10 deputies are on the list of the speakers.

At 0930 GMT an interval until 1100 GMT is announced.

Moratorium Statement Urged

LD2906131290

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1100 GMT on 29 June resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

The Vilnius Domestic announcer says an improvised news conference by Landsbergis was just held in the building of the Supreme Council. No further details are given.

At 1102 GMT debates on the moratorium continue. Deputy Ziemelis suggests the proposed versions should be passed on to editorial commissions and then adopted on Monday. Deputy Rudys objects to this, urging a decision be made today.

At 1155 GMT Terleckas from the Freedom League objects to the moratorium and expresses his confidence that the deputies would not vote for it.

At 1200 GMT Landsbergis approaches the rostrum. He states he believes the debates have been very constructive. He supports his version of the statement and that of Deputy Liaucius which, he thinks, should be considered. It is up to the deputies which versions in which forms could be adopted. It is necessary to inform Latvia and Estonia about any decision.

At 1226 GMT a vote is taken. A majority of the deputies decided that a document should be adopted. By a majority of votes the deputies decided to take Landsbergis' statement as a basis of the document, merging it with the proposed version by Deputy Liaucius. An editorial group is formed to prepare the final text.

At 1245 GMT, by a majority of votes, the deputies decide the final text of the statement should be submitted today.

Finances, Taxes Viewed

LD2906145490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1320 GMT on 29 June resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

It is announced that questions will be taken.

At 1322 GMT Minister of Finance Sikorskis replies to questions referring to various aspects of finances and taxes.

At 1400 GMT Deputy Prime Minister Brazauskas replies to questions concerning the blockade—the use of financial resources by local government bodies in the condition of the blockade, a reduction of housing construction due to a shortage of building materials, the allocation of premises for the ministries and departments, etc.

At 1424 GMT Sikorskis answers questions on Lithuania's currency. Negotiations are in progress on the printing of Lithuanian money, no details are provided.

At 1426 GMT the minister of health is asked about a tragic event at a Vilnius hospital where patients have died because of wrong use of medicines.

At 1437 GMT the minister of health continues to answer questions on the state of helath service.

Moratorium Declaration Read

LD2906160390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1444 GMT on 29 June continues its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Deputies discuss educational matters. This is followed by a proposal to call recess. The proposal is accepted and a recess is called until 1525 GMT.

At 1520 GMT the session resumes. Landsbergis reads Lithuania's Declaration on the Moratorium on Independence. He notes that one more resolution is necessary in order to avoid confusing this declaration with the 23 May proposal.

At 1525 GMT Vagnorius asks a question regarding the discussion of other variants. Landsbergis gives detailed explanation, noting other variants were also discussed.

At 1528 GMT questions are addressed to Landsbergis on the moratorium. He replies to questions and a discussion follows.

At 1530 GMT Landsbergis consults deputies on the voting process. A discussion ensues. Because many deputies have doubts, they need another recess to consult among themselves.

At 1535 GMT Landsbergis notes that a recess should be taken, since those abstaining from voting also carry heavy responsibility in such a serious decision.

At 1540 GMT a recess until 1615 GMT is announced.

Vote To Continue Until 31 Jul

LD2906194390

Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1615 GMT on 29 June resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

An unidentified deputy reads the text of the Declaration on the Moratorium on Independence. Following the

reading a vote is taken: 108 deputies are present; 69 vote in favor; 35 vote against: and 2 abstain. The declaration is adopted by majority vote.

At 1631 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis reminds deputies of earlier agreement to adopt a decree concerning the 23 May 1990 resolution by the Supreme Council of Lithuania.

The decree is read by an unidentified deputy: "A Decree of the Supreme Council of Lithuania. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania decrees to acknowledge that the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania of 23 May 1990, No. 1226, is invalid. Secondly, this resolution becomes effective from the day of its adoption." A vote is then taken and the resolution adopted 98—for; 4—against.

At 1633 GMT a resolution to continue the Supreme Council session until 31 July is introduced and voted on. It is approved with 87—for; 3-against, and 13 abstaining.

At 1635 GMT the preliminary agenda for next week is discussed. A proposal is made to discuss taxation and agrarian reform on Monday [2 July] from 1500 local time. Tuesday [3 July] is suggested for Lithuanian Republic enterprise, republican finance and judicial matters. A plenary session is proposed for Wednesday, from 1200 local time to discuss regulations. Thursday is proposed for discussing state price control draft proposals and state defense and enterprise draft proposals. Friday is suggested for work with voters, and Monday a return to a normal schedule is proposed. Deputy Antanavicius proposed not to hold plenary sesson on Monday, and a discussion followed concerning the proposed agenda.

At 1637 GMT a vote is taken on the Monday plenary session. 19 voted for; 18 voted for a Tuesday [3 July] 1000 local time [0700 GMT] plenary session.

With this the live relay of the supreme council session ends.

Oil Supply to Mazikiai Refinery To Resume

Begins 30 Jun

LD3006124990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Lev Churilov, first deputy minister of the USSR Oil Ministry, today phoned the office of Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene at the Council of Ministers, and announced that at 1500 [1200 GMT] the supply of oil would be resumed to the Mazeikiai oil refinery.

We would be grateful if the workers at the oil refinery would phone us and confirm this information. Our telephone is 66-27-46.

Oil Received

LD3006204290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Oil reached Mazeikiai Oil refinery at 1735 local time [1435 GMT]. We were informed of this by government information representative for relations with the Supreme Council, Ceslovas Jursenas, who was basing his information on the refinery's [word indistinct] Alma Balsyte. For the refinery to start production, operation of its central electric heating unit will need to be set in motion. It is estimated it will start up only tomorrow morning. Thus, a normal work schedule would be effected by the refinery, only in one week. [passage omitted]

Refinery Workers Asked To Report

LD3006214990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuania 2045 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Vidmantas Macevicius, director of Mazeikiai thermoelectric plant, calls on the deputy chief of the turbine boiler shop and on the entire operations staff, who are presently on unpaid vacation status, to report to work immediately. I will repeat the announcement. [passage omitted]

Steam Promised for Refinery

LD0107104890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Summary] Chief engineer of the Mazeikiai oil refinery, Albertas Gimbutas, has stated at an interview:

"Our main task now is to assemble our people. About half the workers are on paid and unpaid holidays. One of our requests will be to announce on the radio that all our employees should return home and to work." Since our thermal power station is not working, we are waiting for steam. Steam is promised for 0300 tonight. We will be ready then to start the first technological line.

Brazauskas' Call Preceded Resumption

LD3006223990 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Using [word indistinct] small reserve [of fuel] the [Mazeikiai] plant's electric power plant has been started up. It provide energy for gasoline and lubricant production for equipment and technological (?facilities). However, as was announced by Ceslovas Jarsenas, Lithuania government information representative, Vice Premier Algirdas Brazauskas called Moscow even prior to that. In a telephone conversation, at aproximately 1000 a.m. [0700 GMT], with Ryzhkov's deputy, Gusev, he called to his attention the fact that yesterday the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared a moratorium to the March act and was awaiting a measure of reply by the Kremlin. Finally, at about 1500 [1200 GMT] the Mazeikiai refinery received a telephone message from USSR Oil Industry Deputy

Popov, advising them to prepare to receive maximal amounts of oil, that is 40,000 tons per 24-hour period. [passage omitted]

Based on very optimistic estimates the Lithuanian economy will be supplied with Mazeikiai-produced gasoline, no sooner than in a week. [passage omitted]

Lithuania's Paleckis Interviewed on CPSU

LD0107022190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1922 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Interview with Justas Paleckis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, by correspondent Lyubimov; from the "Vzglyad" ("View") program—recorded]

[Text] [Lyubimov] You know, there are various sorts of communist parties, and here in Samara we have met many interesting people—communists and noncommunists alike—discussing the question of the forthcoming CPSU congress. Justas Paleckis, now a secretary in the Communist Party of Lithuania and a guest here on our program, is a native of Samara.

Well, Justas, although you are a communist, you probably do not have as morbid an interest in this as members of the CPSU or the Russian Communist Party, as you are looking at things rather obliquely.

[Paleckis] You are quite right. As far as the future of the CPSU—its popularity rating—is concerned, that is the affair of the CPSU, but on the subject of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania I would like to say that at the present moment it is the most popular political force among the influential forces of Lithuania. We—or rather not we, but the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences—carried out sociological surveys which just a year or eighteen months ago were very unfavorable to us; we lagged somewhere behind. Now, however, we have had a swing of plus 39 percent, while the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform has had a swing of minus 56 percent. It is a shame that these figures have not appeared in the Moscow press, although there has been mention made of this sociological survey—of the popularity of individuals, of parliament, and of the government. But as regards the 28th congress—of course we all wish it success. We have not been invited, either as guests or observers. But just imagine what the 28th congress would have been like without April 1985! It would have been boring, tedious, and really very, very dull!

[Lyubimov] Presumably because, as you have said, the point is not the communist convictions that a Communist Party holds, but the specific steps that it undertakes.

[Paleckis] Yes, I believe the main thing now is realism. And for my colleagues from the Russian Parliament who, I believe, made interesting speeches, pragmatism and realism are very important. Of course, it is not because we are communists that we have support. The burden of the past weighs very heavily on us, too. It is because we pursue a realistic policy, and say what is acceptable to people, generally. And the new forces that have entered Lithuania's parliament have declared Lithuania an independent state. That step was clearly long overdue. I would say that in the past three months they, too, have moved toward the center. That is always the way it is: People who enter the real world of politics move from their extremist positions into the center.

[Lyubimov] Justas, we have hanging here a map of Russia—not the USSR, but Russia. Today's program is to a considerable extent, devoted to this sovereign Republic. How do you regard Russia now that it has got its sovereignty?

[Paleckis] Well, of course, I would say that all intelligent people welcome this Russian renaissance—Both, I would say, within Russian and outside Russia. In West Europe, the U.S., and everywhere. This process—judging by Lithuania's experience, and in some respects we have overtaken you, although we have a special status—this is a very complex process. But it is a process. And if...[changes thought] I noticed this in Kuybyshev, or in Samara, rather, and in Leningrad, where I was recently, and in Moscow—I have noticed an enormous polarization. It is always either-or. Gorbachev or Yeltsin; collective farmers or private farmers; black or white; right or left, as the song goes. But what about both-and?

There may be revolution—for yes, perestroyka is a revolutionary time—but the mistakes of 1917 must not be repeated, and there must be as much evolution as possible. We have lived through this, to some extent. But we regard Russia as a country with a great future, I would say. As a country that has suffered a huge amount. And I believe that all of us—Russia and Lithuania, the Ukraine and Georgia, Hungary and Poland—have been participating in the invalids' Olympics. In the sense that Stalinism, and then stagnation, so maimed our peoples and our states—which, according to the Constitution, were independent states, although this was just a fiction—that it will take a long time to get back to normal. And we must get back to normal, as we will now be participating in the Olympics for normal, civilized countries.

[Lyubimov] Well, much depends on the level of political culture. Perhaps our neighboring republics share that to some extent. Our guest has been Justas Paleckis, a secretary in the Communist Party of Lithuania. [As a separate item in the "Vzgvlyad" program at 1922 GMT on 29 June, correspondent Lyubimov notes the program has been taking telephone calls addressed to Paleckis. Lyubimov says, "Justas Paleckis, a question for you. Your father signed the treaty with Russia, and yet you are against it." Paleckis replies, "Well, that is an interesting question. Yes, my father did sign—or rather table—the declaration on Lithuania's entry into the USSR in 1940. Harsh words are now used to describe these actions—annexation and occupation—and these would appear to be correct. But the fact of the matter is that at the time there was no option: either Hitler's

Germany, or Stalin's Soviet Union. But at the time nobody knew about Stalin and his system. And probably there was no third option of an independent Lithuanian state at the time. That option has now appeared. These fifty years have been very difficult for the Lithuanian people—the tragic Stalinist years, which brought incalculable loss. But nevertheless, something has been achieved in these fifty years. And as regards the population of Lithuania—its demographic content—fifty years ago the Lithuanians made up 69 percent; they now make up 80 percent. If Lithuania had ended up in the German empire, and if Hitler had won the war, then 50 years in this correlation would not have existed. But it is clear that there has always been a desire for independence, for sovereignty, and for an independent state. And this came about just as soon as these imperial nuts and bolts were undone."]

Emmigration From Lithuania on Increase

LD0107230190 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Summary] Edmundas Mikelevicius, deputy of Visa and Registration Department in Vilnius, informed us that last year more than 1,200 people left Lithuania for permanent settlement in the West. During the current year almost 1,500 people have already applied for emmigration visas. The rate of emmigration was doubled. More than 1,400 Jews have left Lithuania this year.

Some Lithuanians are also leaving for Israel although there is little chance that they will settle there. Last year an unprecedented 220 people emmigrated without invitation documents. They all left through the so-called Israel channel. Most of them were 20- to 30-year-old unemployed residents of Kaunas who left with their families.

All those who leave for Israel lose their citizenship the moment they cross the state border.

Lithuanian Blockade Leads to Unemployment

LD2906103190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0944 GMT 29 Jun 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] According to information published in Vilnius by the Litnuanian Statistics Department, a total of 102,900 people employed in industry, construction, and transportation have been obliged to cease normal work owing to the blockade conditions in the republic. Also without work are 8,600 machine operators in rural areas. The losses arising from the blockade amount to 115 million rubles. According to available information, the stocks of diesel fuel on most Lithuanian farms will be sufficient until mid-July.

Divisions Reported in Lithuanian Society

LD2706135190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1245 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A new political organization—the Alliance of Liberals of Lithuania—has been set up in Lithuania. Among its founders are 45 members of the intelligentsia: economists, lawyers, and philosophers. The organization's attention is centered on the situation in Lithuania and the moratorium on the act of independence under discussion by the Lithuanian legislature.

Over the 100 days of independence and two months of economic blockade, the inhabitants of the republic have split into several camps. Some are willing to endure all adversities for the sake of independence; others are frightened by the discomforts brought about by the blockade, chiefly the lack of gasoline, and the subsequent absence of transportation by vehicle. Others are gloating over disagreements between the government and the legislature and making a fortune speculating in gasoline and other items in short supply.

Similar opinions were also reflected today in the discussion by deputies. This is demonstrated by the fact that apart from the version presented by the government, deputies were presented with a further 10 alternative drafts of the moratorium. [video shows general shots of legislature in sessions: Prunskiene shown]

Baltic 'Summit' To Be Held in Tallinn

Scheduled for 29 Jun

LD2906162490 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] At the present moment it is impossible for Lithuania to freeze its independence declaration, thinks Edgar Savisaar, the premier of Estonia, speaking at a Hansa seminar in Kotka. According to Premier Savisaar, the Baltic states will start assessing the Soviet leadership's negotiation tactics at a summit meeting of the Baltic countries which will assemble in Tallinn this evening. The Baltic crisis has in every way dominated the Hansa seminar today, reports Jarkko Juselius from Kotka:

[Juselius] Estonian Premier Edgar Savisaar strongly criticized the Soviet Union at his press conference in Kotka for its indefinite negotiation tactics. The leaders of the Baltic countries will meet for a summit meeting in Tallinn this evening to assess the Soviet Union's intentions, said Premier Savisaar. Savisaar was asked for his personal assessment of whether Lithuania could in the present situation freeze its independence declaration. The Estonian premier, assisted by an interpreter, replied to the question unambiguously in the negative.

[Begin Savisaar recording in Estonian fading into Finnish translation] Moscow demands from the Baltic

countries very specific steps, but at the same time gives very unclear statements about its own actions and intentions. In this situation I see no possibility for freezing the declaration of independence. [end recording]

[Juselius] The Baltic crisis has dominated today's Hansa seminar. Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri again appealed earlier in the day strongly to the foreign powers to recognize the independence of the Baltic countries. Foreign Minister Meri was also bitter about the fact that the Baltic countries have not so far been admitted into the CSCE process as independent factors. According to Meri, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the only European states which were left under the occupation of a big power after the Second World War, a power which many, according to Meri, have started calling the world's last colonial power.

Estonian Premier Edgar Savisaar reiterated the same theme when he replied to a question about how much Estonia regrets the fact that the Baltic countries have not been admitted into the CSCE process.

[Begin Savisaar recording] All states must recognize the fact that the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has not been restored after the Second World War. If other countries do not find it necessary to recognize that this has happened, that the independence of these countries has not been restored, if it is quite indifferent to them, then it is also indifferent to whether the Baltic countries participate in the CSCE, and its follow-up conference. If it is not indifferent, then they have to adopt a stand on the matter. [end recording]

[Juselius] The governments of the Nordic countries presently follow a practice according to which the ministers of the new Baltic governments visit the Nordic countries, not so much at the invitation of governments, but more often at the invitation of parliaments and civic organizations. Estonian Premier Edgar Savisaar did not want to criticize this protocol, but thought that there would be unlimited possibilities for developing cooperation between the Nordic and the Baltic governments.

Landsbergis, Prunskiene Attend Summit

LD2906201190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, and Deputy Foreign Minister Valdemaras Katkus left for Tallinn today to attend the Baltic Council session.

On Sunday, Kazimiera Prunskiene will depart Tallinn for Finland where she will participate at the International Seminar on Questions of the Development of Northern Europe.

Parties Meet, Appeal to CPSU

LD2906211490 Riga International Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] A meeting of the leaders of the independent communist parties of the three Baltic states took place in Riga. Algirdas Brazauskas came from Lithuania, Vayno Vyalyas came from Estonia, and Latvia was represented by Ivars Kezbers. A joint protocol was adopted as well as an appeal to the 28th CPSU Congress. It is noted in these documents that the independent communist parties of the Baltic states support the striving of their peoples for state independence, take a stand for the consolidation of democracy and for implementation of the ideals of a humane social justice and freedom of personality.

The Baltic states' independent communist parties regard it as necessary to organize continual meetings and exchanges of opinions. The appeal to the 28th CPSU Congress emphasizes that the independent communist parties in the Baltic region have arisen as a result of objective processes. Therefore, turning against them and using double standards with regard to the parties in the Soviet Union is nonconstructive.

The ideas of the Baltic communist parties appeal for the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress to be based on values common to all mankind, and not only on the interests of some single party and ideology, social stratum or people.

Yesterday the leaders of the three Baltic independent communist parties were received by Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia. In his speech he emphasized that all meetings between representatives of the Baltic states which promote understanding and working out of a common strategy and tactics must be welcomed.

30 Jun Meeting Cancelled

LD3006124790 Vilnius Domestic Soviet in Russian 1200 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] The head of the Secretariat of the chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, [name indistinct], informed us by telephone that a meeting of the Baltic Council planned today will not take place. Anatoliy Gorbunov could not come to Tallinn because of illness.

Landsbergis Departs Tallinn

LD0107141390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chariman of the Supreme Council of the Repoublic of Lithuania, and Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers, have been in Tallinn to take part in a meeting of the Baltic Council.

Yesterday, Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers, left Tallinn for Finland. Vytautas

Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, met with Estonian leaders yesterday, then took part in a song festival in Tallinn.

Vytautas Landsbergis and Arnold Ryuytel held a press conference in Tallinn this morning. Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, returned to Vilnius today.

Confrontation in Latvia Reaches 'New Highs"

LD3006095590 Moscow TASS in English 0939 GMT 30 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaitsev]

[Text] Riga June 30 TASS—Political confrontation that swept Latvia after the declaration of independence has reached new highs.

The latest issue of the EDINSTVO (UNITY) newspaper, published by the Interfront, carries a statement by Interfront leaders on the restoration of the Aizsergs' organisation—a para-military organisation active in bourgeois Latvia—and the forming, with consent of the government, of vigilante groups.

This is an attempt to set up structures alternative to the Interior Ministry.

Interfront members, opposing the Popular Front and the Latvian government (Interfront unites mowstly non-Latvian ethnic groups), believe that there is "a real threat of moral and physical elimination of dissenters."

"We cannot remain calm about the security of Interfront supporters and their families. The Presidium of the Interfront is continuing forming international brigades to maintain public order and in self-defence," the statement said.

In bourgeois Latvia the Aizsergs performed police functions. They did not lay down arms even after the establishment of Soviet power in 1940.

During the Second World War, occupation authorities composed police units from them.

Communist deputies from the Ravnopraviye faction filed a request to the governent on the setting up of vigilante groups. The parliament will hear a government report on the issue next week.

Every action causes a reaction. However, this school axiom is not always good in politics. The setting up by the opposing sides of para-military units, though yet unarmed, can spawn civil disobedience. The Latvian government has so far failed to take action.

Latvia's Ivans Says 'Break Soviet Embrace'

LD0107212190 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 1 Jul 90

[By TASS special correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Kotka, Finland, July 2 TASS— An international seminar on the subject "New Hansa—the Revival of Northern Europe" ended here on Sunday.

The meetings and discussions, involving representatives of Denmark, West and East Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union, Finland and Sweden, focussed on Baltic countries' cooperation in the entire diversity of its forms and manifestations.

Speakers included members of government, activists of informal movements, entrepreneurs, scientists, cultural figures, and municipal officers.

Speaking at the close of the seminar on Sunday, Prime Minister Harri Holkeri pointed out that the Baltic region had always played an important role in European affairs.

Now that the situation on the continent is changing in a truly revolutionary way, one may hope that the cold war period has finally been overcome, he said.

"There have arisen good opportunities for further rapprochement between West and East. Here in the Baltic we do not need to begin cooperation from scratch," Holkeri said.

"For example, in such a major field as environmental protection, cooperation has been developing for many years now. Among other most promising areas for further cooperation are transport, tourism and cultural exchanges," he said.

Cooperation in the Baltic is inseparable from the all-European process, Holkeri added.

Not all remarks at the seminar were notable for constructiveness, though. Obviously confrontational notes were voiced by a number of representatives of the Soviet Baltic Republics.

D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Latvian parliament, raised the question of Baltic Republics' independence in the following way:

"If we do not break the Soviet embrance, we shall have no future. The Baltic republics now constitute only the present edge of imperial appetite. If we are gobbled up, imperial hunger will grow to swallow Scandinavian countries as well."

Of course, everyone has the right to freely express one's views but a person who aspires for the title of politician should do this curcumspectly, the more so that now the "Soviet threat" thesis is not in vogue even with those who act more professionally in politics than ivans.

The Russian Federation's Foreign Minister V.M. Vinogradov justly reckoned such rhetoric among the lexicon of the past. On behalf of the Russian Federation Government he welcomed the holding of the seminar in Kotka and emphasised that the recent adoption of the declaration on state sovereignty provides Russia with

immense opportunities for independent economic management and the establishment of relations with both the other Union republics within the framework of the USSR and with foreign states.

Baltic countries may derive much benefit from partnership with developed Russia, he added.

The minister believes that a Hanseatic-type treatment in the region could be contemplated to provide for mutually easy terms for trade, the establishment of joint ventures, investments, the functioning of transport, cooperation projects in the field of culture, sports, tourism, and people-to-people contacts.

The existence of such a regional or subregional association, Vinogradov said, would not contradict the efforts aimed at building a "common European home." It could become an already built component of it.

Who knows, a "new Hanseatic League", maybe, would stretch via the revived Nizhniy Novgorod fair to beyond the Urals and link the East with Europe, he said.

"Of course, all this requires thorough studies but I would like to emphasise: In our days one should look for such forms of contacts between people, cities and states which could really unite, not divide, them. It would not be bad to draw on the useful experience of the past either," Vinogradov said.

Citizens Congress Session Scheduled 30 Jun-1 Jul

LD2906201290 Riga International Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] The second session of the Congress of Latvia's Citizens will take place on Saturday and Sunday in Riga. According to the information provided by the organizational committee, on its agenda there will be adoption of several documents, preceded by a discussion of the attitude of the congress concerning conclusion of international treaties, also formulating the basic principles in tackling the relations with the Soviet Union. Also the relations with the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia wil be discussed.

During the two months since the previous session of the congress of citizens, in the words of the organizational committee's representatives, the congress of citizens has been ignored at an official level both by the Supreme Soviet and by the Council of Ministers. Only unofficial contacts have taken place between the committee of citizens and the Supreme Soviet deputies. A decision on cooperation with citizens committees has been adopted this week by the board of the People's Front of Latvia dome, stating that there must be joint action in the working out of a citizenship law and also in the preparation of elections to the Saeima.

Latvia Adopts Resolution on Political Parties

PM2906131590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 First Edition p 4

[Dispatch by correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Resolution on Parties"]

[Text] Riga, 26 Jun—The question of the activity of parties and other sociopolitical organizations in state institutions, organizations, and enterprises, which has been long debated in the republic, acquired the form of a specific Latvian Supreme Soviet resolution 26 June. At the basis of this document lay the provisions of a draft drawn up by the Commission for People's Power and Public Affairs under the leadership of Deputy J. Lagzdins (Latvian People's Front faction.)

It is specifically provided that primary organizations of sociopolitical organizations and parties cannot be set up or operate in the republican Prosecutor's Office, KGB, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and their subordinate institutions, or in the courts, in radio or television, or in the government mass media.

Such organizations must cease their activity within one month after the said resolution comes into force. Instructions have also been given to abolish political organs in the republic's internal affairs system. The decisions and directives of parties and other sociopolitical organizations are not binding on state institutions or on organizations and enterprises situated on Latvian territory.

The "Equal Rights" parliamentary faction (which, as is well known, stands on the CPSU platform) offered its own version of the resolution "On Regulating the Activity of Parties and Other Sociopolitical Organizations In State Institutions, Organizations, and Enterprises in the Latvian Republic." But this draft was rejected by 90 votes. True, some of its individual provisions were incorporated in the text of the adopted resolution. In the opinion of the parliamentarians, the adopted resolution will facilitate "the improvement of the activity of state institutions, organizations, and enterprises, and will increase the objectivity of workers in law-enforcement organs." Time alone will show whether this will really be the case.

Latvian Parliament Minority Complaints Viewed

90UN2017B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 15 May 90 p 1

[Article by E. Lapidus under the rubric "How the Parliament Works": "Attendance in the Name of... Attendance?"]

[Text] The monitors have disappeared from the press center of the republic's Supreme Soviet. They created for the journalists the impression of participating in what was taking place in Ordenskiy Hall, where the deputies assemble and determine how our life will proceed in the future.

No, this is not a whodunit. The monitors have disappeared simply because there was no longer any need for them. At the beginning of the session they allowed the journalists into Ordenskiy Hall for about five minutes before the morning meeting and then a couple of times in the course of the day (to take pictures for the most part); now the procedure has become significantly simpler. Because the number of writers and photographers has abruptly declined, access to the hall is permitted without any limits on time. And now we may see with our own eyes everything that is happening at the session and not just what the camera operator chooses.

The first session of the Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation is in its seventh day. The staffs of the standing commissions have already been "settled," and their 15 chairman have been determined.

They have all become members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The procedure of nominating, hearing, evaluating, and confirming the ministers—the members of the administrative cabinet—is still underway.

The majority, representing the interests of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] as we know, firmly holds the reins of power.

But how does the minority faction "Equality" function under these conditions? How do the people's representatives evaluate the seven days of the parliament's activity?

[J. Lalins] In principle the session is organized well. But I consider the absence of an agenda a most significant defect. I do not understand why it is impossible to make up an agenda if only for a week, with corrections following of course. We are sailing without a rudder...

As for the opinion of the minority faction... It is not taken into account at all. And although they give us the floor and more or less listen to our speeches and answer our questions and inquiries, in the end it does not have any significance because when it comes to the final decision the opinion of the minority faction is simply thrown out. I believe that the parliament is obligated to create a mechanism for the defense of the interests of the minority.

[M. Berdikov] The main lesson of the last few days is that we are learning to work in a parliament. The preliminary preparation of the NFL deputies was better and they made many advance provisions, and on that score our faction loses. We are trying to avoid outbursts of emotion similar to those that took place in the Riga City Soviet (I am also a deputy of the city soviet).

The parliamentary majority does not take us into account. And indeed, why should they when distribution of portfolios is underway? I believe that they will remember the "Equality" faction when the Supreme Soviet occupies itself with the practical work of resolving the economic and social problems which have accumulated.

[F. Stroganovs] Unfortunately there are many empty speeches at the session. This was especially noticeable at the 11 May morning meeting.

And how can one speak of democracy? The deputies from the NFL decide everything, and they do it with strictness, the way they planned it in advance. Our opinion does not change anything at all.

[A. Vidavskis] The Supreme Soviet Presidium and the staff of the administration are being formed exclusively from NFL adherents. I am convinced that the principle of staffing the organs of power according to party will have a negative effect on the quality of their activity. In addition, there are few professionals among the new leaders. I am also very alarmed by the tendency that has been noted in the program speeches by D. Ivans and I. Godmanis toward the restructuring of enterprises subordinate to the Union. It will result in mass unemployment. But practically all our remarks and proposals fall on deaf ears.

[I. Prokofjevs] We all remember very well how many arguments and declarations the Duma of the NFL made concerning affirmation of democracy, pluralism of opinions, and repudiation of the traditions of the period of stagnation. The election campaigns of many of the candidates for Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy were also saturated with many of these same proposals. But all these protestations turned out to be empty and meaningless with regard to the work of the parliament and our faction. Discussion of the more or less important issues proceeds according to a previously determined scenario, and the "equality" faction is unable to influence a single decision.

These are the opinions, and this is how things have shaped up in the parliament. The opinion of 59 people's deputies out of 199 is ignored from one day to the next. But "equality" represents the interests of about 600,000 voters!

Does the majority faction consider these factors? Here is what J. Bojars said in an interview: "We find ourselves in exactly the same situation at the sessions in Moscow. But on the other hand the deputies could of course take this minority into consideration."

Here, apparently, we should make a small addition. USSR People's Deputy I. Bisers is the deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities. By way of comparison we will point out that not one of the 15 standing commissions is headed by a deputy from the "equality" faction. Moreover, not one of the minority was even entrusted with the post of secretary of a commission. And only in one instance (an exception?) was a representative of the opposition elected deputy chairman.

Let us remember what A. Gorbunovs said at a press conference which took place just before the session opened. "The situation in the republic is such," he noted, "that we simply cannot realize our opportunities without taking people of other nationalities into consideration."

And can parliament move forward in its work without taking into consideration the positions of 59 people's deputies?

The 11 May working day ended with a conflict. The "equality" faction refused to participate in the vote on V. Skudra's candidacy for the post of the republic's minister of internal affairs, and it then left the meeting hall. Unfortunately, we have not seen the end of stiff opposition.

Ethnic Consultative Council Created in Latvia

LD3006063690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Video report by correspondent N. Kasyanova in Riga, date not given, including interview with Latvian Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Human Rights and Ethnic Issues Chairman Ita Kozakevicha; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The Latvian parliament has examined a statute on a public consultative council of nationalities under the republic's Supreme Soviet.

[Kasyanova] What are the capabilities of the consultative council? Are they, or is it, as the name indicates, purely a consultative council?

[Kozakevicha] The consultative council will be merely one link in the overall structure: there will be the consultative council of nationalities, then a standing parliamentary commission on human rights and ethnic issues, and in addition we are currently setting up a special department under the executive bodies, including the Ministry of National Education. I hope that this structure will help us to tackle ethnic issues as best as possible, in a democratic and brisk fashion.

[Kasyanova] Further to what has been said, literally in the past two years—at a time when the Latvian people have been tackling the most difficult economic and social problems—national cultural societies have been set up for Belorussians, Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Armenians, Azeris, and Estonians, and new publications are coming out in their native languages. For the first time in many years, Jewish readers have received their journal (?VER), and a Russian lyceum has been set up. None of this existed before. Naturally, these are only the first steps, but all of us are taking our first steps; we are only at the very start of the road to a genuinely democratic and free society. [video shows interview with Kozakevicha; everyday street scenes]

Estonian Leaders on Moratorium, United Front

LD3006165290 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Report from Tallinn by correspondent Antti Halinen]

[Text] Confirmation of Baltic political cooperation and Lithuania's decision yesterday [on a moratorium on independence] have been clearly visible here beside the Tallinn Song Festival. The Lithuanian president, Vytautas Landsbergis, arrived here late yesterday evening. The Latvian president will not come because of the illness of his wife, but the Latvian prime minister is here, so that high-level discussions are possible. Estonian President Ruutel told Radio News that he had discussed Lithuania's moratorium decision in advance with President Landsbergis and that he had supported this decision, because Lithuania is now in a very difficult situation.

[Begin Ruutel recording in Estonian, fading into superimposed Finnish translation] According to Ruutel, the discussions will now continue here in Tallin. Among topics to be discussed are, among other things, the CPSU congress which opens the day after tomorrow and the Baltic plans concerning it, which President Ruutel did not, however, want to comment on at this stage. [end recording]

Foreign Minister Lennart Meri wanted to stress concerning the Lithuanian decision that it was not a unilateral gesture but that Lithuania expects Moscow to start negotiations simultaneously with the freezing of the independence declaration. The Baltic foreign ministers said in Tallinn earlier this week that the negotiations with Moscow should be conducted on a one-plus-three basis; that is, with the Baltic countries together. According to Meri, Lithuania's decision is not, however, contrary to the joint Baltic front.

[Begin Meri recording in Finnish] [Words indistinct] more or less it is in harmony, and one proof is the fact that President Landsbergis is in Tallinn just now and we shall have today, apart from the song festival, also important political discussions ahead of us. [end recording]

The start of the talks with Moscow depends now completely on the Kremlin; the ball is in their court, said Meri, and added that immediately after the Soviet Communist Party congress, which is important for Gorbachev, the Baltic crisis must be solved one way or another.

The internal changes in Estonia were visible here in Tallinn today very clearly, for instance in the festival procession of the song festival. Absent were the pictures of Soviet leaders, the red flags and slogans; in their place were the national blue-black-white flags, the flags of the choirs and choral societies, some of them dating from the period of independence. President Ruutel watched the procession together with the Lithuanian president, the

Latvian prime minister and the Estonian prime minister, Savisaar, on the pavement outside the Viru Hotel, and received from time to time cheers from the marchers and armfuls of the Estonian national flower, cornflowers. Ruutel is sure that the next song festival will take place in a free Estonia.

Independent Baltic Communists Outline Stance

LD2806163190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] A meeting of delegations from the Independent Communist Party of Latvia, the Communist Party of Lithuania, and the Communist Party of Estonia has taken place in Riga. Their leaders, Kezbers, Brazauskas, and Sillari, held a press conference today. Journalists were told that a protocol on cooperation between the parties has been signed.

Answering questions about the forthcoming congress, those attending the press conference emphasized that its results will be of the utmost importance: Who will be at the helm of the communist party, and how will the CPSU blend into the general political system?

Assessing their attitude toward the parties that have remained true to the stance of the CPSU, the leaders of the independent parties stressed that they are divided by the most important thing: the aims for which they are striving.

Approval was given to an appeal to the 28th CPSU Congress, which will be brought to Moscow by the Estonian delegates.

Baltic Sea Environmental Agreement Signed

LD3006194290 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] An agreement has been signed in the Estonian Capital Tallinn, on ecological protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. The scientific conference, participated in by the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian science academy, as well, as the Swedish Royal Academy delegations, has projected joint actions for the protection of Baltic Sea waters.

A joint policy of scientific exploration and a long-range plan for development of a Baltic market will be prepared on the basis of an agreement between the three Baltic states.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Says Army Should 'Remain United'

LD0107180390 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 1 Jul 90

[Text] The chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, Boris Yeltsin, has objected to replacing the national armed forces with national units in every Soviet republic. The Army, he pointed out in an interview for television, must remain united. Boris Yeltsin believes this country needs a voluntary and professional army.

The head of the parliament of the largest Soviet republic pointed out an army of this kind would be more capable and more prone [as heard] for democratic orders. Boris Yeltsin also believes a law must be adopted to ensure servicemen social guarantees.

Yeltsin Stance on Reform Discussed

LD0207073590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Excerpts] In the column "On the Theme of the Day", the newspaper IZVESTIYA has published a long article dedicated to a number of decisions of the Russian parliament. As you recall, at a press conference on 26 June, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was asked whether the independence of the Russian and State Bank other measures in the sphere of monetary policy would lead to the decline of the all-Union marked and to the even greater weakening of the ruble.

In reply, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia said that there is a program for the stabilization of the ruble and that in general there is a great Russian program for the whole of the Union, and if it is adopted everything would be all right and that there is no threat at all to the ruble. Otherwise, the republic would be forced to take an extreme measure and to introduce its own money, although that is extremely undesirable. [passage omitted]

Of course, the Russian reformers are risking a great deal. But isn't there a greater risk in not undertaking anything or in undertaking something but in such a way that nothing changes as a result? The Russians have set themselves the difficult task of proving that economic reform can be truly radical. However, its implementation requires not only careful consideration and a sense of proportion but also the ability to use the experience already acquired.

For instance, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin today is repeating verbatim the mistake of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of three year's standing, IZVESTIYA considers. He then assured that price reform would not affect living standards. Promises of the impossible paralyzed reform. Well, and now, Yeltsin is promising to carry out fundamental transformations not affecting prople's living standards. However, as experience has shown, there are no reforms for free. Impossible assurance either tie the hands of the reformers or undermine their authority. So far, the credit for confidence is great enough, in Russia there is a new, truly elected authority, a new government is being formed which is unconnected with the sins and the commitments of the past. [passage omitted]

Deputies, Shevardnadze Remark on Russian Party

LD3006002290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Video report by correspondent Leonid Khatayevich from the Kremlin's Georgiyevskiy Hall in Moscow on 29 June; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Excerpts] [video shows delegates registering in the Kremlin for the 28th CPSU Congress]

[Khatayevich] Even a day or two ago, comrades, we were not sure that we would be making this reportage from the Kremlin's Georgiyevskiy Hall. [passage omitted]

And a curious detail: In the same way as on the eve of the Russian Party Conference, forms are being distributed to delegates, but it is already a new form and its first question—it is rightly so, as it is inevitable that the results of the Russian Congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party which has been set up should have an influence on the content of the work of the 28th congress—so this is what is asked here: Are you satisfied with the results of the founding congress of the RSFSR Communist Party? [passage omitted]

Different people, different views, different degrees of preparedness for the discussions which lie ahead at the congress. And all the same, the first question on the form is like a [word indistinct] by which the delegates' positions manifest themselves. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze. [video shows Shevardnadze speaking to camera]

[Shevardnadze] I have my own opinion in relation to individual speeches, as at any congress. I did not like all the speeches, but as far as the main documents that were adopted are concerned, and the main speeches, and the fact itself that the party organization of a Communist Party of Russia has been founded: these are historic events. [video shows scenes outside the Kremlin; Khatayevich states that a board referring to the 28th congress has been set up outside the Congress Hall]

Silayev Interviewed on Background, Changes

LD2906223990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1744 GMT 29 Jun 90

["Topical Interview" with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Minsters by unidentified correspondent in Silayev's office, date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] On 15 June the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies approved Ivan Stepanovich Silayev as chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. Who is he, the new premier?

Ivan Stepanovich Silayev is 59 years old. For journalists he is an open figure and does not hide from conversations. For 20 years he worked at Gorkiy Aviation Works, where he traversed the path from foreman to director. He became a deputy minister and later himself headed the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The MiG-29, Su-26, Il-96, Tu-160, and Tu-204 aircraft were all created with his involvement. Over the past five years he has been at the head of the USSR Council of Ministers' Bureau for Machine Building, being one of Ryzhkov's deputies. There were four ministries subordinated to him and very nearly 5 million persons were employed at the enterprises under those ministries. It is known that he plays tennis and is old-fashioned in his enthusiasms. He is fond of the songs of the sixties.

A model of a Tu-204 aircraft has indeed migrated to his new office on the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment.

Ivan Stepanovich, you spoke recently in one of your interviews about a new approach to the formation of the Russian government. What is it, and could you tell us in more detail about your approach to forming a government?

[Silayev] Well, really speaking, the new tasks—which are the organization of a program for reviving the sovereignty of Russia—are shaping the new approach to the creation of a government. The first thing that we have to do is to work out a new structure that is equal to these tasks. We are nearing the completion of the development of this structure. I have already twice considered it with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

[Correspondent] Over such a brief span of time? Only two weeks have elapsed since you were elected as prime minister.

[Silayev, laughing] Well, we have been working almost round-the-clock. A republic such as Russia cannot exist for long without a government. There are too many tasks.

The structure has thus in the main been prepared and in the very first days of the session it will be presented to the Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] Will it be one of the first matters to be discussed at the session?

[Silayev] Quite so. It will be one of the first matters. Well, as Boris Nikolayevich said in his interview, we have already determined the approaches and the principles are as follows. Firstly, the structure should be compact and not over numerous. We are planning to halve the number of deputy chairmen of the Council of Minsters.

[Correspondent] How many of them were there?

[Silayev] There were 16 of them; now there will be six. Moreover the old set-up was such that there was, for example, a deputy chairman for culture and also a minister for culture. That is to say, the deputy chairman

was in command of the minister. We are eliminating this principle. There are now a number of deputy chairmen who are ministers too. For instance we are reviving the single sector ministry. We shall have a Ministry of Agriculture. The farmers have been vigorously insisting on this, and we have taken such a decision. Well, the minister of this ministry will indeed be the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. That will be the set-up.

Secondly, we have halved the number of ministries. We have only retained functional ministries and their number has been halved.

[Correspondent] What then was the number of ministries?

[Silayev] There were 51 ministries. Now there will be 21 ministries and committees.

[Correspondent] That means, the number has been even more than halved.

[Silayev] Yes, it has been even more than halved. Finally there has been a very large reduction in the apparatus, which was extremely numerous. From 22,500 persons we are planning to change to 11,300 persons. In this respect the Ministry of Agriculture will naturally be the most numerous. The basic idea is that a ministry should be equal to its tasks, and for this it needs to be compact and small. Naturally it must also be manageable and an up-to-date organizer of production, which can perceive tasks and the situation and adjust its actions in good time. Thus by working together in a united fashion I hope we shall be able to tackle these tasks successfully. Those then are our main approaches. We have given up the principle of single candidate appointments.

[Correspondent] Could you speak in more detail about this?

[Silayev] Well, to give you more detail, we have set oursleves the task of selecting three candidates for each post and not merely by some kind of private recommendation. Indeed one of the goals of my meeting you today will finally be an appeal to the viewers and our fellow countrymen to take part in the formation of the government.

We want too to approach the selection of cadres in a scientific way. We have reached an understanding on this with the Institute of Man, the Institute of Sociology, and the Institute of Psychology. They have allocated very interesting specialists—professionals in their fields—who have been helping me to determine the qualities of the various contenders.

[Correspondent] You mean that you will also with the help of psychologists determine what is termed the professional suitability of the various candidates? That is interesting.

[Silayev] Yes, quite right. That is, determine their suitability for definite tasks and definite duties.

[Correspondent] In general there is as yet no experience of this in our country.

[Silayev] Well, we are making a start. This group set about its work today, and the contenders for office have already had meetings with them. We have high hopes of this. We shall thus have a choice which will make it possible for us to choose the best.

Another principle, about which Boris Nikolayevich has also spoken, is that there should be no one in the government older than myself and Yeltsin.

[Correspondent] So that will also be a criterion. That is interesting.

[Silayev] Yes, that will be one of the criteria, and when various people's candidacies are put forward we look first of all at their age. If their age is not suitable, then we do not look at their work records, since we are of the view that it is possible right now to find a large number of professionals among the younger generation and to choose from among them. Those then are the main principles of our approach.

[Correspondent] I know that you are now working on a scheme of proposals regarding the structure of the cabinet of ministers and government. Many new structures of which we have not previously heard have appeared. Perhaps you would show us.

[Silayev] Certainly, I shall show you and comment upon it.

[Video shows Silayev and interviewer cross the room to a table on which there is a full table-size diagram of the proposed structure of ministries and departments of the new government. Silayev points to various features, some of which are shown on screen, during the ensuing comments]

[Silayev, continues] I should like here simply to draw your attention to the new structures or elements of the structure which are a consequence and a reflection of the tasks confronting the government. Firstly, a very important structure is the Committee on the Economy.

[Correspondent] Is it a transformation of the State Planning Committee?

[Silayev] You have here the State Planning Committee, the State Committee on Prices, and part of the State Committee on Labor, further a Committee for the Management of State Property and Support of the new economic structures has also appeared. This will be involved with the realization of the program for the removal of state control.

Of interest is the post of purely minister. I understand that abroad he would be referred to as a minister without portfolio. There is such a term.

[Correspondent] Yes. Here it says: Minister of the Innovation Council.

[Silayev] Yes, Minister of the Innovation Council. There are provisions for and we are at present selecting a group of professionals at the level of scientists and at the level of those having practice in development work who will work in pioneering areas.

We regard as very important the Committee on Labor Resources and Social Protection. Certain negative consequences of market relations should be reflected in the work of this committee—namely, protection of the low-paid categories and categories such as pensioners, invalids, and students. We think that it will be a very active committee.

Then you have the commission, or rather the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Commission on Economic Reform. In two months we are due to present to the Supreme Soviet and obviously to the congress a finalized version of the reform for a transition to a market economy.

Then there is any minister—let us say, the minister for industry affairs—who does not have a ministry and does not have a large staff. Such a minister has at his disposal a number of consultants—perhaps 20 or 25 people—who are in charge of matters relating to the functioning of industrial enterprises in the territory of the Russian Federation. Within the government he defends the interests of the enterprises, in conjunction with other bodies plans their appropriate development, assesses their work, and so on. There are also a number of ministers without ministries, without any apparatus, whose functions are determined by decisions on the distribution of Union and republican functions. A very important question is the minister of nationalities affairs, with his staff as well. As you can see, one cannot say that we have halved the number of ministers. We have cut the number of ministries by half, but new functions have emerged which will be carried out by...

[Correspondent, interrupting] Ministers without portfolio.

[Silayev] Quite so, ministers without portfolio. We think that one very important matter, and it seems correct to us, after a great deal of reflection and a mass of meetings, I would say, with higher education, with academic figures, is how we are going to bring together and combine higher education and science. And so we have arrived at the deputy chairman... [hesitates] minister for science and education and enhancement of qualifications of specialists. And a very serious reform has been instituted here.

[Correspondent] But could you describe the ministers? Let us put it this way—you have said they are no older than 60 years of age, but what is the lower limit? Could there be a 25-year-old minister?

[Silayev] Well, if it is a wunderkind, as they say, but all the same certain skills in organizational work are needed, and some experience, if you like. But nevertheless, you have a very serious post, naturally, that of Ministry of Finance. We already have candidates. One of them is 32 years old. And I would like to appeal to my fellow citizens, Russians, to help us form the government.

[Correspondent] In what way?

[Silayev] We would like specialists who have a certain experience of work in one or another industry or topic to offer their services, on more or less the conditions that I have already spoken about. That means according to age, professional activity, capability to adapt to new conditions and being ready to work in new conditions, to make independent decisions—we will be giving a good deal of independence to members of the government. I can even tell you what zones, where we are short of candidates today. I would say, both the Ministry of finance—we invite applicants to compete; the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations—we do intend to conduct an independent foreign economic policy, and here we have not formed a complete set of contenders; and there is the Ministry of Justice, as well. [telephone number for applications scrolls across bottom of screen]

I would like to remind you that the republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted a resolution on the separation of functions. In connection with this, new structures will emerge in our government as well, and I would draw your attention to two rectangles [referring to charts] at least, the minister for cooperation with the USSR Ministry of Defense—a minister with a staff, and the minister for activities of enterprises of Union industries located on the RSFSR's territory. And finally, a third one was planned for us, somewhat earlier it was a committee for national security, but since there arises the function of cooperating with the USSR Committee for State Security, there is this function, the committee and the function of chairman of the Committee for National Security and Cooperation with the USSR KGB. [as heard].

[Correspondent] I think we have gathered detailed enough information about how the government will be formed. The proposals really are very interesting and radical. But if we can come again to our sit-down conversation, I would like to ask you this question: Which of the proposals in the program of your competitor Bocharov on radical changes in the republic over 500 days will you use, if any, in the work of the new government?

[Silayev] Naturally, they will be used, but to a larger extent we will be making use of the authors. They will be part of this commission which is drafting the program for economic reform.

[Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich, how do you intend to correct the practice of many years of redistributing the state budget, that the greater part has been left for the state budget, while the smaller part has been returned to the republic, and will this help, will it assist the new Union treaty?

[Silayev] A few days ago, in the Council of Ministers, we had a very big conference with all Union republics taking part, at which we examined issues of the budgets in the new conditions, market conditions, and in particular, for 1991. There we set out our positions on this issue, which boil down to the fact that we insist on a considerable proportion of the republic's income remaining on the republic's teritory. Of course, we have extreme need of a new Union treaty which would allow us to shape on a foundation of law all the fundamental steps and actions, both between republics and with the Union center, and we hope that this Union treaty will be signed in the coming two or three months, it is extremely necessary.

Polozhkov on Party's Future, Careful Moves

AU2906114690 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 28 Jun 90 p 11

[NOVOSTI interview with Ivan Polozhkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party; place and date not given: "I Am in Favor of a Careful Approach"]

[Text] [NOVOSTI] What did you feel when the results of the vote were announced?

[Polozhkov] I felt fear and alarm about the burden of responsibility. You have to consider the fact that the RSFSR Communist Party was founded under entirely new conditions. It will have to learn to work under these conditions. Let us be frank: Many communists and even delegates to the party congress believe that we will continue to work as we have done in the past. However, we must break out of the old system and enter into the new one, and we will have to find our place in this new system with the least possible cost.

[NOVOSTI] How do you assess the situation within the CPSU and in Soviet society?

[Polozhkov] I am unable to answer this question clearly because several factors must be considered. First, the unsuccessful perestroyka years; when the party announced perestroyka, it promised a lot. The people believed the party, however, life is becoming increasingly difficult every year, and the social differences are spreading rapidly. The democratization that we announced touched off political activities among the working people who stated their demands vociferously and spoke about their dissatisfaction with the way political and social problems are being solved. However, numerous would-be politicians [Politikaster] have appeared who are trying to capitalize on this wave and to win the people's confidence by dishonest means. In their wake, political agitators have appeared on the scene. I must say that while all this is natural, given the fact that our society is in transition from one state into another one, it is above all also true that our laws are not functioning. What we urgently need now is more order—regarding both legal order and social justice.

[NOVOSTI] In your view, what must the RSFSR Communist Party and its leadership primarily do to improve the situation?

[Polozhkov] We must dispel the feeling of uncertainty in the ranks of the communists, and we must tell them quite clearly what our guilt is and who is responsible for the present and past sins; however, we must not under any circumstances indiscriminately accuse and punish common communists.

Regarding the constant attacks on the party by those forces who have turned against the CPSU and against communists as such, we must give the communists the confidence that the party lives and will not allow itself to be forced to its knees, that it has a program and will fight for it. I think that if any other party were to propose a more constructive program, our party would accept it and would help that party to implement this program.

[NOVOSTI] What do you intend to do if party organizations or individual communists leave the party in connection with your election?

[Poloskov] I do not think that party organizations will do such a thing out of protest, unless they are deliberately provoked. However, because people have a certain opinion about me I consider it my most important task to show the party organizations my true face. They must know who I am, what plans I have, and how I intend to work. I must try to convince the Russian communists by word and deed that I am not a conservative. I am a man advocating a careful approach regarding any type of reform and regarding everything we do or intend to do, where the interests of millions of people are concerned. Only few people know me today, and they, too, know me from information that is not nearly true. I am absolutely sure that this is so.

[NOVOSTI] Do you think that all communists living on Russian territory must automatically become members of the RSFSR Communist Party?

[Polozhkov] I think that we should register them anew, or we should at least try to find out the communists' opinion in this respect.

[NOVOSTI] What will be the first thing you will do as first secretary?

[Polozhkov] Work. It is necessary that the people already realize in our first organizational meetings that we rely on the delegates to the party congress and that we discuss our work with the communists.

[NOVOSTI] When the conference of Russian communists began you said that delimitation was unavoidable in the CPSU. What do you intend to do to permit a split, or do you believe that this process should not be prevented? [sentence as published]

[Polozhkov] I think we will take measures to prevent such delimitation, so all forces that are not united within the CPSU today can merge in the interest of the party and for the party.

[NOVOSTI] How do you view the party's relationship with the new RSFSR parliament?

[Polozhkov] That is the main issue and one of the most important areas in the work of the party organizations because the communists who work within the soviets bring their influence to bear, no matter what problems have to be solved.

[NOVOSTI] What specifically do you plan to suggest to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to solve the republic's problems?

[Polozhkov] I think we will cooperate and back all resolutions adopted by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies. The congress made very important and significant decisions. We will organize the work of the Russian party organization in a way allowing it to actively take part in interpreting and implementing these extremely important resolutions.

[NOVOSTI] Did you have a chance to work with Mikhail Gorbachev?

[Polozhkov] Yes, when I worked at the CPSU Central Committee I was in charge of the Stavropol region where Mikhail Gorbachev was first secretary of the regional party committee. Our relationship was very businesslike and normal. At that time, we developed several remarkable models of organizational and ideological party work in the Stavropol party organization. Such a thing had never existed in the party before. I think that on the whole, our work was productive.

Moscow Delegates Question CPSU's Direction

PM2206112190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[S. Bogatko and Yu. Kazmin report: "Through the Ordeal of Debate. At the Moscow Communists' 28th Conference"]

[Text] The Moscow CPSU city party organization conference continued its work 15 June. Typically, this was the first time that 1,034 of the 1,193 delegates had been elected to the municipal conference. The delegates include 86 workers, or 7.2 percent, 99 economic leaders, and 240 engineering-technical, scientific, and creative personnel and employees, while 113 delegates are representatives of public education, higher educational establishments, and public health. Some 99 percent of delegates have higher or incomplete higher or secondary education, while 233 delegates have an academic degree. In short, there is pretty mighty potential for the adoption of well-considered, responsible decisions.

The conference debate touched on highly acute and topical problems within the party and society. Roughly 40 people spoke during the debate on the gorkom [city party committee] report alone, and lively polemics developed on virtually every point of the draft "Position of the Moscow City Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress." The delegates discussed bluntly and honestly ways of extricating the party from the crisis situation and subjected various positions and platforms to rigorous analysis. The fragments of the speeches that we call to PRAVDA readers' attention attest to the heated nature of the polemics and the sincerity and principle of the communists' discussion.

V. Piskunov: I am a working man. We working people are not indifferent to economic problems. We are, for instance, in favor of cooperatives. But not those that buy things up and speculate, thus increasing the shortages.

Political questions are closely interwoven with economic questions today. Working people are once again being saddled with solving the problem of the market.. Alternative options are needed.

...There is now talk of a decline in production. There is certainly a decline in production owing to conversion, strikes, and sabotage. But I am interested by the following question: Why are refrigerators and vacuum cleaners, that is consumer goods, disappearing as we cut back our production of tanks and missiles. A worker manufactures a product and receives a wage. In my opinion, commodities are being stockpiled in dumps prior to the transition to a market economy and price hikes with a view to extorting extra money from the people. This is a short-sighted and temporary solution to the problem. Who foots the bill for this adventure? There's money for this, but there's no money for the pensioner on a meager pension.

Enterprises are conscious of the acute shortage of high-grade steel and nonferrous metals. Yet we sell pure raw materials abroad and extract metal from the ore, polluting the environment and letting thousands of tonnes of metal go to waste. That is an example of mismanagement—and there are hundreds of such examples. That is where our reserves lie.

I am also interested in the following: We are adopting a law on protection for the president, but why do we not have a law on workers' rights?

V. Pashchenko: In seeking consolidation and making various compromises, we have, in my view, already crossed critical lines that the party should not have transgressed... We proclaimed perestroyka in industry. What is perestroyka in industry? This is a crisis. A normal phenomenon in any state. During a crisis new products are worked on, capacities are renewed, and so on. But did our state really fail to see that there is a zero growth rate in a normal economy during such a period. Yet we are mechanically working out growth rates right up to the year 2000.

We have said all along that we will move on to the economy after politics. The people's patience is at its

limit today. Unfortunately, given today's falling living standards, the politics will derive from the economics. If we do not set things to rights, we will not solve any political problems, and we will not win any prestige among the people—either the communists supporting the Central Committee platform or those who back the Democratic or the Marxist platforms. That is why we need to gather together all our academicians and economists with all their varying opinions, so that they can work out a common strategy for the future...

Here is an example from our area. We have many agricultural machine-building institutes—both the state All-Union Scientific Research Technological Institute for the Repair and Operation of Machine and Tractor Pools, and the All-Union Machine-Building Research Institute—and people there are holding forth at very great length about democracy. While the peasant lacks the right equipment. So why are these institutes paid 10 million rubles in wages? These institutes' democrats really ought to pluck up the courage to raise the question of closing down these institutes owing to their lack of end results.

V. Tereshchenko: A wall of alienation existed for a long time between party organizations and high-ranking party organs, and party members were and still are divided into bosses and subordinates. CPSU members are given the role of bold executives when adopting decisions, without studying the opinion of rank-and-file communists and primary party organizations in depth... Hence the situation that has taken shape today, communists' passivity and lack of faith in the party's strength and the chance of changing anything, and, as a result, their exodus from its ranks.

G. Plotkin: I do not think that the statements about the dictatorship of the proletariat are correct. That was, effectively, dictatorship by appanage princes with party membership cards who gave themselves the monopoly on speaking on behalf of the people and betrayed their interests. They definitely did enough to lose the people's trust once and for all and forfeit the future.

Does the party have a chance? I think that its chance resides in the fact that the interests of the vast majority of the members of the party, which is still a real political force at this time, are the people's interests. We did not join it for the sake of a career or to obtain privileges, and many people distinguished themselves by doing no more than shoulder a heavier burden rather than freeloading. This chance lies in our determination to progress with the creation of an economically efficient and socially just society...

There must, I think, be dissociation. Dissociation from those people whose actions compromised the party, who forgot about the people's interests, and who drag us back into a past that we should renounce once and for all.

L. Gracheva: There has been a mass exodus of workers from the party. This exodus can only be halted by action. We have had enough of words, positions, and platforms! We need a concrete short-term party program —for one or two years—so that the whole party can keep tabs on it. The theses for the party's program can and must be drawn up and published in a few days—short, clear theses, not more than five or six pages' long—so that they reach every communist. They must be adopted at the congress.

Central Committee documents, letters, and programs contain a great deal of theory and vocabulary which not all communists and nonparty members understand. All our party ideas must be expressed more simply and specifically and, possibly, more briefly. This is also the key to prestige. We must not forget that the party is not only made up of academicians and specialists. There are also plasterers, blacksmiths, and kolkhoz workers. If we want the CPSU to really be the vanguard, we need referendums on the key party issues.

Rank-and-file communists must be given the right to organize the CPSU budget. This is a question on which there must no falsehood or hypocrisy.

A. Usov: Let us take a look at the party and at what is happening in it through the eyes of a young man who is deciding whether or not to join the party's ranks. What does he encounter and what does he see today? The CPSU is rent by internal contradictions, there is a lag in analyzing the fundamentals of socialism. Constantly under fire from criticism and denigration, the party is not taking resolute action and is failing to deal the slanderers a fitting rebuff. So, has it nothing to say? Ruling East European communist parties are losing their leading positions or disappearing from the political scene. Is the CPSU drawing any conclusions?

This short list is enough for the young man embarking on life to have doubts or even be convinced that the CPSU has already exhausted its potential. Since that is the case, is there any point in linking one's future to a party that has no future? In this respect young people see our party conference and the 28th CPSU Congress as the communists' main chance and advocate resolute transformations in the party that would help it win real prestige among the people and among young people.

A. Kostin: Tell me, please, in what civilized state servicemen are forced to attend demonstrations, picket, and write appeals in defense of their rights? You won't find a state like that. The question you have raised is not a departmental one, since the situation today is increasingly vague and is escaping from state organs' control. Army communists' common position is as follows: Society can only be consolidated today by resolute action and the execution of the laws and our constitution.

With regard to the depoliticization of the Army. There is a great deal of speculation on this point today: It is said that political organs are Stalin's creation, that armies in civilized states have nothing of the sort, and that the party political apparatus is robbing the taxpayers. I make so bold as to assure you that this is misrepresentation... Historical experience shows us that the Army cannot be

outside politics. No army in the world can do without political institutions. They are there, only they are given different names, but they are essentially the same.

The logic of history convinces us that in any society an army acts as a guarantee of stability and national accord when fulfilling political functions. So let us make a correct assessment of the political struggle over the Army. The CPSU cannot and does not have the right to lose this struggle.

A. Krasilnikov: We are considering the question of setting up a Russian Communist Party today, yet the delegates elected to the Russian conference only received material on the Russian party virtually yesterday.

There is no concept of a Russian Communist Party to date. It has never been discussed at all. The communists from a subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Institute instructed me to inform you of their position to the effect that representatives of major alternative platforms with different concepts of a future Russian Communist Party (the organizational committee of the Initiative Congress in Leningrad, the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau, the "Democratic Platform" in the CPSU) must be given a chance to deliver reports at the beginning of the all-Russian party conference, a general political debate must be held, and organizational decisions must not be adopted at the conference. A party referendum must be held after the 28th congress to determine the concept of the new party. Delegates to the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party must be elected within the framework of this referendum and debate.

V. Drovennikov:

Everyone agrees on the whole on the democratization processes. One's position with regard to the creation of a Russian Communist Party became the touchstone in our country right away. I do not have to listen to speeches. I only have to find out who is "for" and who is "against." The "Democratic Platform" has wasted time and is striving to prevent the proclamation of a Russian Communist Party now, so that preparatory work can be carried out among communists to find a way out on this crucial key problem. That is the question [Drovennikov ends].

N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, delivered a speech at the close of the conference's highly trenchant debate and then spent almost an hour answering delegates' questions.

Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, said that the conference discussion was frank and useful. It is not merely an outwardly renewed party that is taking shape: Its very essence is changing fundamentally, and it is being radically democratized. This is a difficult and painful process for the CPSU. It has put many people on different sides, it has tightened the threads binding many people to the party to a dangerous degree. Every communist and every party organization must clarify his own positions not only with the utmost clarity and lucidity but also with honesty. That is how the general party debate should end on the eve of the 28th congress. The Moscow CPSU city organization's position was determined during this debate—it proved possible to reach accord on many questions between various platforms and groups within the party. After all, monopolism in theory and practice is unacceptable for life development.

After a stormy discussion the conference delegates adopted the "Positions of the Moscow City Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress" and proposals on the draft new party statutes. Candidacies for the CPSU central elective organs were approved, along with other documents. After extensive discussion within primary party organizations and the tough "dry run" at the conference, these documents should become a sound basis for the Moscow delegation's work at the 28th CPSU Congress.

It was decided to hold the second phase of the conference after the 28th CPSU Congress.

Speeches, Reports on Russian Party Congress

Lack of New Ideas Lamented

PM2906143390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

["Viewpoint" article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Leonid Goldin: "What the Russian Communist Party Founding Congress Revealed"]

[Text] The course and results of the Russian communists' congress provide no foundation for theoretical debate or exploration of concepts. Judging by the content of the speeches, the audience was ill prepared for the discussion.

Many times the serious statement was made: The party is gravely ill, the situation is critical. Those who come to this conclusion cannot see that they are falling into a trap—so it was fine and dandy, was it, in the years of Stalinism and stagnation?

But most of them were not interested at all in philosophizing, in pursuing arguments, in civilized conduct; civilians and army people alike spoke with soldierly directness and simply tore into opponents, adopting the principled positions of a class approach acquired from their earliest years. We felt the full impact of a vocabulary we were beginning to get out of the habit of using: about a people who will stone traitors to death, about the filching of sacred objects, about plotters and enemies within. Some people dug deep and asked meaningfully: "Who benefits?" Apparently, it is fine when it benefits the questioner. The same principle was applied when assessing those who are "pushing for power." When we have power it is fine; if it is taken away it is very bad. You cannot argue with this logic. Judging by the fact that

all this met with approbatory applause, the speakers had done their job—today mission accomplished—and few stop to think what a particular speaker will look like when future historians consult the stenographic account of the founding congress. To hold their ground "here and now," as it were—that was clearly the chief concern; there was no thought about the possibility of a troubled future.

Aside from political interests, the level of education, and the personal dimension, one must, of course, take the purely psychological factors into account. For the majority of speakers it was the first opportunity to express their perception of events publicly and without fear. And a multitude of complexes came into play: Dissatisfaction with what is happening and suppressed aggression spilled forth onto harmless targets and scores were settled with "self-regarding" intellectuals. It was possible to establish for onself the desirable image of bold debunker of authority.

We see it over and over again: What is initially a tragedy subsequently becomes a farce. Some delegates were concerned about the... Gorbachev personality cult. Gorbachev, who faces a daily storm of criticism from left and right for whatever happens in the country and in the world and who is responsible not only for Soviet power and the party, but for any blunder by the Council of Ministers. No Law on Protecting the Dignity of the President protects Gorbachev.

However, I also have a little criticism to make of Gorbachev. He knew the composition of the conference, he knew what its mood was, and he could have foreseen how events were going to develop. But his report did not contain any preemptive reaction; it was geared to an authoritative discussion of the underlying issues and a constructive debate. As a teacher, I know that the most eminent academic authority, when he mounts the platform, must take into account the level of the audience and its mood.

In making my contribution to assisting the general secretary by means of criticism (that is what we call it now), there is something else I want to say.

If there is something that unites us communists today, it is above all the desire to do something at least to maintain the party's authority in the country and in the world. Magic spells and assurances of good intentions will not help. What is needed is persuasive evidence that the implementation of the communist idea can be associated not only with totalitarianism and lawlessness, but also with the actual establishment of lofty general human aspirations and values. What has already been done in accordance with Gorbachev's designs and by his hands is the party's most precious asset today. The very personality of the general secretary makes it possible to state that even in post-Lenin history leaders of the communist movement can be vehicles for progressive changes and humanity.

The attacks on Gorbachev are giving rise all over the world to the notion of an unstable situation and of the possibility of an abrupt swing in domestic and foreign policy and to the logical question: Is it possible to do business with us? Even wooden-headed dummies will be aware that the country will not survive in conditions of a new bout of confrontation and autarky and that it is futile trying to tighten the screws further—the thread has gone.

If one is talking about the real reasons for the party's declining prestige, I believe the congress provided a convincing answer to the question, irrespective of what alternatives the speakers proposed. Alas, it confirmed that there are no new ideas, no constructive proposals on ways of renewing the party. What good is it to change the label if the spirit of it and the methods of activity are decades behind the times. And there are no leaders who can count on general confidence in their knowledge, beliefs, and actions.

Why complain about vilification and attacks on the party, about the opposition's copiers and megaphones, and about the nonparty gutter press, when the stenographic accounts, the reviews published in our papers, which sell hundreds of millions of copies, and the television ruthlessly reveal "who's who."

The most depressing thing was the general spiritual and intellectual level of the congress. I am not going to judge by the occasional highly favorable speech (of which there were so few) or by the speeches that were offensively mediocre—extreme examples are less indicative than the aggregate potential presented by the gathering.

Why so? Well, whatever way you look at the Marxist, Leninist period in the party's history, there is no doubt that at that time it skimmed the intellectual cream of the era. Both the left and the right of that period were real polymaths, polyglots, brilliant orators, and publicists.

Why such impoverishment? Why was there not a single eminent intellectual or politician among the contenders for the leadership of the Russian communists? Why does the still popular word "populist" sound flattering when applied to some of them? Why, despite constant assurances that the party would provide conditions for talent to flourish in, for gifted people to be able to work and breathe freely, was the standard of argument, conduct, presentation, and speaking on the part of so many of the people at the important party forum so poor? There were some exceptional people there, of course, but they had little opportunity to be heard—these days the tone is set by the audience, and there is no prophet who could expect to succeed by not speaking in the language of the audience.

I have been in the party for more than 25 years. I have never been a dissident and I have not received a single reprimand. I worked "with the apparatus," I wrote two dissertations, I headed a department during the stagnation years, and I published many things which, even if I had wanted to, would not have enabled me to join the

new generation of debunkers. And I still do not see any grounds for destroying everything completely and I do not know of any alternative forces with a viable program and the potential to get the country out of the crisis. But it seems to me that many party colleagues have lost a sense of reality, some have even lost their instinct for self-preservation.

The Union congress is in the offing. The last chance for the party, if it is capable of thinking about the future.

Murmansk's First Secretary Serokurov

PM2206101590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 2

[Unattributed account of speech by S.L. Serokurov, first secretary of Murmansk Oblast CPSU Committee, at 19 June afternoon sitting of Russian Party Conference under the general heading: "Discussion of the Report 'With Responsibility for the Future of Russia and the Country as a Whole'"]

[Text] Comrade delegates! Altering somewhat the well-known phrase of our party's founder Vladimir Ilich Lenin, one might say that the event so long awaited and sought after by Russian communists has taken place: The all-Russian conference has opened, and let us hope that it will become the Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR's largest republic.

In my view, the conference should answer several fundamental questions. First and chief among them is whether or not there is to be a Russian Communist Party. There was no clear-cut opinion on this. There were darts of criticism in both directions. There is long-standing opposition to the creation of an autonomous republican organization on the part of many Politburo members. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has tried to persuade us all that the integrity of the CPSU must be preserved, and, consequently, the creation of a Russian Communist Party is impermissible because this step would inevitably turn the CPSU into a confederation of union republican communist parties. While we have been debating the "to be or not to be" issue, new parties, by no means communist-orientated, have been springing up all over the place.

It is clear now that the Russian Bureau, set up not long ago by a CPSU Central Committee decision, has not lived up to expectations and has not performed the functions entrusted to it. At any rate, the Murmansk Oblast party committee [obkom] has not been affected by it, has not seen where it stands in the ongoing perestroyka, and cannot say anything about its practical work. This is particularly sad against the background of mounting social and political contradictions in the Russian Federation.

The Arctic communists are in favor of a Russian Communist Party and want to have a republican Central Committee as a political headquarters. One cannot accept the fact that for many years Russia, particularly its outlying districts, has developed in a lopsided way, as the country's raw material adjunct. We have seen our requests for socioeconomic assistance and the party documents adopted on our region come to naught. Evidently, the party Central Committee had too much on its plate to be able to monitor its own decisions. So we are back where we started.

A major nuclear fleet is currently concentrated in the Kola North, and this is a source of grave concern for the oblast's inhabitants. There are the craters left after the open-cast mining of natural resources, which have not always been prudently used. There are the felled forests, which take three times longer to grow here than in the central area of Russia. There is extreme environmental pollution and high morbidity and mortality. Finally, there are the imported products and goods, which are being supplied in smaller and smaller quantities every day.

This has happened because we lack a proper party, economic, social, and spiritual policy and, as we have seen, the center's arms do not reach "from Moscow to the most remote districts." In short, there is no one to really think about Russia.

Pursuing the logic of this argument, I would like to offer some ideas on what the Russian Communist Party [RCP] should be like.

First and foremost, the RCP absolutely must remain and operate within the framework of the CPSU on equal terms with all the other Union republic communist parties, on the basis of unified CPSU Statutes and common program goals. At the same time, this should in no way rule out the existence of several different and differentiated approaches, taking specific economic features, ethnic traditions, and regional development levels into account when it comes to elaborating fundamental documents.

At the same time, without claiming any exclusiveness, the RCP would, as is predetermined by the entire course of historical development, voluntarily and quite deliberately assume the role of "backbone" of the CPSU. Let us be frank: Without the RCP there will be no CPSU and equally, without the unifying factor of the CPSU, I cannot see a voluntary union of all the republican party organizations.

Thus, the question of RCP autonomy is a political question, and we absolutely must consider this particular feature against the background of the wide-ranging transformation of the Soviet federation and the fundamental documents the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies are discussing and adopting at the First Congress.

Furthermore, in conditions of autonomy and within the framework of the CPSU Program and Statutes, the future RCP would reject rigid, peremptory CPSU Central Committee tutelage, would be able to elaborate its

own program documents, and would decide organizational, cadre, and other matters independently. One must act in such a way that all steps taken by Russian communists are geared to CPSU unity and do not contribute to the development of centrifugal tendencies.

Without any doubt, the formation of the RCP with its elective organs and own structure would also affect the organizational structure of the CPSU Central Committee. In our view, such an extensive Central Committee membership as the present one has in many ways ceased to make sense. Some of its functions should certainly pass to republican Central Committees, including the Central Committee of the future RCP. Therefore, the membership of the CPSU Central Committee should be substantially reduced and it should include representatives of all the Union republics' communist parties, including that of the Russian Federation. As for the composition of the Russian Central Committee, I would support the principles of its formation that were elaborated by the preparatory committee, approved at the meeting of delegations' representatives, and set out in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's report today.

My final point is that the RCP's paramount task is the elaboration of its program. The program must reflect its attitude toward socialism and a communist future. It must also get its ideological bearings. There can be compromises in politics. Moreover, I believe that we cannot do without them today lest we abandon our responsibility for the future of our homeland. But there cannot be any compromises on ideology and one party certainly cannot have several ideologies. But this situation appears to be developing in the CPSU at the moment. Some support private ownership, others reject it. Some talk about the revival of the people's spirituality on the basis of the Orthodox Church, others see it happening through social democracy, another group looks to national self-awareness, and so on. Serious errors in the party's theoretical work, which have been mentioned several times today on this platform, are also a factor. It was a lackadaisical theoretical approach, among other things, that led to stagnation. Indeed, today's errors are largely due to the fact that the party is often forced to act intuitively, relying more on common sense than on theory.

In this situation the question arises: Does one elect the Central Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee secretaries at this stage or form another preparatory commission, call an adjournment, and meet again later to form the republican headquarters? Our delegation by and large firmly supports the opinion that a further delay in the solution of organizational matters is intolerable. I support those comrades who have spoken here about wasted time, saying that the Russian party organization should have been created "yesterday," perhaps even when the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was created. Therefore, I believe that the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the secretaries should be elected at this stage and that the elections of the Politburo and Secretariat should be multiple-choice and direct, at the actual congress. (Applause)

The second stage of the congress would very likely examine the Russian communists' specific tasks in the light of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress. In this context, this is exceedingly important and crucial and would take place, I suppose, six-eight weeks after the 28th congress. The new Central Committee, the new Politburo, and the newly elected secretaries would prepare the documents. Thank you for listening. (Applause)

Leningrad's First Secretary Gidaspov

90UN2196A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 3

[Speech at conference of Russia's Communists by B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, date and place not specified; published under the rubric: "Discussion of the Report with Responsibility for the Fate of Russia and the Entire Country"]

[Text] Dear comrades! We are today present at a very important—I would not want to use hackneyed words—historic event: the revival of the Russian Communist Party.

Russia's communists have been brought to recognition of the need for this step by the entire course of social, political, and socioeconomic development both in the federation itself and in the country as a whole.

However, an even more striking motive for the consolidation of the ranks of the communists has been the intensifying crisis situation in the CPSU. The substitution for the democratization of the party of backstage intraparty reforms, the absence of an ideological concept of perestroyka—all this has been reflected in the state of the party. A withering fire of accusations has been opened against it.

The present position of the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the CPSU Central Committee, and their virtual estrangement from the most important political events occurring in the country, is eliciting a multitude of puzzled questions.

A process of the conversion of the CPSU into a conglomerate of factional formations is under way. We see that there are many disagreements on the question of the political intent behind the re-creation of the Russian Communist Party also. The main task of our conference, it would seem, is to leave aside the settling of accounts between the supporters of different approaches to this idea and to find that golden mean which will not, possibly, satisfy all those present, and most likely will not, but will gain understanding and support among the people and the majority of communists.

I see the Russian Communist Party as a most radical and progressive Communist Party of the Union republics.

Otherwise it is not worth creating it. It is essential for this to renounce any kind of dogmatic notions concerning the role of the party and to consign to the archives many obsolete slogans and declarations. The Russian Communist Party should set an example of organization, dynamism, and cohesion and appear as the party of civil peace and concord.

The radicalism of the Russian Communist Party should be manifested in all spheres, primarily in the sphere of the creation of a new system of mutual relations between the Union republics. For this it is necessary, together with the expression of national interests, for the Russian Communist Party to concentrate on the formulation of an ideology which is acceptable to all republic parties championing the interests of the working people.

At this difficult time, when political confrontation is switching to civil confrontation and blood is being spilled, and when armed formations of an extreme nationalist persuasion have appeared in the republics, we must, as has been the custom in Rus since time immemorial, brace ourselves and display wisdom and the patience inherent in Russians at a time of severe ordeals in order that our multinational power might know and feel that it has something on which to lean at a time of difficulties.

We must not forget that in uttering the word Russia we are simultaneously thinking about the many nationalities and autonomous entities which inhabit the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] also. For this reason the Russian Communist Party Program and Rules, which will undoubtedly be based on the CPSU Program and Rules, should contain formulas and definitions which strengthen the self-awareness of the nationalities and autonomous entities within the framework of Russia and within the framework of the Russian Communist Party, contribute to their free development, and strengthen internationalism.

A recent conference of the oblast party organization adopted a political statement of Leningrad communists for the 28th CPSU Congress, which set forth our vision of the political prospects of society and measures of participation in the ongoing processes.

It is primarily a question of ways of overcoming the party's detachment from the realities of perestroyka and its role and place in a society in renewal.

This document could evidently be taken as a basis for determination of the political priorities of Russia's communists. It would be a good thing for it to be published in PRAVDA, as we were promised. It is obviously essential for a party which is being reborn to determine its position in its ideology and declare its basic principles and sources, and this is all the more important under conditions where communist ideology, vulgarly presented and artificially implanted over many years, is now perceived in the mass consciousness as unscientific.

The communists have a great deal of work to do on the re-creation and propaganda of the fundamentals of their political philosophy and its liberation from hare-brained social schemes and utopianism.

Leningrad's communists regard the communist perspective not as a model of faceless humanism but as the embodiment in the historical future of the ideal of spiritual freedom of the personality and social justice achieved by mankind through suffering.

But a party is a political force only if, having preserved the historical perspective, it offers society a set of relevant and close goals realistic for everyone. We must propound our own line and formulate a policy which attracts by its actual results, not "radiant" prospects. Ultimately people will judge us not by how we tackle intraparty problems but by how practically the socioeconomic program is implemented. Leningrad's communists see as the ways out of the socioeconomic crisis the exercise of the citizens' economic freedom on the basis of the equality of state, leased, collective, and individual labor and the private form of ownership, and constitutional guarantees of their inviolability.

We must have a clear idea of the interests of groups of the population which we express and defend.

The foundation of the party's social base was and remains the working class.

I support the proposal which has been heard here concerning the fact that our conference should constitute itself into a constituent congress which has the right to elect both the Secretariat of the Russian Communist Party and the members of the Central Committee. Anticipating events somewhat, perhaps, I would say that it is essential, in our view, to delegate to the Central Committee workers and peasants, engineering-technical personnel, and the artistic intelligentsia, and in only the most minimal number full-time party officials (applause).

The primary party organizations and communist rank and file would then be extensively represented in the Russian Communist Party Central Committee. As has already been said here, an organizing congress of the Russian Communist Party was held this April in Leningrad. In many of the speeches heard it was a question of defense of the values of Soviet history, Lenin's theoretical legacy, and the socialist, not opportunist, interests of the working class and all working people. However, in the resolutions of the organizing congress all this was expressed in unjustifiably extreme form. One can trace in them an analogy with the past, and they lack an in-depth analysis of the causes of the deformation of socialism. The resolutions were constructed mainly on Leninist propositions of the times of the exacerbated class struggle and the civil war, whose logic is unacceptable for our time. Their incompatibility with Leninism and their chauvinist motifs show through.

There is also a specific proposal pertaining to the procedure of the formation of the directive authorities of the Russian Communist Party and the procedure of our future work. I believe that we need now to elect a Secretariat and the part of the Central Committee which the congress will determine for preparation of the second stage of our forum. And then, following consultation with the primary party organizations, the remaining members of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee.

Our state has now become, unfortunately, a boundless meeting hall. Passions are seething at all ends of it; intensive debate in organizing committees and strike committees is being conducted at a variety of congresses, forums, conferences, and meetings; and statements, manifestoes, and platforms are being formulated. Not only are there no longer sufficient television channels but there are also not enough newspaper columns for coverage of this entire universal bustle. Is it not time to ask ourselves whether we need the Herostratus-type fame of being the country that holds the most meetings in the world?

The time has come for action, and it is our conference which should demonstrate constructivism, purposefulness, and a capacity to generate ideas and embody them in programs and put what has been planned into practice.

A time of anxiety engenders despair but it also engenders great courage among those capable of giving hope. May the congress of Russia's communists be a congress of civic hope. Thank you. (applause)

Yakutsk First Secretary Prokopyev

PM2606115190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 5

[Unattributed account of speech by Yu.N. Prokopyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Yakutsk Oblast CPSU Committee, at the 20 June morning session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Constituent Congress, under general heading "Discussion of the Report 'With Responsibility for the Fate of Russia and the Whole Country'"]

[Text] Comrades! At their recent oblast party conference, Yakutiya's communists were almost unanimously in favor of the creation of a Russian Communist Party within the framework of a renewed CPSU, and instructed their delegates to bring this to the attention of participants at the Russian congress. People have long been arguing the case and submitting proposals for forming a Russian Communist Party. Only last year, local party organizations were very close to the practical possibility of creating it. Instead of this, however, the Central Committee December (1989) Plenum adopted a half-hearted decision to set up a Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], which disappointed many people to a certain extent. The hopes that this institution might become a fully-fledged political organ, capable of autonomously solving Russia's topical problems were not justified in practice. It is already clear now that yet another delay was allowed to occur, along with excessive caution in the implementation of a task that had by then become urgent and the absence to a certain degree of strategic vision of the development trends of complex social and political processes.

I often wonder why we, our party, have been taking our time in our assessment of events, without anticipating them and without taking preventive measures. This strikes at the CPSU's prestige.

I perceive two aspects of the answer. First, having initiated such huge political, socioeconomic, and psychological transformations in society, we have approached them without theoretical foresight, hoping for the best and expecting to learn as we go along. Hence all the vacillation, all the prevailing extremes, right up to the abnegation of socialist values. While rejecting the Stalinist past and the years of stagnation, we have started overthrowing all that we hold holy, and even taking swipes at V.I. Lenin and denying his teaching. The saddest thing yet is that, by not duly repulsing such attempts, we are getting society accustomed to the idea that this is a normal, natural phenomenon. Without ideals, without sacred values, no society can have a future.

The second aspect that has contributed toward the weakening of the party's authority is, in my view, the serious slackening of preventive organizational and explanatory work by party organizations. Moreover, it is often said that local party organs are to blame. Indeed, their work is many respects inadequate. But if local party organizations had failed to maintain their positions, the party's position would have been even worse. The blame evidently lies in the style and leadership methods of both the currently operating Politburo and Secretariat, and the Central Committee's working apparatus, where the proper generalizing and coordinating work is in essence lacking today.

In today's complex circumstances, we local party organs are frequently left to stew in our own juices. Earlier there were at least some telephone calls, some interest was shown, but now there isn't even that. Out of the entire huge Central Committee apparatus, there is just one single designated responsible organizer at the Organizational and Party Work Department who maintains close contact with the obkom [oblast committee], and that's all. The overall impression, especially recently, is that the Central Committee secretaries, let alone department chiefs or other Central Committee officials, have got out of the habit of resolving problems autonomously, and they all wait for the general secretary's instructions.

Comrades rightly said from this rostrum yesterday that Mikhail Sergeyevich has taken on so many various and very important state posts, that it is beyond the strength

of one man. Evidently this was another reason why the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR did not justify the hopes that were pinned on it. In any case, we at local level have not felt the presence of this organ.

In the corrected draft of the party statute, the top party structures have been rendered so complex that a future CPSU chairman heading a CPSU Presidium or a Council of Union Republic Central Committee Secretaries seems a mythical figure, while the first secretary of the Central Committee to be elected will be shackled in his actions and will not possess sufficient powers.

A simpler structure would be necessary, one that is easier to comprehend by rank-and-file CPSU members and every party organization. For instance, [we could have] the CPSU chairman and his deputies—singling out here the first deputy who would coordinate all practical work—and an expanded Presidium incorporating representatives of the workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia.

One more question on the draft CPSU Statute.

The preamble of the draft statute says that the CPSU relies on the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and other social strata committed to the socialist choice, and expresses and defends the interests of working people. All this would seem correct. But does it not emerge that we are advancing the old dogma in different words—that the CPSU is the party of the whole people? Such a claim, even if veiled, would hardly be accepted by everyone today. Step by step, we are allowing a retreat from the principled position of the working class and peasantry. Under the banners of pluralism, democratization, and alternative choice [alternativnost], the working class and the peasantry are being increasingly squeezed out from participation in the elaboration of policy and from the management of society's affairs, along the line of state power and the party alike. There is no need to look far to find examples. Look how many workers and peasants were elected USSR or RSFSR peoples' deputies or, indeed, delegates to the 28th party congress.

In order to really win the support of workers and peasants, who are the basic productive force in society, would it not be better to bluntly state in the draft CPSU Statute that the CPSU is a party of workers and peasants in alliance with the intelligentsia and other social strata committed to the socialist choice, and aiming for the consolidation of the multinational Soviet society on a platform of socialist renewal?

In my view, such a formulation would give us an opportunity to define more precisely the party's social base and, jointly with state, trade union, and other organs, to elaborate thoroughly considered mechanisms for the social protection of workers and peasants. Russia's peoples are pinning their hopes for the acceleration and solution of questions of socioeconomic development and cultural and spiritual revival, and for the implementation of Lenin's principle of the self-determination of nations and ethnic groups within the framework of a united Russian Federation, on the formation of the Russian Federation's autonomous political structure. I think that the renewal of the federation should begin with regulating the structure of the RSFSR itself. Above all a truly Leninist perception of the Federation, whose fundamental basis was the equality and equal rights of peoples, must be restored. Each people can join the federation together and on an equal basis with all other peoples. Russia's peoples—no less than other peoples and perhaps even more than others—were the victims of Stalin's virtually unitary model of state structure. Today no true Russian Federation exists, for, as is well known, a federative state is shaped on treaty principles.

We must improve federative relations and give a real content to the sovereignty of autonomous republics proceeding from their legal nature as Soviet socialist states. Today's status of autonomous republics, still in the form which was defined back in the twenties, no longer responds to the level of the development of productive forces, the economic base, or the growth of the national self-awareness of the peoples of these republics. It does not uphold either their economic or their political sovereignty. It does not promote the exercise of the age-old right of nations to self-determination, which is the key element of the party's nationalities policy.

In our view the autonomous republics should receive the status of sovereign soviet socialist republics and be parts of the RSFSR on a treaty basis as subjects of the federation with full equal rights. Raising the political status of the republics belonging to the RSFSR will enable them to autonomously exercise state power on their territory and to resolve with sovereign powers any questions of sociopolitical, socioeconomic, national and cultural life, except for those which have been voluntarily transferred on a permanent or temporary basis to the RSFSR.

The autonomous republics' economic autonomy should be mainly based on republic and state ownership, the proportion and scale of which should be predominant in the total aggregate of socialist property on their territory. In the Yakutsk Republic, for example, mineral resources provide the basis for the development of productive forces, and in this respect the mining industry is the core sector of the regional economy. For this reason the republic will have genuine economic rights for participating in the distribution and acquisition [prisvoyeniye] of output and profits and for earning legitimate income from property in the interests of its territory's socioeconomic development only when it has the right to own, exploit, and dispose of the land and the republic's mineral and other natural resources.

The alteration of the legal nature of currently existing autonomous republics and the granting to them of greater economic autonomy require a more considered attitude to them on the part of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet than exists today, and also keener attention on the part of the future RSFSR political leadership.

In conclusion I would like to note that the Yakutsk delegation supports the name "RSFSR Communist Party," since it reflects more accurately the socialist and federative character of the state within whose framework it will operate.

Thank you for your attention!

Krasnodar's First Secretary Polozkov

90UN2196B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 6

[Speech by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Party Committee and chairman of the Kray Soviet of People's Deputies, at conference of Russia's Communists; date and place not specified; published under the rubric: "Discussion of the Report with Responsibility for the Fate of Russia and the Entire Country"]

[Text] Dear comrades! We are deciding the question of the creation of a Russian Communist Party at a very difficult time for the CPSU. And it is all the more gratifying to recognize that it is being created in accordance with the initiative and wishes of the majority of Russia's party masses. The communist idea in people's consciousness is strong; consequently, the people's faith in the party's humanitarian principles and ideals is profound; consequently, the working people's hope of its creative possibilities is great.

An absolute majority of the communists of the Krasnodar Kray party organization expressed the idea that the creation of a Russian Communist Party should be seen primarily as the revival of the CPSU on a new basis. The following question was asked repeatedly here yesterday: What kind should the Russian Communist Party be? In my opinion, there have been no big differences either yesterday or today as regards the fact that this a party of the socialist choice and a communist perspective. Our delegation, on behalf of the 333,000 communists of the Kuban, shares this opinion. Defining the socialist choice, the policy of the renewal of socialism and defense of the working people's vital interests as the main goal, the party may count on their firm support.

Many of our present difficulties are the result not only of the deformation of socialism at the time of the cult of personality, voluntarism, or stagnation but also the mistakes in the course of perestroyka, particularly the ideological spread in the party, which Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, innocuously called "a certain uncertainty." We are all now seeing how dearly the CPSU is having to pay for this state it is in.

Many communists and nonparty people are seriously concerned at the position of the present CPSU leadership, which is failing to duly rebuff the debunkers of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of socialist building. It is a question not of the defense of ideological dogmatic teachings but of formulating and bringing home to people the humane essence of developing Marxism-Leninism and the truth about party policy and of paying tribute to preceding generations of Soviet people, which created for us all that was within their powers. It is a question of defending the shining aspects in the history of our party and people. After all, in indiscriminately canceling out our past and portraying it as a chain of continuous mistakes and tragedies we are depriving more than just the present generation of a future.

Inconsistency, concessions on matters of principle, increasingly new promises, delay in the adoption of serious decisions, and the inability to remove mistakes in good time testify to the absence of a clear-cut action program among our party's leadership in respect of the renewal of socialism. I, as a member of the CPSU Central Committee, bear a certain amount of the blame for this. Although I have to say plainly that I, like other members of the Central Committee, have repeatedly submitted proposals and expressed criticism of the Politburo and individual members of it. But there has frequently been no due response to this. In addition, various labels have been firmly pinned on us, and those who have spoken and criticized most often have been labeled opponents of perestroyka, the ultra-right and so forth.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, I put the following question to you at a meeting of Central Committee, kraykom, and obkom [kray and oblast party committee] first secretaries: Are there opponents of perestroyka among us? We concluded at that time that there were not, seemingly. Then another question was put: Who is finding it necessary to divide Central Committee members into radicals and conservatives? You replied to us at that time: "This is to some people's benefit." The barrage of blows against the party is coming in planned fashion and is on the increase. Initially in respect of personnel, the idea of taking its property away from the party and dividing it up, taking over its newspapers, and not transferring dues to the party budget is now being advanced. I also am for a party budget open to all communists, for its glasnost. But, dear comrades, is it not understood that all this together is nothing other than organized actions aimed at the disintegration of the CPSU from within? (applause) Let us keep a sense of proportion here. We are dealing with serious matters. Such things are not, after all, happening in Belorussia and certain other republics as yet. Comrade Russians, for all that let us see, finally, whom all this benefits. Thus, incidentally, has the question been posed at many kray and oblast party conferences.

It needs to be acknowledged also that the CPSU Central Committee as a whole has transferred too much power of attorney to the Politburo. The CPSU Central Committee RSFSR Bureau has been practically inoperative. Local party committees are noting a weakening of collective methods in the work of the top political leadership and failing to receive timely necessary information on most important matters of party life. There has recently been practically no direction of their work on the part of the

Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat, as already mentioned. The persistent guidelines from the top here concerning noninterference in decisions on economic matters at a time when a new mechanism of management has not been completed and when the soviets have not yet taken shape as full-blooded authorities have led to the party's withdrawal from economic life. And this is a principal cause of the backsliding of the country's economy and of many of our failures in perestroyka (applause).

The communists are decidedly for perestroyka. But not at the expense of a lowering of the working people's living standard and not by way of the elimination of social gains and safeguards, which socialism ensures. And if today many of our economists and politicians have not found or have been unwilling to find ways of renewing socialism, this by no means signifies that there is just one solution: turning back and starting everything from the beginning, according to the Swedish, Danish, or some other such model.

Blindly copying any of them, however splendid they are, in haste what is more, is unserious to say the least.

As has rightly been observed here, no one consulted the Central Committee and the communists on the fundamental reforms in the economy, nonetheless, the whole party will have to answer for the negative consequences—and they are not ruled out.

The question of transition to a market economy and private ownership of land and other means of production and questions where the fate of millions of people is affected can never be decided without consultation with the people. Today even less. (applause)

Faith in the ideals of socialism and the soundness of our historical choice has been persistently dented of late. Popular wisdom proclaims: If a person has lost a wallet containing money, he has not lost that much, if he has lost a friend, he has lost a great deal, if he has lost faith, he has lost everything. I see many Soviet people's loss of faith in the party's capacity for leading the country out of the serious situation as a crisis not of the CPSU but primarily of its directive authorities. (applause)

And in order to enhance the authority of the party the Russian Communist Party must clearly determine how it will build its party, how relations in it should be built, and what position it will occupy in the solution of these most complex economic, social, and spiritual questions. And this is the first thing that I wished to emphasize.

I see as the second, no less important, area of work the deliverance of the communists from disarray and from the guilt complex for all that has been unjustly or incorrectly done in the party and for decisions which were adopted without their knowledge, although on their behalf.

It would in this connection not be legitimate, more, it would be immoral to shift the blame of certain past and present party leaders for their mistakes and departures from the rules of party life onto the entire party as a whole or, further, to demand repentance of it. Such pressure is also, it would seem, very advantageous to some people today. (applause)

The third area is the utmost democratization of the party. It should organize its activity on the principles of democratic centralism. Not for show, as we had before and which is today rejected by the party masses, but real democratic centralism, as Lenin saw it. Such as would in practice ensure a spirit of democracy, the preeminence of the party masses, and their active participation in the formulation and implementation of party policy. A democratic centralism such as would exclude the creation in the party of chiefs, cults, and figures to whom there is no alternative is essential.

The fourth area is the party's struggle for the genuine democratization of society. Not the kind where on a wave of mass meetings, denunciations, and political ambitions the main creative force—the working people, workers, and peasants, and other working strata—are rolled back onto the sidelines of political life. But the kind where it is they who are really in power. Unless we lose this main reference point and divorce ourselves from our main social base, our party will strengthen and develop.

Under the conditions of political pluralism and a multiparty system the communists' tactics should consist of the cohesion of all public movements and associations which remain loyal to socialism and are prepared to jointly tackle the difficult problems of both Russia and the country. As far as all kinds of antisocialist, anticommunist forces are concerned, we must here firmly hold to positions of principle and opportunely reveal to the people the truth concerning their real intentions. The Central Committee and its bodies are not, unfortunately, occupying such positions.

A particular question today, and it is being raised in the local party organizations, is the work of the communists in the soviets and other public organizations. We have already seen for ourselves the absurdity of the situation where there are communists in the soviets. Any party in any country struggles for political power or its influence on the organs of state power and the pursuit of its policy in them through its representatives elected to them. We, however, are now observing paradoxical situations where the communists are opposing the formation of party groups and diverging into various formations of deputies, thereby depriving the communist deputies of the possibilities of creating common platforms. We need to master this science and, preferably, more quickly.

And the final point. We can all see what difficult work lies ahead of us. I believe that our congress should decide the main organizational issues at the first stage: elect the directive authorities and the Central Committee in order to go to the 28th CPSU Congress as a structured party and in order that there be people to organize stage two.

And we need to develop the activity of the Russian Communist Party as quickly as possible. (applause)

Chechen-Ingush First Secretary

PM2706103990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Single Edition p 2

[Speech by D.G. Zavgayev, first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush CPSU Obkom, at the 20 June evening sitting of the RSFSR Communist Party Congress under the general heading "Discussion of the Report 'With Responsibility for the Fate of Russia and the Whole Country'"]

[Text] Comrades! The party and questions concerning the federation—both the Russian Federation and the Union federation—are problems of extreme concern to me, primarily because we can all feel how the multiparty system is beginning to have an impact on state-national structures in the complex, unstraightforward process of its formation.

Let us be frank and say that for all the flaws, extremes, and contradictions in the many years that our multiethnic, multilingual state has existed, it is the party that has been its integrating, cohesive force. Who will now replace it? This is not an SOS signal but a normal reflection on the future. I would very much like to see a situation where our internal party affairs are not discussed in isolation from the complex, contradictory life of the federation.

I would like everyone to remember that destruction is not creation; we are also familiar with the words about how first we will raze the whole world to its very foundations and then.... We have passed through this stage.

I think that we now say little about the real people who watch our sessions on television and think to themselves: What are they going on about? We talk about our party affairs while in some regions there is bloodshed, thousands of people are without a roof over their head, and there is not much to be found in the stores. Certainly we must seriously develop the field of our analysis of the individual, because he is, after all, the main factor in perestroyka.

As head of a party organization in a region with a complex political background, the problems of culture and interethnic communication in the party and the country as a whole are my greatest concern. The growth of national consciousness, which did not stop even when we had totalitarian structures, has now been given the possibility of a real outlet which sometimes takes complex, dramatic forms. We must now combine the processes of renewing our society's sociopolitical structures with the unique social and psychological formations which have arisen during the years of our multiethnic country's existence and certainly are not negative in every respect. Even in the conditions of the administrative-edict system, positive relations between people of different nationalities formed over the decades.

We now hear many ironical assessments regarding the nature of the proclaimed new historical community: "a united Soviet people." I agree that the complex processes involved in every people's cultural development must not be levelled. That is a mistake. But it is also a fact that a certain social and psychological community does exist and this should hardly be denied. It is a unique formation—must we now renounce it?

I appeal to the party's research centers and to the CPSU Central Committee with the request to seriously study the party's problems in the conditions of a federation that is undergoing renewal. We are falling behind in theory and, naturally, failing to keep pace in practical policies too. I personally am against the idea of housing the CPSU in national apartments. Our strategy must be a common strategy but must also take account of national and regional tasks, problems, and specifics: Without this the party cannot live, without this its perestroyka potential is held in check.

The party's national structures are gradually becoming reality. How should they be treated? I think that our urgent task is not to extinguish conflagrations but to engage in serious scientific study to develop a doctrine of party work in the conditions of a democratic federation. With the absence of a developed concept of the CPSU, extreme movements in this sphere—such as in the Baltic, for example—are perfectly natural in the new conditions. There are no new common approaches. After all, no serious options for considering national and cultural diversity within our party system were proposed at central level before the situation with Lithuania. This is made all the more important by the fact that non-party people are intruding increasingly actively in internal party life and acting as a catalyst for processes taking place in the party.

What is the status of party organizations in autonomous formations and how will it interact with autonomous formations' national-state status? In this connection I propose that a special working group be set up at our congress to develop the concept of the CPSU in autonomous formations, after generalizing those proposals drafted by the republics. This will be a real step in the building of the RSFSR Communist Party.

Critics of the CPSU Platform claim, among other things, that it has come too late. There is no doubt that it would have been good if this document had appeared straightaway in 1985. But was it possible at that time? Probably not. We have all had to live through these years in order to appreciate what is happening now. And the actual idea of founding the RSFSR Communist Party did not appear immediately. It came to fruition in the course of the highly complex sociopolitical processes taking place in the country and was not accepted straightaway, although now it is seen as something perfectly natural and as an

inevitable, necessary event. The same is true of the party platform. We have had to experience stresses in the economy, deputies' discussions, the essence of expression of people's aspirations, and worrying movements in the party itself on the way to this platform.

That is why, for all the possible criticism, this document is important and has been reached through suffering. But it still leaves many questions and problems that have yet to be worked through.

Let us take the very real situation of a possible multiparty system. What are our work forms and methods in this case? How do we see party influence on political, economic, and spiritual processes in the conditions of a multiparty system? Essentially, no one is studying this. At least we practical workers have not been informed of this. But the political realities are such that this work context requires serious reformation. There is no doubt that every party worker has a head on his shoulders, but why are we not now perfecting forms of activity so as to be prepared for work in the new conditions, be able to control the situation, keep one step ahead of it, help to shape it, and so forth? What will the party committee's work ethos be in the conditions of a real multiparty system and how will it adapt its work style and methods? We must urgently begin to study these questions—naturally, looking to the future.

Unfortunately, these questions are not properly reflected in the draft CPSU Platform and CPSU Statute. Meanwhile, the CPSU's opponents are very actively shaping their own structures, exploiting all of our previous blunders, and sometimes openly playing on current painful issues. But many party committees are, at best, defending themselves rather than feeling the pulse of the new social movements. They must be analyzed, contact must be established, and forms of integration on positive principles sought.

We must endeavor to unite everything progressive around the party. I see the solution of this problem as the most important task facing our congress. Essentially, this is the main matter affecting the party's real authority and influence on people.

How are we struggling for this influence in practice? I sometimes get the impression that we communists and entire party committees are voluntarily relinquishing this influence and, if you like, responsibility for everything that is happening. What is more, we often do this under pressure from the demagogic slogans of our our opponents who, while criticizing us for exercising undivided authority, are themselves striving for power. So why do we not adopt a clear stand in this respect? Why can we not hear the considered opinion of the Central Committee?

Ultimately, we must defend the party and its healthy core and allow no opportunity to form an enemy image of communists in the mass consciousness, which is what some are trying to force on us. And in the new, democratic conditions we must conduct a frank, principled party discussion which we often avoid.

Judge for yourselves. The government has come up with a cardinal economic program which has prompted various reactions in the country. The trade unions and Komsomol are discussing it, the republic Supreme Soviets likewise, but the Central Committee is silent. Why? It is not a question of another plenum but of working out our common approach to this measure. I am sure that we are not only seeing sluggishness in this case but even avoidance of the most painful issue troubling the people. Around this problem public opinion and other forces are forming which, unfortunately, are not in our favor.

Even if 20 parties were to be formed in the near future, I am convinced that they would be too weak to assume responsibility for the most important political decisions on an equal footing with the CPSU. That is why the CPSU's integrational, cohesive role in a multilingual power like ours is enormous. The people look with hope to the party, they put their trust in us in the elections, and communists expect the renewal of the CPSU. We must live up to these expectations.

One last point. At the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum I drew attention to the fact that analytical work and information have not been placed on an adequate footing in the Central Committee. But the political situation is changing at an amazingly dynamic rate. I strongly request, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that you prompt the comrades who are responsible for this work—and, if necessary, present them with a demand—because no serious changes have been made. The Central Committee must be the theoretical and operational headquarters of perestroyka. Only then will we really be able to direct sociopolitical processes and exert a creative influence on them. In my view, today's congress is a step in the direction of forming a renewed CPSU. It is good that this step has been taken. Thank you for your attention. (Applause)

Gorno-Altay First Secretary

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[Speech by V.I. Chaptynov, first secretary of Gorno-Altay CPSU Obkom and chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, at the 20 June evening sitting of the RSFSR Communist Party Congress under general heading "Discussion of the Report 'With Responsibility for the Fate of Russia and the Whole Country'"]

[Text] Esteemed comrade delegates. There is no doubt that these hot June days of 1990 will go down in our state's difficult history as a turning point toward the revival of Russia's greatness. (Applause)

We have gathered here to report to the congress on how communists in our region assess the present situation in

the CPSU and to draw up a program of action for the future. Perestroyka can only be given a new boost if authority is strengthened. (Applause)

I would like to say that we are particularly alarmed by the vagueness, inconsistency, half-heartedness, and hollowness of work by the party's central bodies. The wish of the Politburo and the Central Committee to extricate the party from the administrative edict system as quickly as possible often leads to confusion in the minds of communists and non-party people and to an erosion of faith in the party's vanguard role and its ability to lead society in the future. There is now an increasingly frequent tendency to question the correctness of Marxist-Leninist principles and the Great October Revolution's choice. Without going into theoretical questions, I would like to stress that the main problem is the consolidation and purity of party ranks. Without ideological demarcation, there can be no talk of consolidating party ranks and turning the party into a dynamic, leading force in society. (Applause, uproar in the auditorium)

Comrade communists, I would like your permission to convey the point of view of one of the smaller party organizations in our great Russian Federation and ask you to find within yourselves the courage to hear out this point of view. We feel that the path to be followed, comrades, is this: Immediately after the congress, all communists working in existing apparatuses should register with a labor collective primary organization. A reasonable minimum of full-time personnel should be left in the apparatuses—again, on the recommendation of primary organizations—to ensure good quality preparation for a full-blooded report and election campaign and to make it possible to maintain continuity in future report and election campaigns.

One of the cornerstones of party renewal is the demarcation of functions and the guarantee of real unity between organizational and ideological activity.

We have become overspecialized in intraparty life in recent years. The Central Committee apparatus has been artificially divided into departments which are isolated from one another. The party's unified political course has been fragmented into separate "policies." And comrades Medvedev, Yakovlev, Slyunkov, Ligachev, and Razumovskiy are each individually trying to single out their objectives as the most important and urgent. To this I should add that we at local level have felt neither a beneficial impact nor a negative impact from the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau, which was founded without the consent of Russian communists.

I would like to continue by saying that the enormous intellectual potential of the Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Social Sciences belonging to the party Central Committee, the Marxism-Leninism Institute, and higher party schools is not yielding the appropriate return. Perestroyka has created a fundamentally different situation. Party committees must turn sharply in the direction of ideological functions, the sphere of thought and action, and people's education: They must have paramount importance, and this work must be headed by the party organization leader. The question is to ensure that all regulating features of party life, admission to and expulsion from the party, and membership fees are transferred to the authority of the party masses.

At the same time, in my view, the importance of personal honor, party ethics, and morality is increasing more sharply than ever before. In this crisis situation in party life, when the shortcomings and merits of every one of us are being thrown into particularly sharp relief, it is hard to explain to people why the party still retains high-ranking officials who are undermining its foundations. The most dangerous thing of all is that it is retaining them in the party cadre training sphere and in ideological institutions. I am thinking, for example, of Comrade Shestakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School. There are quite a few people like him, unfortunately.

Another major problem is that of national relations. Now, at this truly fateful time, the Altay peoples confirm that our future and our historical past are linked by common ethnic and genetic features with the destiny of the Russian fatherland's peoples. It is now doubly painful to realise that people's unity is clouded by mistrust, hostility, grief, and bloodshed. We must at last achieve a free union of equal peoples, irrespective of their number and their path through history, and attain Lenin's understanding of the federation's nature as opposed to Stalin's "autonomization," which we in fact have now. The renewed party must now take this difficult burden upon itself.

We must achieve the optimum combination of the vigorous drive from below and the center's efforts, which are contributing to the decisive formation of the Russian Communist Party with its full-blooded organizational and ideological arsenal and primarily with its republic-level mass media system (this exists at other levels too). It is time we finally looked faced up to the truth. A market economy and multiparty system, with their tough inner struggle, are the realities of today. The party's political destiny is being decided.

And one last point. I would like to disagree with my colleague in some respects about there being a new personality cult. In my opinion, it is precisely a cult that we are lacking, or, to be more specific, comradely, party-minded mutual understanding and a respectful attitude to the party and state leader and, ultimately, to one another. Thank you for your attention. (Applause)

Credentials Committee Makes Report

PM2606132190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 2

[Report delivered by G.M. Khodyrev, chairman of the Russian Party Conference Credentials Commission, at the 20 June morning sitting of conference]

[Text] Esteemed comrade delegates!

The Russian party conference Credentials Commission elected by you examined at its sitting a range of questions that fall within its purview and makes the following report to you.

The Russian communists' conference has met at an extremely complex and critical stage of Soviet society's development. It is to make decisions that will be of vital importance for the future course of perestroyka processes in the Russian Federation and, consequently, for the development of the social and political situation throughout the country. The conference's importance is determined primarily by the RSFSR party organization's position in our party and the pivotal, consolidating role the republic plays in the destiny of the USSR.

Recognizing the weighty responsibility each of the delegates bears, it is necessary to pay special attention to the question of the Russian Party Conference's right to adopt very important decisions that will be valid for all CPSU organizations in Russia.

As is known, the resolution on holding the conference was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum. However, the plenum did not define its powers. Nor are they defined by the norms of the existing CPSU Statutes. However, the nature of the questions on the agenda assumes that the conference has the wide-ranging powers of a supreme party organ, essentially a party congress.

The Credentials Commission examined this problem in detail and we reached the unanimous conclusion that the present Russian Party Conference has all the powers it needs to decide to organize a Russian Communist Party and elect its leading organs. The following considerations were taken into account.

First, the existence of a historical precedent. It occurred in January 1912 and is connected with the work of the Sixth All-Russian Party Conference. For a number of reasons it also raised the question of the legality and competence of the conference. This question was specially considered in the report delivered by V.I. Lenin. He convincingly established the necessity and possibility of making the conference the party's supreme organ. The arguments about the political advisability of such a step and also the fact that nearly all the party organizations that existed in Russia at the time were represented at the conference were of decisive significance. The conference deemed these arguments sufficient and quite rightly set itself up as the Russian party forces' supreme organ.

Thus this is not the first time the task of making a conference a supreme organ with wide-ranging powers has presented itself in our party. This gives us the moral right to follow the same path. Particularly as the actual political situation vigorously dictates the need for the immediate formation of a Russian Communist Party. There are eloquent and exhaustive arguments on this score in many conference delegates' speeches.

It should also be borne in mind that the majority of CPSU organizations operating on the territory of the RSFSR have come out at their meetings and conferences in favor of creating a Russian Communist Party, to that end investing their delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress with the relevant powers. This effectively predetermines the question of investing the conference with the rights of a Russian party congress.

Finally, the fact that the conference delegates represent absolutely all the RSFSR kray and oblast party organizations and were elected in accordance with the unified representation norm determined by the CPSU Central Committee is also of vital significance.

It is also an important fact that the leaders of our fraternal Union republics' communist parties are participating in the conference.

We believe that all this fully entitles the present Russian Party Conference to set itself up as a fully fledged Russian Communist Party Congress and adopt a corresponding resolution to that effect.

Now we come to the conference delegates. They were elected on a broad democratic basis in one-seat or multiseat party districts in accordance with the "Statute on the Election of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress," approved by the Central Committee March (1990) Plenum.

Whatever method of election was used, the nomination and discussion of candidates took place publicly and openly in primary party organizations, taking into account the views of labor collectives and the public, on a multiple-choice basis, as a rule, and in an atmosphere of competing platforms, positions, and views.

It is a fundamentally important fact that the Central Committee March Plenum supported proposals that the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress elected by RSFSR party organizations represent them at the Russian Party Conference. Thus, the nomination of candidates and their election took place in Russian party organizations with a view to the upcoming Russian Party Conference. The instructions to elected delegates were formulated accordingly.

The aforementioned approach made a big impact on the party and society and contributed to the further growth of the people's political activeness. The keen and principled way in which each candidate was discussed in the majority of cases is indicative of the great interest of communists and a considerable number of nonparty comrades in party affairs and in the decisions of the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress and Russian Party Conference.

The delegate elections were a real education for party organs and all party cadres and a serious test of their maturity and ability to work in conditions of comparison and confrontation between different positions and platforms and struggle among their authors and supporters.

Comrades! The Credentials Commission reports to the conference that the elections of delegations in all RSFSR kray and oblast party organizations were carried out in accordance with the approved statute and the representation norms laid down by the CPSU Central Committee: one delegate per 4,000 party members. RSFSR party organizations elected a total of 2,768 delegates to the 28th congress and, accordingly, to the present conference, 2,020 in one-seat districts, 257 in multiseat districts, and 491 at kray or oblast conferences.

The vast majority of conference delegates were elected on a multiple-choice basis.

The Credentials Commission checked the credentials of all the delegates and declared them valid.

The biggest delegations represent the party organizations of Moscow—278 people; Leningrad—147; Moscow Oblast—126; Krasnodar Kray—81; Rostov Oblast—80; Sverdlovsk Oblast—66, and Gorkiy Oblast—64.

The conference delegates represent the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, Soviet intelligentsia, women, young people, and party and labor veterans.

The delegates include 577 construction, transport, and communications industry workers, or 20.8 percent, and 235 agricultural workers, or 8.5 percent.

Precisely 264 workers or equivalent categories of working people, or 9.5 percent, were elected to the conference, along with 118 kolkhoz members, or 4.3 percent, which is 3.5 and 3.7 percent more representatives than they had in the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. Nevertheless, the commission believes that the delegate elections failed to avoid the general trend toward reduced worker and peasant participation in representative state and party organs that has been evident of late. In our view, the passive attitude of party organizations and inadequate assistance from party committees for ordinary working people in the election struggle prevented workers and peasants from assuming their due place at this conference. We have encountered this problem during other election campaigns. Obviously, the closest attention must be paid to this aspect of party organizations' activity in the new conditions.

Given the situation that exists at the moment, in our view, the CPSU Central Committee and the Russian Bureau deemed it correct and necessary to invite an extra 200 communists to the Russian Party Conference—workers and ordinary kolkhoz members who participated in the pre-election struggle for for delegates' seats and have great authority in their primary party organizations. The Credentials Commission sees fit to entitle the invited comrades to a full vote at the present conference.

The conference delegates include 210 leaders of enterprises, associations, design bureaus, construction trusts and administrations, and transport organizations, 75 kolkhoz chairmen, 60 directors of sovkhozes, pedigree stock farms, and poultry farms, and joint ventures. The conference delegates include 245 representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia. There are 129 cultural and artistic figures among them.

Our press and all the media have an exceptionally big part to play in shaping public opinion and developing democratization and glasnost. They are represented at the conference by 34 working people.

At the present stage of perestroyka there has been a sharp increase in the responsibility of cadres at all levels for the implementation of the course elaborated by the party. It is extremely important now for them to master political methods of leadership, to be able to act in conditions of democracy, to find reliable partners among the various social and political movements, and to be constantly working amid the people, not only in production, but in residential areas as well. The republic's party cadres have been markedly overhauled of late, acquiring enterprising, businesslike, competent working people, keen supporters of the party's cause.

Precisely 1,171 party workers were elected to attend the conference—42.3 percent of the total number of delegates. They include 339 secretaries of primary party organizations, 250 secretaries of rural party rayon committees, 421 secretaries of party okrug committees, city committees [gorkoms], and rayon committees [raykoms], and 97 secretaries of party kray committees [kraykoms] and oblast committees [obkoms]. CPSU Central Committee secretaries and Politburo candidate and full members were also elected.

But it must be stressed that the vast majority of party workers have had a major industrial education and cannot be called apparatchiks, in the bad sense of the word.

Safeguarding the soviets' real sovereignty and fully restoring their role and powers on the territory under their jurisdiction are essential to the solution of the fundamental tasks of renewing and democratizing socialist society. The role of communists as members of soviets and the consolidation and unity of their actions in implementing party policy in these organs acquire enormous importance in conditions of a multiparty system. Precisely 305 conference delegates, or 11 percent, are soviet workers. They include 10 members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 20 chairmen of autonomous republican Supreme Soviets or kray or oblast soviets, and 49 chairmen of okrug, city or rayon soviets. Of the total number of conference delegates 113 are USSR people's deputies, 126 are RSFSR people's deputies, 102 are autonomous republic people's deputies, and 1,387 are local soviet deputies. In our view, this is graphic evidence that the party's stock is quite high from the electorate's viewpoint.

In present-day conditions the CPSU is reshaping its relations with public organizations, which form part of our society's political system, as equal partners joining

forces in the solution of general humanitarian tasks in people's interests. Thirty-one workers of trade union and Communist Youth League organs and other public organizations were elected conference delegates.

Precisely 183 representatives of our Armed Forces are participating in the conference. They are maintaining our country's defense capability at a high level in the difficult conditions of the fueling of anti-army feeling and reduction in the army's size and armaments.

Soviet women are actively involved in the difficult work of the socialist renewal of all spheres of our life. There are 173 of them among the conference delegates, or 6.3 percent, which is obviously not commensurate with their role and position in the RSFSR, and this, in the view of the commission members, also indicates serious deficiencies in the work of party committees and party organizations.

Russia and its communists have always been the unifying, international force of the great socialist Union and of all the peoples of our country. There are representatives of 47 nationalities working at this conference.

Communists of different generations were elected to the conference. Some 1.3 percent of the delegates are under 30; 27 percent are 31-40; 43 percent are 41-50; 26 percent are 51-60, and 2.6 percent are over 60.

In terms of party service the breakdown is as follows: 20 joined the party in 1941-1945, that is, during the Great Patriotic War; 3.1 percent joined between 1946 and 1965; 68.7 percent joined between 1965 and 1985, and 2.1 percent of the delegates have joined the party since the 27th CPSU Congress.

More than 98 percent of the delegates have higher or incomplete higher and secondary education.

Nearly 62 percent of the delegates have received orders and medals for combat and labor services; 10 are Heroes of the Soviet Union; 31 are Heroes of Socialist Labor, and 62 are Lenin or State Prize winners.

Comrades! The composition of the body of delegates and the course of our conference's work reflect the positions and mood of RSFSR party organizations and the tumultuous contradictory and complex processes taking place in all spheres of the life and activity of the republic's communists and working people. Communists and nonparty people and all people who are not indifferent to the fate of the party and of socialism expect us conference delegates to set out clear positions on the fundamental problems affecting the interests of the peoples of Russia and to take concrete action to promote the formation and development of a republican party organization as part of the CPSU.

'Conservatism' Voiced at Congress

PM2106154190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition pp 1,2

[P. Gutiontov article: "Conference Becomes Constituent Congress"]

[Text] So, on 20 June 1990 at 1102 hours precisely, the Russian Party Conference came to an end and the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party began work. That this would happen was clear to everyone both inside and outside the Palace of Congresses auditorium, despite the ambigious assessments, as they say, of the emerging organization's prospects. But one thing is beyond doubt: The appearance of the RSFSR Communist Party in the country's political arena changes the situation not only in the RSFSR itself but throughout the Soviet Union.

In this connection I shall repeat what is, in my view, the main question: **What kind** of party will it be and **where** will it lead the communists of the largest republic, which, some insist, is finally really acquiring true equality through the creation of its own party structure? This is no idle question, because unresolved problems concerned with the long-urgent need for radical democratization within the party itself and for its integration into a society that is itself becoming more democratic have somehow taken second or even third place behind the stormy debates surrounding the question of "national affiliation."

Here is just one example.

Discussion of the agenda on the second day of the conference began with a report from the Mandate Commission, delivered by G. Khodyreg. I think it would not be without interest to take a look at who is representing Russian communists at their forum and to ponder the question of just how fully the body of delegates reflects the social makeup of the party organizations, which, as is well known, incorporate a total of 11 million people.

Well, 210 leaders of industrial enterprises, 130 leaders of state farms and collective farms, 245 representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, 34 journalists, 245 workers, 116 collective farm workers, and, finally, 1,171 party workers of various ranks have been elected to the 28th CPSU Congress (and, therefore, to the Russian Conference). I will not comment on these figures; I will just say that the speaker blamed their poor relation—to put it mildly—to the social makeup of the party on "the passivity of party organizations and party committees."

The obvious desire to "correct" the class makeup of the conference was responsible for the infamous idea of inviting 200 workers and peasants from those who had stood as candidate delegates but failed to make the grade in the elections. The chairman of the Mandate Commission even said that it "seemed right" to give those invited a mandate with the right to vote. **How** was this

justified? USSR People's Deputy V. Yudin from Magadan Oblast immediately asked. By the CPSU Statutes or the provision on elections? Muscovite O. Latsis supposed that Comrade Khodyrev probably intended all 200 to tell the conference about themselves, their political programs, and so forth, as delegates did not even know the names of those invited....

Then someone else rushed to the microphone, but at this point a statement from the workers themselves was at last read out. This made it clear that they felt it discourteous to assume that they could use such an undemocratic method to "get delegated."

What strikes you generally is the ease with which some delegates are prepared to commit acts which are, at best, insufficiently considered. For example, a resolution was adopted in a rush, in the course of the proceedings, and then a discussion developed that almost brought the constituent congress into confrontation with the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. The kind of speeches people were making forced delegate D. Kugultinov to get up from the presidium table to remind those present that Article 6 of the Constitution has been abolished and say that the party must organize its relations with the soviets in line with this.

I think this is the first time, here in the Palace of Congresses, that we have heard such sharply-worded criticism addressed to the top party leadership and the general secretary personally. Moreover, this criticism from the conference rostrum is being greeted with noisy, unconcealed approval by some members of the auditorium.

Gorbachev said repeatedly that he had knowingly linked perestroyka with his own personal future and that the moment of choice would seem to be now, the summer of 1990—not only for him but also for the party of which he is head and for the whole of our vast country. The administrative-edict system, which has led the party into crisis and brought the country to the brink of catastrophe, is trying to seize its last chance by creating the semblance of struggling for the ideals and class interests of the workers and peasants. Gorbachev's supporters are also finding it tough at the conference because the disappointments and failures experienced in politics and the economy during the perestroyka years are obvious and the "center" gives every reason to be blamed for them itself, although (and all the most critical speakers glossed over this for some reason), as a rule, good initiatives have come to grief on the powerful bureaucratic system which Gorbachev and his colleagues have hitherto been unable to smash.

I feel it is now very important to understand that the criticism of the general secretary at the conference is first and foremost a demonstration of rejection of the policy of renewal, whatever formulas of "renewal" taken from the "lexicon of the new thinking" speakers may use to hide behind.

I will quote just a few extracts from speeches made on the first day of the conference.

I. Osadchiy, chairman of the Preparatory Committee, essentially accused the CPSU Central Committee leadership of taking a course virtually designed to break up the Russian Federation. The same Central Committee leadership has "doomed the party to the role of sitting in the trenches under fire from strengthening antisocialist forces and the press.... The situation at the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies would have been different if the Russian Communist Party had been founded before the start of the election campaign." (Applause) "The theory of deideologizing society is being forced on us on the pretext of struggling against dogmas. That theory does not hold water!" (Applause)

V. Tyulkin, secretary of the Leningrad "Avangard" Production Association party committee and representative of the "Russian Communist Party initiative congress," had this to say: "Some comrades are already saying that the party might have to go underground.... A new, no-alternative perestroyka dogmatism has appeared (theories about the priority of common human values over class values and the slogan 'All power to the soviets!' are once again included among the new 'dogmas')..... There are communists in the United Front of Working People and in the people's fronts, so the person watching all this from above says: Good, we have pluralism. (Applause) Now they are trying to delay the election of the Russian Communist Party's leading bodies, and all because the comrades have trouble pronouncing the word 'Russian' and frankly have no wish to pronounce the word 'communist.'" (Applause)

V. Golovachev, first secretary of the Saratov CPSU City Committee and chairman of the city soviet, said: "The economic measures proposed by the government conflict with the party's ideological directives. Our ideals are being sacrificed on the altar of economic expediency...."

Not all the speeches were like this, of course. The speech by G. Sklyar, first secretary of the Obninsk CPSU City Committee in Kaluga Oblast, for example, made a very strong impression on me with its sincerity and anguish for the common cause. B. Gidaspov made a very constructive speech.

But so far they are not the ones setting the general tone.

Before the start of the morning sitting, I asked Prof. A. Denisov, USSR people's deputy, what he thinks about the first steps taken by the Russian party forum.

"I find the conservatism of so many delegates depressing. The problem with their stance is not only that it is conservative and 'right-wing' but also that it offers absolutely no prospects at all. Under Leningrad's quota, I was nominated as a member of the future Central Committee. I declined in no uncertain terms. I could not work in the kind of Central Committee that will inevitably be elected here...."

That is only one opinion, of course. But it should be given a hearing.

The constituent congress is continuing its work.

Western Republics

Belorussian Agrarian Workers Union Founded

LD2806112390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] The Belorussian Union of Agrarian Workers, a sociopolitical organization set up in Minsk, will have the task of defending the rights and interests of peasants. The members of the Union of Agrarian Workers regard equal rights for, and the development of all forms of economic management on the land, and boosting the prestige of rural workers as the basis for solving the food problem.

A package of urgent measures planned by the union includes the attainment and maintenance of price parity for agricultural produce and the lifting of regulations restricting the independence of collective and state farms. It has been decided to work out a precise mechanism for transferring land to future independent farmers.

Moldavian Media Reorganization Resolution Adopted

PM2206142990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent E. Kondratov under the rubric "At the Republic Supreme Soviet Sessions": "Newspapers Handed Over to Soviets"]

[Text] The Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution on transferring the republic's city and rayon newspapers to the exclusive jurisdiction of soviets.

You will no longer see beneath the titles of local newspapers any reference to the party bodies that lead them. Most deputies were of the opinion that the transfer of full, real power to the soviets must be accompanied by depoliticization of the press. To a certain extent, this was a reaction to the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee plenum decision adopted two weeks ago, which announced that the republic newspapers SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA and MOLDOVA SOCIALISTA will become the exclusive press organs of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee from 1 July.

The session resolved to found—or, to be more precise, to revive—the republican daily newspaper SFATUL CERII, published in 1918 during the Moldavian Democratic Republic's brief existence. It will now be the newspaper of the Moldavian parliament, independent of influence by any parties, political organizations, or social movements. The session abolished the republic's Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting the same day. Henceforth, this information body will be called "National Television and Radio Broadcasting" and will be headed by a general director approved by parliament. The formation and activity of any party and political organizations whatsoever within SFATUL CERII or the television and radio network is forbidden.

The session abolished ATEM—the Moldavian branch of TASS. MOLDOVA-PRESS will be created in its stead, with its own correspondents in the republics and, consequently, abroad as well. It also abolished the People's Control Committee.

The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet renamed the city Kotovskiy: Its historical name of Khynchesht has now been restored to it.

Moldavian Popular Front Congress Begins

LD3006144490 Moscow TASS in English 1343 GMT 30 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Takii]

[Text] Kishinev June 30 TASS—The second congress of the Moldavian Popular Front (MPF)—an ethnic movement pressing for the sovereignty of the republic and for the extension of the rights of its indigenous population—opened here today.

Ion Khadyrke, chairman of the MPF Council, delivered a report at the congress, describing MPF successes over the two years of its existence.

The MPF is now one of the most influential sociopolitical forces in the republic: not less than one-third of deputies of the now Supreme Soviet of Moldavia were elected on the MPF ticket and many of them hold responsible positions in the republic's parliament.

Khadyrke was elected the vice chairman of the republic's parliament. This enables the MPF to consistently pursue its policy in the elaboration and adoption of laws and in shaping a new composition of the republic's government.

The MPF chairman called on Moldavia's indigenous population to come to realise that ethnically they are of Romanian origin.

He emphasised that the supreme goal of the MPF activities is to unite the Romanian territories to the east of the Prut River into an independent state—a Romanian republic of Moldavia. The goal must be achieved in line with the rule of law, democratically, without violence or a threat of the use of force.

During the two-day session of the MPF second congress, delegates are expected to adopt a new charter of the movement and an action programme for the coming period. It is also planned to adopt a number of resolutions on specific problems.

Moldavian Rally Attracts Few Participants

PM2706150990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Eduard Kondratov: "Tired of Meetings"]

[Text] Kishinev—The action conducted by the People's Fronts of Romania and Moldova as a token of grief to mark the 50th anniversary of the Red Army's entry into Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, despite its organizers' expectations, gathered few people.

It would seem that everything was promoting its success—the appeals to the people from the pages of a popular newspaper, the resolution adopted the day before by the republic's Supreme Soviet denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences, the sunny weather, and the excellently organized trading along the route. But the planned continuous "human chain" of people holding hands proved rather to be symbolic: On the route leading to the border from Kepriyany to Leusheny only on individual sectors did sometimes tens, sometimes hundreds of people stand with "tricolors." For many kilometers salesmen, food vendors, and militiamen stood alone and bored.

What was the matter? At any rate it was not a case of the People's Front being unable to organize the masses. Obviously people themselves have grown tired of meetings and political events. Visiting the border bridge on Sunday I saw for myself that today both Moldavians and Romanians are far more moved by simple, beneficial daily matters—for instance the ability to embrace and talk with their relatives and friends on the other side of the Prut.

Donetsk Coal Miners To Strike 11 July

LD2906141790 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Gorlovka, Donetsk Region June 29 TASS—Mine workers of a large coal-producing region in the Ukraine intend to hold a 24- hour political strike on July 11 to demand the resignation of the Soviet Government.

The decision was taken at a conference of the regional council of strike committees of the Donetsk coal basin in Gorlovka, which closed late last night.

Representatives of 25 out of 30 mining communities voted in favour of the strike.

The conference appealled to workers in coal-producing and other industries to support the action and invited the workers to express their attitude to the following issues:

—depolitisation of interior ministry and state security bodies, prosecutor's office, judiciary, army and public education.

—nationalisation of the Soviet Communist Party's property,

—the activity of the existing trade unions.

Although many councils of collieries' work collectives oppose the strike, the leaders of the strike movement are determined.

"We have already received news that mine workers of Vorkuta, Kuzbass and Karaganda have taken similar decisions to strike," said Aleksandr Kolomiytsev, co-chairman of the Donetsk strike committee.

"I'm convinced that the strike will be held. In addition, Donetsk transport workers are preparing for their own strike. They will probably join us on July 11," Kolomiytsev said.

Miners Urged Not To Strike

LD2906143790 Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev June 29 TASS—Workers of the Yuzhkoks production amalgamation in the Ukraine have appealled to Donbass miners to display common sense and restraint in the wake of the announcement of a 24-hour strike scheduled for July 11.

Uzhkoks workers called on miners not to create difficulties for other branches in handling their own problems.

The decision of the Donbass Regional Alliance of Strike Committees to down tools on July 11 will only exacerbate the situation as the republic's coke-producing plants are already experiencing shortages of coking coal, says the appeal.

Plants have reduced output, the quality of coke has dropped. This is having a negative effect on the operation of metalworking enterprises, the appeal points out. In June alone, they fell short of plan assignments by 200,000 tonnes of rolled stock. This means that the mine-workes will not receive enough items they themselves need.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Discusses Sovereignty

LD0107222190 Kiev International Service in English 2300 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] Today the session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet in Kiev continued discussing the draft declaration on state sovereignty of the Ukraine. The parliamentarians expressed different views in the analysis of the major provisions of this document but the general view is the document must really ensure the sovereign rights of this republic in all spheres of social life.

Falsified Voting Results Reported in Ukraine

LD2906221390 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] [Announcer] Today's plenary session [of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Supreme Soviet] began a bit later than scheduled. The reason was this: Yesterday, the election of head of the Council of Ministers was all but wrecked. The counting commission detected a crude violation of the voting procedure. It discovered that one of the deputies cast his vote without being present in the session hall. In other words, the ballot was obtained by someone showing his identity card. The repeated voting was not undertaken for the lack of necessary quorum.

Well, this fact does not add to the image of parliament. Therefore the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was compelled to make today a corresponding statement, whose drafting caused the delay in the opening of the session.

The statement was delivered by Volodymyr Ivashko, chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Among other things, it included:

[Begin Ivashko recording] First, the presidium resolutely condemns the behavior and actions of those people's deputies who, without valid reasons and without being excused by the presidium, were absent from the session yesterday. The presidium is to introduce the rule that a deputy can miss this or that session only after submitting a written explanation to chairman or deputy chairmen of the Supreme Soviet. All violations of this rule will be publicized in mass information means and in communications to the culprits' electors.

Second, the presidium resolutely condemns the behavior and acations of those deputies who issued ballots to wrong persons, to those who pretended to be someone else. The presidium proceeds from the premises that everything that has taken place needs to be closely analysed. We must draw necessary conclusions for keeping order. Therefore, the counting commission has been instructed to look into the matter and submit its report to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. On our part, should the need arise, we shall form a special commission to check everything once again, should the report fail to satisfy certain parties. [end recording]

[Announcer] This incident with the voting produced serious consequences. Immediately after Ivashko, the rostrum was given to Ihor Yukhnovskyy, people's deputy from Lvov Oblast. He made a statement on behalf of the official parliamentary opposition called Narodna Rada [People's Council].

[Begin Yukhnovskyy recording] The Narodna Rada states with regret that a certain wing of the party apparatus representatives in parliament resorted to the falsification of results of the election of chairman of the Council of Ministers. [noise, angry shouts] There were two candidates for this high post: Vitaliy Masol, member of the Politburo of the CpUk Central Committee, nominated by the parliamentary majority; and Volodymyr Chernyak, doctor of economic sciences, USSR people's deputy, from the opposition.

In order to conceal the size of falsification, the party apparatus manipulated a repeated election. [angry shouts, interruptions] The opposition believes that for the deed committed by the conservative members of parliament the Narodna Rada cannot take any responsibility nor can any other progressive member of parliament. The falsification of procedures make it impossible for the Supreme Soviet to carry on with normal work and with drafting the bills for which the Ukrainian people is waiting. All this threatens to paralyze the work of the Supreme Soviet and bring itd to the edge of self-dissolution and holding new elections. We demand the creation of a parliamentary commission to investigate the incident and bring to account those guilty in committing falsifications. [end recording]

Ukraine Fails To Elect Prime Minister

LD2806103390 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] At the session of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet in Kiev today, there was continued examination of the question of electing the head of the republic's government. Two candidates were nominated for this post: Vitaliy Masol, the current prime minister of the Ukraine, and Volodymyr Chernyak, Kiev scientist and USSR people's deputy. They outlined their programs, which were discussed in detail by the parliamentarians. Voting took place on these candidatures, during which there was a deviation. The counting commission established that there had been some violation of the voting rules. A repeat vote was also declared invalid, since less than half of the members of parliament took part. Tomorrow, the session will continue its work.

Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party Aims Viewed

AU2106121990 Gdansk TYGODNIK GDANSKI in Polish 17 Jun 90 p 10

[Interview with Lesia Levkiv, secretary of the Lvov region Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party organization, by Marzena Wozniak; place and date not given: "Lvov Eyes"]

[Excerpts] [Wozniak] You are so pretty, young, and you have decided to become politically active....

[Levkiv] Is it any different in Poland?

[Wozniak] Quite different. Polish youth thinks of starting a family, study, and trips abroad. Very few think about politics. What are you fighting for?

[Levkiv] For an independent and democratic Ukraine, separate from the Soviet Union. An economically modern Ukraine that will be open to the world.

[Wozniak] Tell us how you came to be interested in politics.

[Levkiv] In November 1988, in Lvov, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front was formed. Vasiliy Sichko, a former political prisoner is its leader. At present he is 33 years old. He is a true revolutionary and a man of struggle. He studied journalism in Kiev. They threw him out and later he spent several years in prison. I live and work in Lvov, but I only found out about the movement several months later. There was no information on the movement, people organized themselves clandestinely, they met in private houses. In April 1989, I joined the movement and that is how I begun my political life. Work apart, all my spare time is taken up with political work. During the movement's congress I only managed to get two hours of sleep a night. At the congress the movement changed itself into a political party with the name the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party. Some 20,000 people signed the founding declaration and we have 2,000 people who are very active in party work. Besides Lvov, we have branches in Odessa, Kiev, and Ivano-Frankovsk.

We have applied to the Soviet authorities for registration, but we have already been registered in the West with the International Christian Democracy movement. Andrea Lui is its president and Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki is the deputy president.

At this moment we are the largest and best organized party in the Ukraine.

[Wozniak] How is your organization structured? Is the secretary very important?

[Levkiv] The most important person is the chairman, then comes the Main Board, and then the regional and section secretariats. I am only the secretary of the Lvov region.

[Wozniak] Are you allowed to function freely?

[Levkiv] The beginnings were very difficult. Our meetings were systematically broken up, people were persecuted, imprisoned, and beaten up. All that has gone now. The authorities have to take world public opinion into consideration and Lvov often has visiting foreign journalists. Thus, the authorities have stopped their campaign of persecution and imprisonment and instead they take photographs, make notes, and keep registers. This is being done very thoroughly. We are kept under constant surveillance by security service personnel, and the authorities are perfectly aware of our movements. The same is happening all over the Soviet Union. One no longer persecutes political movements, but for future eventualities one compiles data about them. [passage omitted]

[Wozniak] What about Lithuania?

[Levkiv] Ah yes, they jumped the gun and miscalculated. I realize that this was not the best move and things are tough for them now. Earlier, we had called for the formation of a Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian block, and construct a front that would remain united during the period of confrontation. If this had happened we would have represented a force to be reckoned with. Ukraine itself has 50 million people. Vasiliy Sichko was clearly calling for the formation of such a block, but the Lithuanians decided to go it alone, and now we are obliged to help them. During our congress in April we passed a resolution to help Lithuania, for example, we could supply them with crude oil. But nothing came of this because Ivanko, the Ukrainian secretary, takes his orders from Moscow. Our hands are tied.

That is how it is, we have to fight for every inch of democratic space and continue to enlarge it. We have to break out of the web which our country is enmeshed in. When this happens many parties will emerge and free elections will show that freedom and democracy have ceased to be hollow words. [passage omitted]

[Wozniak] What do your parents think of what you do?

[Levkiv] For them it is natural. My father fought in the ranks of the Ukrainian National Army and as a result he spent 10 years in a labor camp.

Ivashko Addresses Komsomol Congress Delegates

90UN2201B Moscow PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 10 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by UKRINFORM special correspondent: "Being Partners in Building a New Society: Get-Together Between Delegates to the 26th Ukrainian Komsomol Congress and Republic Government and Political Leaders"]

[Text] The 26th Ukrainian Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress convenes today, 10 June. Congress delegates will be discussing the most important issues pertaining to Komsomol affairs and activities, as well as problems troubling young people, and will be adopting decisions which are to become the basis for renewal of Ukrainian Komsomol. A get-together between congress participants and the republic's political and government leaders was held on the eve of the congress, 8 June, at Kiev's Ukraina Palace of Culture. Participants included V.A. Ivashko, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; V.A. Masol, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; S.I. Gurenko, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; and Politburo candidate member L.M. Kravchuk, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

The proceedings were opened by Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Anatoliy Matviyenko.

V.A. Ivashko addressed those present at the meeting. "Today everybody, both old and young, is faced with a great many questions: what happened in our past history, what is happening now, where are we going, and what is to be done? And this is not simply a sign of the times but is also one of the most appreciable changes for the better in society which have taken place since April 1985. The main thing in the current situation is to take into consideration both the high degree of people's politicization and the soil on which this has developed. The fact is that over the course of many years society lived by certain stereotypes. As painful as it may be to say this, there was a lack of genuine political and economic knowledge, political and overall sophistication and awareness. Experience at democracy is practically totally lacking. Precisely for this reason we frequently go too far and make mistakes. Unique 'syndromes of the time' have appeared, since society is in a state of arousal. Typical of such periods, as history attests, is the appearance of a large number of new sociopolitical organizations: parties, associations, and movements. The experience of history also attests to something else: in time things are reduced to two principal parties and five or six secondary ones. I believe that Eastern Europe will come to this, and I believe that we shall as well."

The speaker discussed several issues connected with the forming and activities of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. In particular, he pointed out that in conditions where we rejected predetermined quotas for public organizations. Komsomol did not engage in a genuine struggle in the campaign for seats in the Ukrainian parliament. As a result young people are poorly represented in the legislature. Due to this, the youth union is lacking persistence and initiative in its work. This situation must be changed.

V.A. Ivashko then went on to describe the ideological processes among youth, in particular the attitude toward communist ideals and Leninist teaching. "Unfortunately debates are frequently conducted over individual, isolated citations; in making reference to these citations, an attempt is made to refute the entirety of Leninism. The main thing with Lenin, however, just as with any thinker, is not a quote taken out of context but rather his philosophy of socialism, of that system over which mankind has yet to come up with an improvement. You can name to your heart's content various structures which exist in various countries, but if we take a close and careful look, we shall see that contemporary capitalism has adopted a great deal precisely from our teachings. Thanks to the Great October Revolution and our victory in World War II, the capitalist world came to the realization that socialist trends were capturing the masses to such an extent that it would be better to yield a portion of profit to the workers than to lose everything." The speaker emphasized that the Ukrainian Communist Party remains faithful to the socialist idea, faithful to the Leninist philosophy of socialism as a living method of cognition and transformation of the world.

"Today our society is going through difficult times," continued V.A. Ivashko. "We have inherited many negative things from the past, and we have also made many mistakes in the course of perestroyka. The most difficult situation has developed in the socioeconomic domain. For this reason the main thing right now is restructuring of the economy on the basis of new principles."

In conclusion V.A. Ivashko stated the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's position on relations between the party and Komsomol, emphasizing that they should be political partners. "We want to work with a youth organization," he stated, "which, following the socialist choice of our party and our people, would build a new life on new principles."

Republic and Ukrainian Communist Party leaders replied to numerous questions by delegates to the Komsomol Congress.

Ukraine Introduces Own Time 1 Jul

LD3006221890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2030 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Text] Beginning today [1 July] the Ukraine will live according to its own time, which differs from the Moscow time by one hour. This decision was made by the republican Supreme Soviet. The so-called decree time [local time plus one hour to maximize on daylight], which was established in our country 60 years ago, becomes invalid on the terrritory of Ukraine. The Moscow time is preserved, however, for all means of transport.

Odessa To Go Its Own Way on Free Economic Zone

PM2906124990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by S. Fateyev and B. Zamchinskiy, identified by caption]

[Text] [Correspondent] At the moment we are all constantly discussing the market and free economic relations.... Here in Odessa, the market has existed for a long time, and it is a great success. For instance, today this site, where the famous Odessa secondhand market is located, has attracted a minimum of 100,000 to 150,000 people. Anyone you speak to will tell you that having this kind of market in Odessa is a good thing, it is a kind of prototype for the free economic market, the free economic zone in Odessa about which all local inhabitants are dreaming, and they are not alone.

You could say that Odessa is an ideal place for doing business. It has a large port which provides contact with all the countries of the world, it has large-scale industry, and it has enterprising people.

Certain news media have already reported that Odessa can be regarded as a free city, as a free economic zone. Is this true? Let's ask some competent people.

[Doctor of Economic Sciences B.V. Burkinskiy, chairman of the city soviet, identified by caption] Odessa has always been famous for being a free city. But seriously speaking, if we are talking about a free economic zone, then I must say that the mass media have been somewhat premature.

[Correspondent] What is preventing you from implementing this idea?

[Burkinskiy] A great deal. There are many problems. We have still not received an answer to the proposal which we sent to the republic and the USSR Councils of Ministers two years ago. So we are trying to do it on our own. We have set up a group, we have set up an association which is working on these questions flat-out.

Caucasus

Movsisyan Report to Armenian Party Plenum Viewed

NC3006154190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 30 Jun 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] As has already been reported, the plenum of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee opened on 28 June. The plenum discussed the draft platform of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee prepared for the 29th party congress. Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report on this issue.

The newspaper today publishes the report delivered by Comrade Movsisyan, who said: When formulating the platform, we considered not only the general atmosphere prevailing in the country and in the party, but also paid particular attention to the radical changes that have taken place in the republic's political life. The platform was also shaped by the critical situation that has arisen in the republic, which touches all aspects of our lives. The people, in reassessing the past and looking to the future of our fatherland, are (?acutely sensitive) about the instability prevailing in the region, the condition of their compatriots in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the apartheid and policy of Azerbaijanization in the neighboring republic, the crisis prevailing in the economy and ecology, the disappointing pace of eliminating the consequences of the destructive earthquake, and the delays in the solution of the problems faced by the refugees.

The republic's Communist Party attaches principled importance to the correct and truthful assessment of the present situation and the formulation of mechanisms to surmount the prevailing dramatic situation, the speaker said, adding: It is especially important that we recognize that it will be impossible to solve tomorrow's problems without a profound and radical reform of the party and party life. Regrettably, the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, its Bureau, and our party organizations have lagged behind in this regard. The people are tired of repeated promises, unproductive speeches, unrealized social expectations, an unstable situation, manifestations of a lack of authority, arbitrary and groundless decisions, and frequent violations of law and legality. This situation can no longer be tolerated.

Movsisyan said that a clear orientation toward the place and role of the party in our republic's public and political life is necessary above everything else. What political aims should it pursue? On what sort of conceptual principles should the party's future activity be based? How should it be in harmony with universal and national interests? How can party and state structures be disengaged? What are the basic principles, directions, and (?forms) for deepening democracy in our party? The replies to these questions have often been contradictory. The party must either chose the path of effective reforms with an eye to the future or it must leave the stage of history. Under our present conditions, the party must not only assist in every way in the radical transformation of our life but should also be the main political force [word indistinct] shouldering and implementing this historically fateful process. Our aim should be the creation of an [word indistinct] Armenian Communist Party with an active political stance, which should have its own specific program and constitution and be in (?a position) to play an effective role in the [word indistinct] renaissance of the republic.

Azerbaijan Front Issues Demand on Armenian Border

LD2906134790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1245 GMT 29 Jun 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Azerbaijani People's Front has addressed the republican president with the demand to start constructing military engineering facilities on the border with Armenia.

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Adopts Laws

PM2906125390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 8

[AZERINFORM-TASS report under general heading "At Union Republic Sessions"]

[Text] A session of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet was held here today. A whole package of new draft laws, whose adoption should play a most important role in the republic's sociopolitical and socioeconomic life and promote the real implementation of perestroyka and political and economic reform, was submitted for the deputies' examination.

Among the many issues included on the session agenda were the Azerbaijan SSR draft laws "On Changes and

Amendments to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution (Basic Law) On Matters Relating to the Electoral System," "On the Election of Azerbaijan SSR People's Deputies," "On the Election of Azerbaijan SSR Local Soviet Deputies," "On the Economic Autonomy of the Azerbaijan SSR," "On Ownership in the Azerbaijan SSR," "On Leasing," "On Azerbaijan SSR Citizenship," and others.

During the discussion of the draft laws, emphasis was placed on the importance of shaping a corps of deputies who would be able to operate independently, competently, and with a view to the future under the new political and economic conditions. It is planned to establish 360 deputies' seats in the republic's Supreme Soviet instead of the 450 at present.

The deputies adopted laws on changes and amendments to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution on matters relating to the electoral system, on the election of people's deputies and local soviet deputies in the republic, and on Azerbaijan SSR citizenship, and ratified an interim provision on the chairmen and presidiums of Azerbaijan SSR local soviets.

The session resolved to hold elections for Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies and deputies to the republic's local soviets 2 September 1990. The Supreme Soviet formed a Central Electoral Commission for the elections of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies and ratified a provision on the Central Electoral Commission.

The session thus ended its work.

Azerbaijan Sends Aid to Iranian Quake Victims

LD2706170490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] A real conveyor of aid to the victims of the earthquake in Iran is operating in Azerbaijan. Columns of motor vehicles with foodstuffs, tents, field power plant, household and everday goods are going through the border towns of Astara and Dzhulfa to the neighboring country. A cargo plane, an Il-76, flew medicines, medical equipment, provisions and essential goods to Tehran on a special flight. Over 200 doctors, traumatologists and nurses have gone to Iran. The republican Ministry of Social Security has announced that it is ready to receive 100 elderly people for treatment and to make prosthetic appliances free of charge. A special account has been opened to help the victims of the earthquake. Over R3 million has been deposited in it.

People's Front Rules on CPSU Membership

LD3006133290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1225 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondents Devi Berdzenishvili and Boris Gazzayev]

[Text] Tbilisi, 30 June (TASS)—The second congress of the People's Front of Georgia (PFG), represented by 1,500 delegates, is continuing its work in the capital of Georgia. Guests from national liberation movements from other republics of the Union are present.

On the first three days of the forum's work annual reports were heard from the PFG board and the commissions and sections acting under it in autonomous formations and rayons. The assembly adopted a decision to participate in the elections to the republic's parliament this autumn on a multiparty basis, in accordance with the law recently adopted by Georgia's Supreme Soviet.

Amendments and additions to the PFG's rules and program provoked a sharp discussion. It was decided not to admit to the PFG's ranks representatives of organizations and parties whose programs do not coincide with the aims set by the Front. In connection with this, CPSU members who are in the PFG have been presented with this condition: Either leave its ranks or resign from the Communist Party.

The work of the second congress of the People's Front of Georgia is continuing.

Independent TU Confederation Founded in Georgia

LD3006194390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1230 GMT 30 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Eduard Gasparov]

[Excerpts] Tbilisi, 30 Jun (TASS)—The Confederation of Trade Unions of Georgia (a Soviet republic in the Caucasus) was set up here at the first congress of this new public organisation, which has emerged to replace the republican Council of Trade Unions. The confederation has been proclaimed an independent body, distinct from the Council of Trade Unions which for decades was essentially an adjunct of the state administration and the party apparatus. [passage omitted]

The confederation is based on the full voluntariness and independence of its members—the independent industrial trade unions of the republic and the trade union bodies of autonomous administrative entities. Rejecting all diktat and rule from above, it possesses the right of legislative initiative and has coordinating functions in tackling national problems. The confederation's activities are aimed at achieving real political and economic sovereignty for Georgia and it aims to defend the rights and interests of the working people, whatever their political views, ethnic background, or creed.

Georgian Independence Movement Viewed

PM2706150490 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Jun 90 p 11

[Anders Steinvall dispatch: "Georgia Rises Up Against Moscow"—all names as published]

[Text] Tbilisi—The Georgian president tried desperately to explain to the rebellious students that "the Communist Party is the only party really working for the republic's sovereignty."

His audience howled with laughter, because here the break with the old system is total.

The scene, which took place in a small hall at Tbilisi University, is a good illustration of the mood of the tiny Transcaucasian Soviet republic of Georgia, with its 5.4 million inhabitants.

It may be true that Georgia has not yet declared its independence from the Soviet Union, but it is only a matter of time before this happens.

Here the inhabitants refuse to listen to talk of some "new federation" or other solutions in which the central Soviet power in Moscow is involved.

Even Georgia's great son Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze does not enjoy any great popularity here. He is the Kremlin's man, not Georgia's, people here say.

Everything Soviet must go, most Georgians believe. The republic must once again become an independent state, as it was most recently in the years 1918-1921.

"When we have had our elections, when a new and democratic goverment has been appointed, we will become independent," said Zviad Gamsachurdia, the popular leader of the radical independence movement.

In the republic's capital of Tbilisi the break with the Soviet system seems almost complete.

Around the city pedestals stand empty after the statues of Soviet leaders have been removed. The only one remaining is the huge Lenin statue in the center of the city and another statue portraying the founder of the Soviet state in front of party headquarters.

On several occasions this spring riot police surrounded the huge Lenin statue to protect it from crowds.

Other Soviet symbols are extremely rare. Everywhere the independent Georgian flag flutters—dark red, black, and white.

The situation in Georgia is just one of a number of examples of the fact that the dissolution of the Soviet Union is in full swing.

It is true that central power in Moscow is trying to put the brake on developments and sometimes adopts tough measures, as in the case of Lithuania.

But the fact that now even Russia and the Ukraine—the two largest republics—are striving for ever greater independence means the death blow for the Soviet Union in its present form.

The break with the Soviet Union takes many forms in Georgia.

Every day several hundred Georgians make their way to a ramshackle office in the shadow of the huge Lenin statue to resign their Soviet citizenship.

"As of today 82,000 people have resigned their Soviet citizenship at this office," a woman said when DAGENS NYHETER visited the office.

"Once 100,000 people have resigned their citizenship we will start exchanging Soviet passports for new Georgian passports," the woman said.

In another part of the city, at Tbilisi University, I saw how the republic's president and party leader, Givi Gumbaridze, tried to talk to rebellious students to make them see reason.

Gumbaridze had come to the university to persuade a group of students on hunger strike to end their action.

If Gumbaridze thought that he could persuade the students of the party's splendid qualities he had made a very great mistake. His assurance that the party also wants a free Georgia met with gales of laughter.

"We cannot believe you. The whole time you say one thing, but do another," was the accusation from an angry member of the audience.

The meeting ended in triumph when the hunger strikers declared that their action would continue. The students embraced their heroes—there is a great of love of dramatic actions in Georgia.

"We do not intend to give up until all our demands have been met. All the Georgians are with us and we are prepared to give our lives for a free Georgia," said 27-year-old Emzar Goguadze, one of the five hunger strikers.

It took only a few days before the republic's leadership gave in. The Georgian Supreme Soviet was summoned for an extraordinary session, which began its work 20 June. The hunger strike ended.

The 10 points of the hunger strikers' demands amount together to preparations for an independent Georgia.

One demand is that the republic's Supreme Soviet suspend the 16 February 1921 decision which made Georgia a Soviet republic.

In the republic's present Supreme Soviet there is no majority for secession from the Soviet Union, even though many members have begun to trim their sails to the wind.

However, when the republic elections, postponed from this spring, are held in October those forces demanding independence are certain to win a crushing victory.

"We are moving rapidly toward the restoration of our independence," Zviad Gamsachurdia said after a mass meeting in front of the parliament building in Tbilisi.

The 51-year-old philologist and former political prisoner is probably the republic's most popular political leader at present. He is a slightly graying, elegant man who meets with great applause and chaos wherever he goes.

Gamsachurdia leads an alliance of the most radical supporters of independence called the "round table."

"The elections we will have in October will not be Soviet elections. They will be new, democratic elections involving many parties," Gamsachurdia said.

This latter will not be a problem in Georgia, where the reappearance of democracy has blossomed into a rarely seen diversity.

When DAGENS NYHETER asked a political activist to bring together representatives of some of the various parties for a meeting, he said, somewhat alarmed:

"I hope you don't need to meet representatives of all the parties. That could be difficult, because now we have over 140 parties here.

"We have lived for almost 70 years in a one-party state. That is why things easily develop in this sort of way now that we are making a start on democracy," said Vladimir Tevdoradze, a member of the green movement.

What is perhaps remarkable is the fact that one of the most popular parties are the monarchists. They want to restore Georgia's old monarchy, which they consider to be the oldest in the world.

"We are a conservative party and we have very strong support. Georgia is a very conservative society," party leader Temur Shorsholiani said.

The party advocates a constitutional monarchy on British lines. The claimant to the throne who will be King Giorgio XIV lives in Spain.

"We have regular contacts with him and we have received a positive response from him," Shorsholiani assured me.

No one is worried by the serious ethnic antagonisms inside the tiny Georgian "empire." Abkhazians, Ossetians, and other minorities feel threatened by Georgian nationalism—and there have been many clashes.

"Everything will sort itself out," the Georgians say—generally with the warm smile of people who live in warm climes.

Georgia's National Forum Opens Congress

90US1024A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 25 May 90 p 4

[Chronicle of events of the National-Liberation Movement by Georgiy Nadareishvili]

[Text]**The Congress: Day One**

On 23 May in Tbilisi the General National Congress of Georgia began its work in the Sports Palace. About 6,000 delegates are participating. The idea of convening this forum arose in March of this year at the Extraordinary Conference of the republic's National-Liberation Movement.

The current meeting is designed to be an important step in the struggle for restoration of the independent statehood of our republic. Theoretically it should provide answers to a multitude of disturbing questions. The forum agenda includes analysis of the sociopolitical situation which has come about in the republic, determination of the functions of the National Congress, confirmation of regulations on elections to the National Congress, etc.

It is significant that present at the National Congress are Abkhaz, Ossetians, Azeris, Armenians, Greeks—representatives of all ethnic groups living in Georgia. In giving the blessing to the congress, the Most Holy and Blessed Ilya II, Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia spoke of "the ability to have good relations with representatives of all nationalities granted the Georgian people from above." At the same time he noted that "mutual understanding must reign first and foremost among us, the Georgians..."

Alas, consolidation has truly become the Achilles heel of the National-Liberation Movement of Georgia. It is a complex matter to overcome the split between political organizations comprising the National Forum which arose following the exchange of fire on Rustaveli Avenue, a sad incident which has cast a shadow over the entire national movement of Georgia. But there is no other way. A call for consolidation of all sound forces which place the interests of Georgia above their own resounded the first day of the congress in almost every presentation. Addressing the congress were Irakliy Tsereteli (National Independence Party), Georgiy Chanturiya (National-Democratic Party), Teymuraz Sumbatashvili (National Independence Party), and Ilya Khaindrava (Tbilisi Political Club). Irakliy Kakabadze (Christian-Democratic Association), Dzhansug Charkviani, Eldar Shengelaya, and others participated in the debate.

The speakers addressed the fact that the Georgian nation needs a political leader who will guide it along the true path. They believe the National Congress will subsequently become the entity which expresses the true interests and will of the Georgian people, the main force of consolidation. How true is its path? Three days of

session of the National Congress will provide an answer to this question. In the meantime, it remains for us to support a leading idea of the presentations—that Georgia today needs not "raw" emotions, but judicious actions.

The Congress: Day Two

The session began after a 35-minute delay, at which point I. Tsereteli took his seat in the Presidium. G. Chanturiya presided over this day's session. There were two questions on the agenda—a resolution on the Georgian National Congress and one on the Law on Conduct of Elections to the National Congress. It will be stated straightaway that no discussion of the second document took place since debate on the first matter took up all the time which had been allotted for discussion.

The presiding official informed those present that following the first day's session, representatives of the Georgian People's Front turned in 25 sets of credentials, thereby expressing their attitude toward the congress...

The first half of the day was devoted to welcoming remarks. Addresses were delivered by S. Khutsishvili, A. Dzhavakhishvili, Z. Kapianidze, and G. Kharabadze, who stated in particular that the preelection campaign for the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] conducted by the Georgian People's Front was based on the subjective relationship of the chairman of the organization to those in contention. The speaker went on to warn that this must not be the case with respect to elections to the Georgian National Congress: Democracy and subjectivism are incompatible. N. Natadze was then given the floor. He expressed his personal views on the coming elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and Georgian National Congress, and on their future cooperation on the basis of coordinated effort.... The final address for this portion of the day was given by V. Khomeriki, son of Georgian republic minister N. Khomeriki, today a French subject.

Session break. The Sports Palace is similar to a beehive—delegates gathered here and there. It is difficult to say what the main theme of discussion was, but it seemed to me that many people were disturbed by the fact that the presiding official cut off the microphone from a Tbilisi University student who wanted to refute false—in his opinion—information presented from the podium. This had to do with a meeting which took place 23 May at the university, initiated by "Roundtable" representatives. Another topic of discussion was the withdrawal of a number of parties and organizations from the National Forum...

The break ended. I. Tsereteli acquainted the session with the resolution on the Georgian National Congress. There was practically no quarrel with the general provisions. But now comes a point with regard to elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet.... Whereas everything prior to this went smoothly, this point elicited heated argument... The congress had apparently reached its critical stage.

Speakers posed the question—does it make sense to put such an important document to a vote—on a previously unfamiliar resolution now grasped "by ear"? The presidium replied that for the present just fundamental questions would be voted upon, that stylistic imperfections would be worked on by an editorial commission and any attempt to delay adopted resolutions would be seen as provocation. The principle of existence of the future Georgian National Congress was the subject of long discussion—actually not so much a discussion as an explanation by the presidium to the delegates in attendance...

So as not to confuse the reader, I will try to summarize the debate which took place. So... The future Georgian National Congress is a legislative and coordinative organ only for the National Movement. Its functions are limited to this. At such time when Georgia becomes independent, when 50 percent of the republic population takes part in elections, the National Congress will be authorized to take upon itself the full scope of power. With respect to elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, each party and social organization must itself decide whether or not to participate in them. Following the discussion and adoption of the resolution on this issue, the congress will inform the public of it.

This ends day two of the functioning of the Georgian National Congress. In my view we have not yet seen the victory of pluralism and democracy. And this is understandable—there has been no one to learn from. Again, in my view, we did not see any serious discussion of the resolution. I would like to hope that the experience we have acquired will accrue to the benefit of our overall cause.

Congress Concludes

90US1024B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 26 May 90 p 3

[Chronicle of events of the National-Liberation Movement by Tamaz Lomsadze]

[Text]**The Congress: Day Three**

The concluding day was calmer than the preceding days although one cannot term the matters under discussion less serious than those discussed earlier. Among them were adoption of draft regulations on elections to the National Congress, election of the Coordinating Center of the Georgian National-Liberation Movement, resolution of the issue of the Central Electoral Commission, and the date of elections to the congress.

We will begin with the Coordinating Center, into whose composition Aleksandr Dzhavakhishvili, Akakiy Bakradze, Vakhtang Goguadze, and Merab Aleksidze were personally invited. This entity is conceived as a center for the leadership of the Georgian National-Liberation Movement prior to the beginning of activity of the National Congress. It will consist of three representatives from each party participating in the work of

the congress, three representatives from each social organization—including organizations which unite the non-Georgian population of the republic and creative unions, and 10 representatives of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. The National Forum is an organizational entity of the center. In addition, representatives of those parties which have joined at the Roundtable may be a part of the center if the desire is expressed. The Coordinating Center will elect the Central Electoral Commission.

And now—the most important matter, the regulations on elections to the National Congress. Stormy dispute arose in this area, especially with regard to participation of political parties in both elections to the congress and to the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. And this is understandable. As we know, many parties participated in the congress only after achieving consensus with an irreconcilable opposition. But at the congress itself the question again arose—can a party or a specific individual participate in both elections? At the outset, the attitude toward such a formulation of the question was sharply negative. But after Tbilisi Political Club member Irakliy Machavariani spoke, the opposite point of view prevailed. Voting results made it clear that the absolute majority of congress delegates supported the original proposition. Two things came into play here in my view—first, Machavariani's address, which unlike many others was minimally emotional and highly constructive, well thought-out; and second, the draft roundtable concept recently published played a role. In addition, a consensus was necessary—adoption of another decision could utterly split the parties which had gathered together. Here something happened which many did not expect—Irakliy Tsereteli, leader of the Georgian National Independence Party, declared that the Georgian Communist Party, comprising a good many honest patriots, could also participate in elections to the National Congress. Ignoring them would lead to violation of the democratic principles of the Georgian National Movement.

Further stormy controversy was stirred up by the question as to whether the National Congress should be considered the exclusive—I repeat, exclusive—legal entity expressing the interests of the peoples of Georgia. Opinions were diametrically opposed and the presiding official, Merab Aleksidze, had to exert great effort to reach accord. Although...as became clear later, all the congress delegates were unanimously disposed toward acknowledging the congress as the exclusive legal entity.

Now to say a few words about the regulations on elections. Elections will be conducted simultaneously with a referendum which will express either a vote of confidence or no confidence in the National Congress. The elections will be proportional and direct, accomplished on an equal basis and in secret. All Georgia will comprise a single electoral district. The voters will have to elect 200 people to the congress. The term of office of the National Congress is five years. As Irakliy Tsereteli noted, in the event Soviet occupation troops are withdrawn, the National Congress will take the entirety of authority into its hands. Until that time it will be the legislative and coordinating organ of the National-Liberation Movement. Furthermore, the right to participate in the elections scheduled for 30 September 1990 is afforded to citizens of Georgia who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of nationality, religion, political orientation, etc. The sole restriction is that officers and enlisted men of the armed forces, KGB and internal forces, will not have the right to participate in the elections.

In addition, any party or organization which leaves the Coordinating Center or National Congress will be left outside the National Movement.

Also we must not ignore the fact that Zurab Achba, deputy chairman of the Abkhaz People's Forum "Aydgilara," addressed the congress for the first time. Representatives of the Abkhaz informal movement were present at the congress as observers. This address dealt mainly with the organization's attitude toward the congress. Although it was clear from the general context that the "Aydgilara" position remained essentially as before, one could not help but note constructive elements all the same—in particular, several references to specific steps directed toward rapprochement between the Abkhazian People's Forum and the Georgian National-Liberation Movement. Naturally, the report of provocations occurring in the village of Lidzava evoked special interest on the part of delegates—the House and Museum of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia there was set ablaze. As Zurab Achba reported, "Aydgilara" appealed to law enforcement organs for a thorough investigation and a request that those responsible be punished.

Incidentally, a representative of one of the Azeri societies operating on Georgian territory also made a presentation. The substance of his speech was to the effect that all peoples residing on Georgian land must enter into consolidation with the Georgian National-Liberation Movement—we have no other motherland!

Referring on the whole to the work of the congress, we must not view it in isolation from the actual political situation. There does exist a split in the National-Liberation Movement, and it seems to me that any, even indecisive steps toward reconciliation will run into mutual intransigence. Thus, the roundtable's attitude toward the National Forum, the Coordinating Center, and elections to the National Congress is well known—sharp rejection. The existence today of parallel structures of authority, in the view of Zviad Gamsakhurdia let us say, is not simply a political mistake. For its part the Forum accuses the roundtable of splitting the National Movement. The final minutes of the congress were again filled with attacks upon political rivals. Accusations of splitting again rang out. Emotions again flared up and there was little perception of a mood for dialogue. One could not manage to avoid the feeling that

there was more mass-rally democracy present than parliamentary democracy. This is my personal opinion, of course, and one can argue with it...

Central Asia

Moiseyev at Alma-Ata Officers' Graduation

PM2906150190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Correspondent Colonel A. Ladin report: "Officers' Graduation in Alma Ata"]

[Text] The latest graduation of young officers was held at Alma Ata's Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev Combined Arms Command School. The following took part in the solemn ceremony on V.I. Lenin Square: N. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; K. Baykenov, chairman of Alma Ata City Soviet and first secretary of Alma Ata Party Gorkom [city committee]; and Lieutenant General Yu. Bukreyev, Turkestan Military District chief of staff.

Tension, Disturbances in Temirtau Reported

PM0207090390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent O. Stefashin report: "Situation in Temirtau Uneasy"]

[Text] Karaganda—A major seat of tension has emerged in the metallurgical workers' city of Temirtau. The disturbances provoked by the killing of two students are not abating.

On the evening of 22 June a group of graduates of Temirtau's higher technical school plant started up a drunken brawl in which Azerbaijani residents accidentally found themselves involved. As I have already said, it ended in tragedy: Two Kazakh students were killed, and another two sustained knife injuries.

At first virtually no one in the city attached particular importance to this incident. However, it then began to be surrounded with rumors which lent the incident an interethnic hue. Mobs of excited students poured onto the streets with the intention of getting even with the killers, but they were greeted by militia details. The disturbances did not stop over the following few days.

Tension is not abating. A party obkom [oblast party committee] bureau sitting pointed out that fresh attempts are being made in Temirtau to fuel the conflict and involve labor collectives in it.

Kirghiz Plenum Elects New Officials 15 Jun

LD0107205790 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 16 Jun 90 p 1

[Report: "Information Report on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party"]

[Text] The first plenum of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee elected by the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party was held on 15 June.

A.P. Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, opened the plenum.

The plenum elected A.M. Masaliyev as first secretary and member of the Bureau of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee.

N.M. Chepelev was elected second secretary and member of the Bureau of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, and chairman of hte Central Committee Commission on Issues of Organizational Party and Cadre Work.

M.Sh. Sherimkulov was elected secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee Ideological Commission.

M.I. Paryshkura was elected secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee, and chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Issues of Socioeconomic Development.

A. Zhunusov was elected secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee, and chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Issues of Agrarian Policy.

D.B. Amanbayev, A. Dzhumagulov, R.V. Zolotareva, V.K. Kandakov, R.S. Kulmatov, M.O. Madaliyev, U. Sidikov, and U.K. Chinaliyev were elected members of the Central Committee Bureau.

E. Abakirov, D. Asankulov, E. Duysheyev, and T. Tabyldiyev were elected candidate members of the Central Committee Bureau.

The plenum confirmed T. Ishemkulov as editor of SOVETTIK KYRGYZSTAN.

Taking part in the work of the plenum were N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, and V.I. Ivanenko, a senior worker at the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum has finished work.

Continued Osh Oblast Tension Reported

PM0207083590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[IZVESTIYA correspondent Andrey Orlov report: "Tension Persists"]

[Text] Tashkent—The tension continues in Osh Oblast, particularly in Uzgen.

It is being fed by rumors circulated here and passed on to Andizhan Oblast. A group of inhabitants from Dzhalalkudukskiy Rayon submitted an alarming report to Militia Major General G. Rakhimov, commandant of the territory where the state of emergency is in force, saying that people are arming themselves.

"We visited the localities and kolkhozes [collective farms] and refuted the false rumors that are kindling enmity," G. Rakhimov told me. "Law-enforcement personnel are persuading the inhabitants to voluntarily surrender the weapons which some people are holding illegally.

A total of over 100 illegal firearms have been confiscated from the population.

Tajikistan Reduces Publications Frequency, Size

PM2906102990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Karpov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Newspapers on Starvation Rations"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has adopted a decision to reduce the frequency of publication of republic, city, and department newspapers.

For an indefinite period, subscribers to KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, TODZHIKISTONI SOVETI, and SOVET TODZHIKISTONI will receive newspapers four times a week instead of six times, and the two Dushanbe evening newspapers—in Tajik and Russian—will appear three times a week instead of five. The weeklies OMUZGOR (TEACHER) and ADABIYET VA SANAT (LITERATURE AND ART) will be halved in size. The reason—the critical paper situation. Paper stocks at the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee publishing house depots now are just one-tenth of the normal figure.

"The reduction in the number of issues per week and the size of publications is an enforced measure," V. Ruzanov, deputy chief of the Central Committee Ideology Department, explained. "This will make it possible to avoid complete disruption of the publication of periodicals in general, and while the 28th CPSU Congress is at work in particular."

Tajikistan Small-Scale Hydroelectric Plant Viewed

PM2906124190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by K. Kukharenko and S. Dzheglov, identified by caption]

[Text] [Correspondent] The Takob GES [hydroelectric power station] has produced 4 million kilowatt-hours of electricity to date. The history of this power station is unusual. Built in 1948 on a small river, it was closed down when cheaper electricity from the Nurek GES started arriving in the republic's power system. It remained inactive for 12 years.

The current new thinking and departure from gigantomania have also brought about a new approach to power industry development in Tajikistan. Interest in small-capacity power stations is being revived in the republic. And so power industry workers have again focused on the Takob GES.

"Daryo," a cooperative especially set up for this purpose, took only a year to restore equipment and start up two power units with a rated capacity of 1,500 kw, thus providing the station with a new lease of life, so to speak. And here is the result. The station supplies up to 50 percent of the energy requirements of the Takob fluorspar combine in winter and up to two-thirds of requirements during the summer, which means that the enterprise uses correspondingly less electricity from the main power system, leaving more for the numerous other consumers.

Allow me to add that the Takob GES is a profit-making enterprise. A staff of nine ensures its operation around the clock.

[B. Sirozhev, director of the "Tadzhikenergo" production association, identified by caption] We have drawn up a large-scale plan for the utilization of small rivers in Tajikistan. It provides for the commissioning of some 40 small GES's. We are building new ones and restoring old ones that have fallen into disrepair. The problem is that capital investments per kilowatt of rated capacity are 10 times higher on small stations than on the average station. That is the first point. And second, there is the lack of automated equipment for small stations. Running costs are too high. You cited the example of the Takob GES, with a staff of nine. That is too much. We believe that small GES's should be fully automated, with service personnel merely checking equipment from time to time.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 25 Jun

LD2906125890 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek 0115 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] In the Presidium of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, SSR, Supreme Soviet. On 25 June a sitting of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was held. Ibragimov, the republic's Supreme Soviet chairman,

chaired the sitting. Information of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission on the investigations of the circumstances and the consequences of the massive disturbances in some districts of the Parkent Rayon on 3 March 1990, which was delivered by (Irazhayev), the deputy chairman of the commission, was heard. Ruzmatov, first secretary of the Parkent political committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan; Gusev, the first deputy of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Republic; Mamarasulov, people's deputy of the USSR, the chairman of the Tashkent city soviet of the people's deputies, first secretary of the Tashkent Oblast Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party; (Oripov), deputy chairman of the [words indistinct] procurator of the Uzbek SSR; (Shozin) the procurator of the military procurator's section of the Turkestan military district; Mirkasymov, people's deputy of the USSR, the chairman of the Committee for People's Supervision of the Uzbek SSR; (Almaatov) the head of the Taskhent city executive committee for management of internal affairs; (Volkov) the deputy of the Tashkent city executive committee for management of internal affairs; the chairmen of the committees of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR; and other people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR.

A decision was made to send the materials of the commission to the procurator of the republic, certain military procurators of the Turkistan Military District for adopting the corresponding measures. The presidium approved the decision made by Mamarasulov, the chairman of the Tashkent Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, that the question on the events in Parkent Rayon and measures for the elimination of the causes and after-effects be put foward for a collective examination at the scheduled session of the oblast soviet. The executive committee of the Taskent Oblast Soviet has been instructed to put forward a proposal to the Council of Ministers of the republic on the socioeconomic development of the Parkent Rayon.